

**STRATEGIC REALITIES IN IRREGULAR CONFLICT**

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January 10, 2013

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## FORWARD

The United States has engaged with the problems of irregular conflict throughout its history. Since the end of the Cold War, irregular conflicts of various types have become more frequent—and the difficulties of successful resolution have become manifest. CNA has sought to provide analysis and insights that contribute to achieving the goals of the United States, it allies and partners in such conflicts.

This book arose from one such effort. Along with the National Defense University and the United States Institute of Peace, CNA hosted three workshops in 2011 and 2012 that dealt with different aspects of irregular conflict. The first workshop on “International Security Reform: Integrating Authorities, Budgets, Operations, and Training/Education” was held on May 19, 2011. The workshop panels focused on “Authorities and Governance,” “Integrating at International Level,” and “DoD Training/Education for Building Capacity for Integrated Comprehensive Approach.” The second workshop on “International Security Reform: Preventing and Responding to Crisis and Conflict” was held on September 26, 2011. The panels were on “Core Missions--Embracing Conflict Prevention and Response as a Core Mission,” “Operations--Conflict Prevention and Conflict Response,” and “Planning; Education and Training.” The third workshop on “New Approaches to National Security Strategy/ Complex Operations” took place on January 24, 2012. The panels covered “Understanding Culture and Social Psychology’s Influence on Effective Governance,” “Building on Host Nation Strengths in Irregular Conflicts,” and “Innovative Tools for Building Stability and Sustainable Peace.” Numerous experienced practitioners participated in the workshops, and keynote speakers were former National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley and Ambassador Thomas Pickering.

Each of the authors in the book participated in one or more of the workshops. Their chapters benefited from the workshop discussions. There are no easy answers to resolving an irregular conflict, but this book provides a framework for those who must plan and implement a strategy as well as those who are involved in generating the institutions, education and training that will help the United States engage as effectively as possible. In the recent defense strategy, “Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” the Secretary of Defense underscored that “U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations .” This book undertakes to develop and illuminate those lessons, and includes a significant focus on the civilian side of the equation as well as on the challenges of dealing with a host nation that, by definition, is undergoing traumatic stress.

Irregular conflict will never be easy, but our objective is that it can be successful, and that proper analysis can aid in that goal.

ROBERT J. MURRAY  
President and CEO  
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## **SECTION 1**

### **INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW**

## Chapter 1

### Setting the Stage: Key Issues and Questions

*Franklin D. Kramer*

This book seeks to answer two questions: Why is irregular conflict so hard? Can we do it better? The concept of “strategic realities” applies to both questions. Problems arise in the irregular conflict arena that generally do not arise in either conventional conflict or classic development, yet irregular conflict also requires understanding each of those domains—and something more besides. When we undertake responses to an irregular conflict, we do so with organizations that are designed, educated, and trained for other purposes. Jerry-rigged solutions can work and sometimes have, but success usually comes only because of stellar ad hoc efforts, and not because of a focused systemic approach.

There is no shortage of writing on irregular conflict—Afghanistan and Iraq have made certain of that—but the virtue of this book comes from the experience of those writing it and their willingness to tell it as it is, both problems and proposed solutions. The authors look both into problems faced in and by the host nation and at the United States’ approach to irregular conflict in the field and in the bureaucracy. Beyond description, the authors attempt to meld multiple perspectives and propose solutions that those with experience believe could generate more effective results.

The themes of context and culture arise repeatedly in the following chapters. Understanding and assessing an environment different from ours and with multiple deficiencies—security, governance, economic—is no easy task.

On the response side, integration, education, training, and technology are all highlighted. Changes to the current frameworks are repeatedly called for. Both operational and structural strategies are described.

The book proceeds in three parts: *Strategic Approaches—Operational and Structural; Fundamental Obstacles—and Responses; and Focused Solutions and Strategies*. Because many of the chapters have elements of each, the organization is meant only to be useful, not definitive.

In the *Strategic Approaches* section, the authors focus on how to develop operational and structural strategies in the field:

- Retired Ambassador John Blaney discusses “The Art of Strategy Creation for Complex Situations.” The chapter highlights the complex, non-linear nature of irregular conflict and offers multiple steps for the policymaker and the leader on the ground.
- The next chapter, by Lisa Schirch, details “Lessons Learned in Conflict Prevention: ‘The Whole of Society’ Comprehensive Approach.” The focus is

structural and systems oriented, highlighting, among other things, the need for coordination and the requirement for specialized skills beyond those of the classic diplomat.

The chapters are complementary and offer a sophisticated overview of the issues.

The *Fundamental Obstacles—and Responses* section, focuses on key contextual obstacles and the roles of culture, social structure, corruption, psychology, and economics:

- Stacia George describes “The Impact of Culture on Complex Operations,” pointing out that “many critical errors in complex operations can be linked to not understanding the dynamics of local culture; conversely, some great successes have resulted from leveraging knowledge of local culture.”
- Michael Dzeidzic discusses “Designing a Remedy for Illicit Power Structures: The Hidden Center of Gravity for Stabilization and Peace Operations.” This is one of the chapters that overlaps the obstacle/solution division and both describes the problem and makes recommendations concerning intelligence and police force capabilities.
- Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, describes “The Centrality of the Rule of Law: Lessons on Corruption from Iraq.” The focus is on “grand corruption” and the need for the development of transparency, accountability, and effective institutions and actions undertaken from the earliest point of outside engagement.
- Rosa Brooks writes on “Lessons from Social Psychology for Complex Operations,” describing how the “issues of obedience, conformity, and group polarization . . . can affect and distort individual behavior.”
- William Rosenau, in “Reconsidering ‘Nation-Building Under Fire’,” discusses the impact of resource constraints and the “limitations” posed on responses to irregular conflict.

In the *Focused Solutions and Strategies* section, the focus is on what works and what needs to be changed to accomplish results:

- Retired Ambassador Ronald Neumann writes on “The Hole in Whole of Government Needs Leadership and Learning Organizations,” offering recommendations on the need for cultural depth when providing technical solutions as well as the importance of revising civilian in-country efforts, including tour lengths.



- John Inns discusses “Culturally Sensitive Capacity Building” based on his experiences in Afghanistan and how to reach effectively across cultural divides while providing critical managerial, organizational, and technological assistance.
- Karim Merchant and Lisa Schirch write of “Formal and Informal Governance in Afghanistan: Cultural Perceptions” and how “inadequate Western understanding of non-state-based governance has been a significant limitation for developing effective strategies.” Looking beyond the Western paradigm is a key element.
- Sandra Hodgkinson describes “U.S. Efforts to Enhance Domestic Capabilities through Justice Sector Development,” keying on the critical role of the rule of law and focusing especially on the importance of developing the host nation domestic legal capacity.
- John Agoglia turns the focus toward the United States and proposes “Systematizing a Holistic Approach for Education and Training on Conflict Prevention, Stabilization, and Reconstruction.” Key aspects include an interagency approach, systematic lessons learned collection and dissemination, and a single executive agent to organize the process.
- Beth Cole discusses “A ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to Conflict Prevention and Stability Operations: Challenges for the Future.”
- Retired Ambassador Robert Beecroft considers “Is Diplomacy a Profession?” and emphasizes the need not only for training but also systematic professional education.
- Franklin Kramer analyzes “Irregular Conflict: Critical Reforms in Integration, Capabilities and Education” with a series of recommendations that can leverage capacities and be implemented even in a budget austere environment.
- Melanne Civic writes on “Two Sides of the Coin: Integrating Civilian and Military Surge Capacity for Stability Operations,” including the use of National Guard and Reserve personnel.
- Nancy Nugent and Sherri Goodman discuss “Facilitating Leadership: The Comprehensive Approach in an Age of Uncertainty,” with a focus on an integrative civil-military approach in-country and greater use of technological capabilities including social media.
- Steven Gale and James Ehlert describe “Tools for Peace: The Emerging Role of Science and Technology” and discuss social media, geographic information systems, mobile phones, and information communications technology.

In the concluding section, Franklin Kramer writes on “Integrating Strategic Realities into Strategy,” describing how, even in the face of the complexity of irregular conflict, the opportunities for success can be enhanced when policy-makers understand and take into account the importance of culture; multiple factors in the host nation, such as corruption and illicit power structures; the criticality of integrated assessments, planning, and operations; and the keys to leveraging, including the role of education and training and technology.

The object of the book is to present these ideas for consideration and evaluation. The authors hope that those ideas that are found valid find their way into effective approaches to implementation in irregular conflicts in which the United States is involved.

## **SECTION II**

### **STRATEGIC APPROACHES: OPERATIONAL AND STRUCTURAL**

## Chapter 2\*

### The Art of Strategy Creation for Complex Situations

*John Blaney*<sup>†</sup>

*“All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved”.*

Sun Tzu (c. 500 B.C.)

Attaining peace and stabilization in complex situations truly is a wicked problem.<sup>1</sup> Just one subset of complex situations, those having to do with irregular conflict, contains great variation—from peacekeeping or stability operations, to counterinsurgency campaigns, and can morph back and forth from one to the other. More broadly, complex situations include dealing with non-conflict calamities as well, such as natural disasters, and, increasingly, with prevention strategies.

Each case is unique because of a host of important factors—such as history and geography—as well as more dynamic ones like the nature of the crisis, socioeconomic factors, power relationships, the external factors involved, governance variations, and differing political situations. Furthermore, operating in permissive environments versus non-permissive ones is a major differentiator when dividing types of complex situations. Non-permissive environments understandably tend to be dominated by security priorities. And, complicating things even more, it is usually *how* permissive an environment is, not whether it is entirely permissive or completely non-permissive.

The type, nature, and goals of complex situations vary greatly. For example, in situations such as a tsunami or an earthquake, donors provide rapid assistance to substitute for inadequate local

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\*NOTE: This chapter was written prior to the 2012 violent outbreaks in Libya and other Arab Spring countries.

<sup>†</sup> This chapter is based in part on a keynote speech made by the author at an interagency conference of the Government of Australia on August 12, 2011, and his remarks at the United States Institute of Peace on September 12, 2011. The views herein are personal and strictly his own.

<sup>1</sup> The CogNexus Institute posts on its website, <http://cognexus.org/id42.htm>, a typical definition of a wicked problem: “A wicked problem is one for which each attempt to create a solution changes the understanding of the problem. Wicked problems cannot be solved in a traditional linear fashion, because the problem definition evolves as new possible solutions are considered and/or implemented. The term was originally coined by Horst Rittel. Wicked problems always occur in a social context—the wickedness of the problem reflects the diversity among the stakeholders in the problem.”

capacity. A counterinsurgency or stability campaign, however, usually involves a longer-term commitment with more complex goals, including local institution building, even nation-building, and where local buy-in is much more important.<sup>2</sup>

Because of wide circumstantial variation, there is unfortunately no cookie-cutter strategy, no single paradigm, no set sequencing of actions, nor one formula that will serve as a blueprint for handling such a broad universe of complex situations. Even the beginning of action sequencing, necessary to address complex situations, inevitably varies. Not even the establishment of security as the essential first step of any stabilization sequence, an assertion voiced constantly, is always the correct initial move.

In Liberia in mid-2003, for example, diplomacy moved on the ground to end the war on the battlefield before security was established. The situation changed from violent chaos into something that was still a complex and dangerous mess, but more manageable. West African peacekeeping forces then moved in permissively to separate the combatant parties, secure the ground, and keep the war stopped. Had they tried to move in before battlefield diplomatic actions were taken, the African peacekeepers would have become another combatant party, which is exactly what they expected to happen.<sup>3</sup>

### **Non-Linearity of Complex Situations**

Not only does correct sequencing of measures vary case-by-case in complex situations, but handling such situations on the ground is decisively not a linear experience. Problems are rarely resolved permanently. They are seemingly solved, but then appear again and again or morph into new problems. In fact, those who try to deal with such complex situations will be doomed to failure if they try to address the spectrum of issues facing them seriatim, that is, one-by-one. Leaders must “multitask” and create positive movement along many fronts at once, all of them having differing objectives and timelines.

For example, in Liberia, after ending the war, the United States (U.S.) was simultaneously doing large-scale humanitarian relief; trying to keep firefights from restarting the war; planning for the arrival of badly needed United Nations (UN) peacekeepers; securing resources for upcoming disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of combatants; working on

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
<sup>2</sup> See *Civil Power in Irregular Conflict*, edited by Kramer, Dempsey, Gregoire, and Merrill, CNA, January 12, 2010.

<sup>3</sup> In mid-2003 the West African group of countries, known as ECOWAS, initially deployed into Liberia small vanguard units as part of its “ECOMIL” force. ECOMIL played a key role in stopping the fighting and helped set the stage for the departure of then-President of Liberia, Charles Taylor. A few months later, United Nations peacekeepers arrived to further stabilize Liberia. Years earlier, ECOWAS deployed a force into Liberia known as “ECOMOG,” which quickly became a combatant party. In 2003, had ECOMIL become a combatant party, the fighting likely would have continued indefinitely as a four-way struggle—that is, the forces of Charles Taylor, the fighters from two separate rebel armies (i.e. LURD and MODEL), and ECOMIL.

returning home displaced Liberians and refugees; striving desperately to somehow restart a dead Liberian economy; supporting an election still 18 months away as later stipulated in Liberia's Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and much more. It was a spectrum effort, conducted by remarkably few personnel.

In such complex situations, linear thinking, including graphs (such as the one below) that move so seductively from war to peace can be misleading<sup>4</sup>

## The Comprehensive Approach: Relative Military vs. Civil Level of Effort




<sup>4</sup> *The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel*, Stephen J. Hadley, William J. Perry, et al. United States Institute of Peace, page 36.

## An Art, Not a Science

The key to the art, not the science, but the art, of strategy creation is to design a multipronged, simultaneous approach tailored to each individual case, and then be flexible as circumstances change—and they will.

More dynamic and complex is this second, deceptively simple looking diagram, which is closer to reality than a linear depiction.<sup>5</sup> The intent is to depict how all activities affect all others and the overall success or failure of the outcome. Security, of course, has a vital function (i.e. as the “shell”), providing necessary structural integrity to a highly dynamic process.

## TRANSITION “EGG”



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<sup>5</sup>Created by the author in 2009. The composition of the “shell” of security gradually changes from external actors into indigenous security institutions, and it holds the egg together. Money is the answer to the question, “what incubates the egg?” No depiction is perfect, and this one is intended mostly to challenge many standard ones that move linearly, usually from war to peace through time, from left to right.

## **Here and There, the Past and the Future**

With so much emphasis on the uniqueness, non-linearity, and varying types of situations encountered, an important dilemma presents itself: How transferrable is the role of doctrine, best practices and lessons learned from one complex situation to another and from past cases to future ones? After all, this area of knowledge is quite unlike the sciences, such as chemistry. This is about dealing with very different human beings of various contexts and cultures, consisting of many and changing variables. So, doing the same thing in one place, or the same sequence of actions done previously and successfully but in another situation and time, will often get very different results, and even produce failure.

Is this analysis therefore an expression of nihilism? Not at all, it is rather one of realism. Freedom to conceptualize strategy is crucial, albeit that that process should not be done unschooled or recklessly. Conceptual thought should be tempered, but not bound, by knowledge of doctrine, of the past, and of lessons learned.

Doctrine, the study of best practices, and lessons learned are all useful, but only as suggestive guidelines, not as recipes in a strategic cookbook. They will greatly stimulate thinking in creative leaders faced with new complex situations, but they should not be seen as conceptually binding handcuffs.

Indeed, the secret ingredient to the art of strategy creation is people—more specifically, smart leaders and their advisers, especially those on the ground who are both trained and able to visualize creatively and holistically when faced with new problems or even seemingly familiar ones, but in differing contexts. Having knowledgeable, interdisciplinary, flexible-thinking, creative cadres is so important.

Furthermore, there are some important cognitive guidelines that can help leaders create better strategy. Moreover, systematic review of the architectural elements of strategy can also help ensure success.

## **Simplification—an Axiom for Success**

Ironically perhaps, one of the most important guidelines when formulating strategies is to seek ways to make complex situations less complex. One, albeit imperfect analogy, would be to think of complex situations as being like the old game, “pick-up sticks.” The winner of this game is the person who can remove all the tangled sticks, one at a time, without disrupting a complex pile of them. In other words, the winner wins by careful simplification of a complex problem. Although complex situations require simultaneous actions along several fronts, not seriatim like this game, much attention should be given to the guideline of simplification. For example, in wartime Liberia in 2003, peace was never going to be achieved without the exit of then-President Charles Taylor. As that simplification of the situation was in process, it then became possible to



consider what to do to actually stop the fighting. When a fragile battlefield ceasefire held, a further simplification was pressed home—geographic separation of the three warring armies, with permissive injection of African peacekeepers between them. Later on, Liberia’s still dangerous situation was simplified again by the UN disarmament of the combatant parties.

### **Causality and Leadership**

Moving from complex situations to less complex ones should also help guide leadership methodologies and styles. In truly chaotic situations, causal relationships do not render consistent, logical outcomes. In such circumstances, it may be necessary for leaders to push boldly ahead without knowing precisely what will happen. If the situation becomes calmer, simpler, and more predictable, an effective leadership practice is often to build a web of peacemakers, and play a less unilateral leadership role.<sup>6</sup>

Forming or rebuilding contact groups, working more with allies, non-governmental organizations and indigenous groups—building a peace web—can all help counter those who seek instability or a return to war.<sup>7</sup> It is not surprising, but unfortunate, that many U.S. diplomats and seemingly other leaders do not alter their leadership styles much regardless of the changing nature and complexity of the situations they face.

### **The Elements of Strategy Creation for Complex Situations**

Complementing such cognitive guidelines is a set of important elements to consider when creating strategy for differing situations. Of course, not all of them will apply universally. Indeed a complete list of elements to consider when creating strategy for a particular complex situation has to vary. Nevertheless, here are some considerations that are fundamental to successful strategy creation in many situations.

#### **First: Understand, discuss candidly, and frame the real strategic problems at hand**

For example, the problems in much of the Middle East and South Asia today have everything to do with religion, schisms within Islam, with the Middle East Peace Process’ lack of resolution, nuclear weapons, asymmetrical warfare, terrorism, and energy, as well as with pent-up repression, ethnic issues, national fragility, poverty and much more. Yet, there is often a tendency to over-simplify and assess strategic progress on these highly complex, interlocking issues by focusing too much on shorter-term, tactical metrics. For example, where are the

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<sup>6</sup>See David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” *Harvard Business Review* (November 2007). The extrapolation of this work to complex stabilization situations has been made by the author, based upon earlier experiences, and does not necessarily represent the views of Drs. Snowden and Boone.

<sup>7</sup>See Steven Goldsmith and William D. Eggers, *Governing by Network*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2004). The extrapolation of this work to complex stabilization situations has been made by the author, based upon earlier experiences, and does not necessarily represent the views of Messrs. Goldsmith and Eggers.

Taliban's military positions? Were they pushed back by the troop surge? How many leaders of Al Qaeda have been killed?

Yes, killing Bin Laden and again pushing back the Taliban were important and heroic actions. These actions, however, are tactical accomplishments, ones that should only be parts of comprehensive country-by-country and regional strategies.

Similarly, the so-called "Arab Spring" countries are in the midst of differing, fluid, and uncertain processes where outcomes may not end up as democratic as the initiators had hoped. The overall strategic problem for the West in some of these countries may be how best to approach politically, strategically, ideologically, economically, and theologically the rise of political Islam. This approach would include the key issue of pluralism in these societies as well as protecting the range of Western political and economic interests.

But NATO withdrew from Libya on October 31, 2011, after its military successes, seemingly without a clear follow-on strategy in place. What comes next in Libya? How likely is it that the Libyans will be able to sort out everything themselves? In fact, how many Libyans regard themselves as Libyans and do not affiliate more closely with their tribe or clan? What constructive, coordinated positive roles can foreign countries or organizations play without crossing Libyan perceptual boundaries of cultural hegemony?

How are challenges to stability and arms control going to be met in Libya? How clearly defined is the role of the United Nations? How and when will disarmament be conducted? Will security sector reform be properly shaped? How will institutional capacity deficits be addressed? Can outside mediation be injected into unstable situations without being viewed as interference? Will the new Libya permit pluralism? Will there be free elections? How will economic stabilization (particularly employment) be quickly addressed? And, how can the West best pursue its interests and relations with Libya?

A successful strategy must include understanding, candid discussion, and joint framing of the full set of problems and threats at hand, with whole of government participation. Allies, international institutions and others should be included in this joint visionary process of strategy creation whenever possible. Strategy must also be developed on time, avoiding policy vacuums and event drift. Without strategy, military missions may be victorious, but gains from them risk becoming only tactical successes that are ephemeral.

## **Second: "Is the Game Worth the Candle?"<sup>8</sup>**

One of the major, unsung reasons why the empire of the Soviet Union collapsed is that it was broke. Its economic construction was not guided by efficiency, but rather by the Communist Party's obsession for political control over the highly diverse groups of peoples comprising the USSR. Economically, the Soviet Union became chronically and increasingly inefficient.

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<sup>8</sup> The original quotation is probably: "The candle is not worth the game." This may be an old French saying about the merits of playing a card game by candlelight.

Furthermore, as a command economy, it skewed lavish resources towards its military and space programs. As a result, the fabric of the rest of the Soviet economy was feeble. In the long run, the Soviet Union's economy rusted to a halt and collapsed, despite belated efforts to reform it.<sup>9</sup> Because of the vast systemic and other differences between the West and the USSR, comparisons must be made with great care. The same is true when comparing the Soviet Union and communist China. However, one thought is particularly nagging.

No society has limitless resources (i.e., military, economic, social, and political), not even the United States. Every campaign launched will impact across-the-board on the country undertaking that endeavor. Thus, every country must accurately assess, insofar as possible, the costs and benefits involved in each complex situation—before commitment. Conflict or just involvement in complex situations can be very costly, is usually longer than anticipated, and often weakens militarily, economically, politically, and socially the fabric of those countries repeatedly addressing such situations.

In some cases, such as going into Afghanistan after 9/11 or America entering WWII after Pearl Harbor, not much time needed to be spent considering whether the threshold for U.S. involvement had been met. However, in most cases, the course of action to take is much less clear.

Some of the factors to consider are: How important is this situation to U.S. and allied interests? How much capacity is available to deal with the situation, including what is going on or likely to happen elsewhere? How much is commitment likely to cost (e.g., in lives and financially)? Who else will share the burden? What is the capacity of the prospective host country, including people and resources, to help deal with its own situation? What sort of partner would the host country make, and will it struggle and fight well to achieve victory? What third parties would likely become involved or be affected, how are they likely to react, and what are the likely consequences? What is the likely duration of the situation, and how and when will it be concluded? What will be considered a win? How will the U.S. and its allies exit? Domestically, how much durable political support is there for involvement?

It should not be assumed that the consequences of U.S. involvement in situations are always estimated beforehand accurately and carefully. In fact, from the American Civil War, to Vietnam, and into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the duration and costs of resolving wars or complex situations seem to have been chronically underestimated.<sup>10</sup> Although opinions vary sharply on whether each U.S. engagement was worth its associated costs, the point is that, whenever possible, a better job needs to be done estimating likely total costs and benefits (i.e., military, political, social, and economic) before commitments are made.

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<sup>9</sup> For an eyewitness account, see Blaney and Gfoeller, "Lessons from the Failure of Perestroika," *Congressional Quarterly*, Volume 108, Number 3, pp. 481-496. 1993.

<sup>10</sup> The initial conscription for the Army of the Potomac was just three months, which reflected the widely shared expectation that the Civil War (1861-1865) would not last long. In the early days of Vietnam, the prevailing Washington view was that it would take only a matter of months for the U.S. to win the war.

### **Third: Recognize the importance of the content of any peace agreement and UN resolutions in complex situations**

In cases involving conflict and perhaps peacekeeping operations, the contents of peace agreements often determine what intervening outsiders are allowed to do. For example, how much sovereignty has a host country ceded to outsiders in order for them to work through underlying issues or not? How much design and architecture is in a peace agreement to chart the way forward, or are there too many missing pieces? Will there be an interim government established, and for how long? If an election is needed, is it specified? How much capacity will the interim government likely have in order to move pending issues forward? Is reform of the security sector adequately covered?

If the peace agreement involved does not generally chart the way forward, the parties to it will likely find it difficult to make progress and may have a falling out. Incomplete, ambiguous, poorly designed, or even overly specific peace agreements are quite common.<sup>11</sup>

Similarly, success or failure in handling complex situations is often determined by the nature and quality of UN resolutions. For example, mandate differences between Article VI and Article VII Security Council resolutions often decide what the international community and its peacekeepers are allowed to do in a host country. In short, the shoe must fit the foot it is trying to contain and manage.

### **Fourth: Embrace the need to capture and maintain momentum**

Seldom is stabilization attempted in a benign environment. In fact, that environment is usually a highly dynamic and perilous one where, initially, those pushing for peace and stability, often led by outsiders, must set the agenda. Incredibly, this is perhaps the most overlooked element of strategy creation.

If those on the side of peace and stability simply wait to see what happens, ceding momentum to others who would undercut such efforts, control will soon evaporate or shift to the enemies of peace. Leaders must habitually think ahead of the present, sometimes even take risks to keep things on course, and ensure control over the tempo of events.

The current, dominant thinking is that indigenous people should lead the way in the myriad problem-solving actions necessary for stabilization and peace. Yes, local involvement, local buy-in, and, eventually, local ownership are all indeed critical. But, especially in the initial phases of spectrum stability operations, leaders must not stand around and await a consensus of the locals on what to do next.

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<sup>11</sup> See *Interim Governments Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy*, edited by Guttieri and Prombo, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 2007.

Remember, outsiders usually come into a country, which is thereby surrendering part of its sovereignty, because something is seriously wrong, and the locals cannot fix it themselves, and they do not have all the answers. If they had answers, outsiders would probably not be there. It is unfortunate that momentum is not emphasized when making peace as it is when making war or in sports. Think of a tennis match; how important is momentum? Winning and securing peace is similar. In particular, programmatic momentum is a big part of securing, controlling, and setting agendas for the future.

This point could be illustrated by recalling well-known recent programmatic gaps where positive momentum for stability was lost and even reversed, such as occurred in Iraq after the initial Coalition military take-down of Saddam Hussein's forces in 2003. A positive example, however, will serve just as well.

In Liberia in 2003, urged by the U.S. Ambassador (the author), the UN commenced disarmament quickly, even as occasional fire-fights still occurred, knowing that there were not many UN peacekeepers on the ground. Indeed, a serious riot broke out at the first UN disarmament operation in December 2003. There was criticism from armchair pundits in both New York and Washington, even though the riot had been planned by the chains of command of those forces being disarmed, and would have occurred at any time disarmament commenced.

What these critics failed to grasp, however, is the importance of momentum in situations like this one. By launching disarmament quickly, the attention of tens of thousands of armed fighters turned from restarting the war in Liberia to "WIIFM," or, "What's In It For Me?" They wanted money for their weapons, and the first cracks in the chains of command of the fighters appeared. Although the UN's Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) program had to be suspended for a time, some seven thousand AK-47s were collected by the UN during this first outing. Ultimately, total DDRR participation topped 106,000 from three armies. Tactically, it was awkward and somewhat risky to start DDRR so fast, but strategically, doing so was a critical and decisive action that kept up momentum for peace and stabilization.

As disarmament continued, the U.S. in particular was already focused on the next "D," that is, on "Demobilization." Due to funding limitations, the UN could provide only a short period of deprogramming of the fighters, and there was much reason to worry about thousands of ex-combatants just swirling around on the streets with no future. Nobody believed that all the weapons were being turned in, and so there was a palpable fear that ex-fighters would re-arm, go on "Operation Pay Yourself," and eventually restart the war.

The U.S., however, had readied a novel jobs program, modeled after the U.S. Civilian Conservation Corps (i.e., the CCC) of the 1930s. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) implemented the idea rapidly, hiring tens of thousands of ex-fighters from all three armies, and mixing in some other Liberians who had never fought. They got \$2 a day and were sent off throughout Liberia, fixing the roads they had mortared, the bridges they had just blown up, the health clinics they had burned down, and much more. Furthermore, by giving the ex-fighters something concrete to do, a job, and some hope, particularly until more

UN-led reintegration programs could kick in, they were gradually coopted, and the grip of their old chains of command further diminished.

Similar accounts could be given about programmatic and other measures taken to assure retention of momentum during rehabilitation, reintegration, and Security Sector Reform (SSR) operations. Retaining momentum is not just a nicety. Pauses are literally deadly.

**Fifth: Make the state's achieving a genuine monopoly of force a centerpiece of strategy**

Long ago, Max Weber defined the state as, "a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."<sup>12</sup> For many reasons, the nation-state of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is now under greater pressure as the world's primary form of social organization, including its ability to achieve and maintain a monopoly of force. Weber's definition and emphasis is even more important in the 21<sup>st</sup> century than it was when he wrote it. To normalize, or even just stabilize, the state must have a genuine monopoly of force in order to proceed along a number of critical transmission belts leading to stability and eventual normality. Real security sets the stage for institutional capacity building, economic growth and development, societal acceptance and advancement, and is indispensable for the establishment of national sovereignty and legitimacy and all that that conveys.

Among the modern tools available to achieve that monopoly of force in complex situations are DDRR or DDR programs, SSR, cleaning up internal arms and munitions caches, and minimizing exogenous destabilizing interference. Of course, disarming any segment of the citizenry implies a solemn and perpetual obligation to protect those who are disarmed and, therefore, made defenseless.

To be clear, the goal should be to disarm the entire citizenry and make the state free of militias of any sort. Of course, fanatics, religious or political, will rarely allow themselves to be disarmed and view perpetual warfare as their goal. For them, continuation of the struggle is success collectively, and martyrdom is success individually. There will likely be no DDR solutions for such groups. They may have to be eliminated, as part of achieving the state's monopoly of force. It does not follow, however, as is often voiced, that the last insurgent has to be put out of action before any DDR is possible. That is an unfortunate example of linear thinking. DDR may well be possible in more benign parts of a state where the population can be protected. In fact, how likely is identifying and neutralizing remaining insurgents going to be if everyone is allowed to retain arms?

In that regard, a particularly irritating and common assertion, from Bosnia to Afghanistan, is that disarmament of the populace is impossible because the people have a long history and culture of bearing arms that precludes any such action. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, this usually translates into the populace having an inalienable right to own for their "protection" one or more AK-47 rifles.

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<sup>12</sup> See: Weber, Max, "Politics as a Vocation," From Max Weber: *Essays in Sociology*. Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills, editors and translators (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p.77.

Such argumentation is specious. The AK-47 is not some sort of hunting rifle or defensive weapon. It is history's most prolific assault rifle, an inexpensive and deadly machine gun. It is a conventional weapon of mass destruction. There is no lengthy history of the AK-47. It was developed in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Kalashnikov around the end of World War II. In other words, it was invented within living memory.

What happens to lasting stability when the state does not achieve and retain a genuine monopoly of force? Generally, the failure to achieve that monopoly enormously complicates the achievement of stability and normality in countless ways. Examples abound, but, for the sake of illustration, consider Iraq.

There has been heroic progress against hard-core extremists and insurgents in Iraq, but the state still does not have a genuine monopoly of force. That is true not only because insurgency continues, albeit at much lower levels, but also because there have been no sweeping DDR programs in Iraq and not enough limitation of incoming weapons from abroad.

So, where does that leave SSR and other fronts where momentum has to be created and maintained? In other words, how can one be a real policeman in Iraq today and do enough normal "beat cop" work throughout the country so necessary for societal stabilization? How does a policeman tell people to move their cars out of the middle of the road when they likely have AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades? How can there be sustainable and widespread development and institution building when armed, ethnically based militias are intact, extorting and menacing? How does government have enough political cohesion and legitimacy under such circumstances to make key but tough decisions, illustrated so dramatically by the strained Iraqi internal debate on the question and form of a continued U.S. military presence?

How do you prevent external meddling from countries like Iran when guns and more advanced weaponry are pumped regularly across borders, jeopardizing Iraq's achieving a monopoly of force and its sovereignty? What are the prospects for political institutions and the rule of law mediating and controlling multi-ethnic Iraq, when there has been no significant disarmament of the populace?

Tactically, the difficult fight against hard-core extremists, or just insurgents, might suggest in some countries arming militias or ethnic groups. But if done, what are strategic, longer-term trade-offs involved, that is, for achieving national cohesion in such loyalty-shifting societies, which often have not achieved orderly successions of power? Does building up ethnically based armies or police forces really enhance long-term stability and national identity, even if they initially help suppress insurgents?

Good guns are really hard to get back or control once they are passed out. Remember what happened when the Soviet Union collapsed. Weapons from its impoverished military-industrial complex were subsequently sold worldwide. Even in just causes, consider how hard it is going to be to wrangle in the weaponry of Libya, including huge stockpiles "liberated" from Muammar Gaddafi's depots. Whole arsenals are already on the move, and some will likely end up on the

global marketplace for arms. The coup in Mali, fueled by Libyan weaponry, is just the beginning.

Outside countries should think harder before taking extreme actions that support shorter-term objectives, such as those of counterinsurgency, but, in turn, make the longer-term end game mission of attaining sustainable peace, legitimacy, state sovereignty and normalization much tougher and more complex to achieve—or simply impossible. Monopoly of force is a bridge to the future, and it must be fairly complete, strong, and lasting.

### **Sixth: Design sequencing with “boots on the ground”**

In the words of Woody Allen, “Ninety per cent of life is just showing up.”<sup>13</sup> Designing a good game plan while leading from afar is much more difficult, and usually there is no valid reason in the 21<sup>st</sup> century for trying to do so.

Such an observation probably seems like nothing more than common sense, which indeed it is. Surprisingly, however, trying to design and run operations “long distance” is still occurring. Look, for example, at NATO in Afghanistan, which has not adopted a command forward approach. Despite the efforts of so many brilliant electronic innovators and the fervor of younger generations for computers of all sorts, virtual reality will never beat being there.

### **Seventh: Internationalize the problem whenever possible**

The 21<sup>st</sup> century is seeing a host of new problems emerge, with not enough old ones having been put to rest. In fact, this backlog of unresolved situations and issues should be one of the major concerns of this era. Problems are deferred or warehoused, almost frozen, but few are resolved or age well over time. For example, the rapid growth of multilateral peacekeeping operations is worrisome, with many of them existing for many years.<sup>14</sup>

At least 40 nation-states are deemed fragile or worse.<sup>15</sup> From just an economic perspective, the 21<sup>st</sup> century is proving to be a huge challenge for many countries, even the United States. Meanwhile, the total costs of societal defense in modernity—of trying to protect nation-states from irregular warfare and terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, cyber-attack, and a host of other internal political and economic challenges—are astronomical. Particularly for those many countries struggling to develop or those just trying to stabilize and protect themselves, the contemporary reality is that it is much easier to tear down than to build up.

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<sup>13</sup> Although President George H.W. Bush used this same quotation as well, Allen’s exact words to columnist William Safire may have been “Ninety percent of success is showing up.”

<sup>14</sup> A good place to see the impressive totality of ongoing “Multilateral Peace Operation Deployments” is the map of them produced by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at [www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org)

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, *Ensuring Fragile States are not Left Behind*, Summary Report—February 2010, The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Figure 2A, page 3.



In these days of problems growing like hydra's heads, with few of them dispatched permanently, better internationalization of complex situations should be sought whenever feasible. Certainly, more burden-sharing during this era of austerity is one strong reason to seek more multilateral approaches to new and old complex situations. Just as compelling, however, is the need to sustain the political will necessary to engage across so many problems simultaneously, and for increasingly longer periods. Having partners helps here as well.

For example, Liberia was judged to be the worst place in the world in 2003 by *The Economist*.<sup>16</sup> Stopping the war and bringing back Liberia from these depths was a Herculean task, many years in duration, and is still continuing. It was accomplished by the coordinated involvement of many countries and organizations.

An active International Contact Group for Liberia (ICGL) was led by the EC Commission and Ghana, as well as a World Bank-led donors group. Africans provided much of the political muscle, including leadership of the formal peace process and involvement of several heads of state. A huge role was played by West Africa's regional group, ECOWAS, and its vanguard peacekeeper deployment into Liberia (i.e., ECOMIL). Liberia's new government and non-governmental organizations, as well as former combatants and the general population, can also share in the near-miracle of Liberia's escape from hell and ongoing recovery. And, finally, the UN, and especially its mission in Liberia (UNMIL), provided an indispensable follow-on peacekeeping force, which was also the centerpiece and main organizer of many sustained post-conflict operations. The UN and UNMIL in particular deserve a lot of credit for giving Liberia the chance to emerge as potentially one of the greatest turnaround stories of this century.

The United States, of course, played a role, providing the most resources of any single country, and occasionally took the lead in the peace process. The point here, however, is that this success was not a U.S. unilateral operation. Moreover, had it been only a unilateral effort, success would have been unlikely. The U.S., after all, was deeply engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the idea that the U.S. would have pulled Liberia up by itself over the past nine years is farfetched. In sum, the steady political will and shared leadership emanating from a number of countries, groups, and individuals, foreign and indigenous, all on behalf of Liberia, have proven to be synergistic, sustainable, and even inspirational.

Of course, every case is different, and often there will be no way to emulate the multilateral winning approach on Liberia. In particular, navigating the UN is politically tricky, and, even when successfully done, the UN is often slow to act. It also rarely forces peace on the ground, and sometimes only maintains it. There will likely be circumstances when America must act without UN support or approbation, but, even then, experience suggests recruiting as many allies, coalition partners, and others as is possible when undertaking such future endeavors.

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<sup>16</sup> "The World's Worst: Liberia," *The World in 2003*, report published by *The Economist*, November 2002.

### **Eighth: Achieve and assess local buy-in**

One of the main lessons of the Vietnam War was the importance of winning, as it was called then, “Hearts and Minds.” Somewhat paradoxically, as argued previously, it is also important not to lose momentum and become paralyzed awaiting impossible local consensus on what has to be done.

Often there is no way to completely resolve the inherent tension between achieving local buy-in and retaining reasonable momentum and control of events. Both are critical elements of strategy creation and both must be weighed over and over again. In some cases, local buy-in initially may have to be given less emphasis but, even so, must be kept carefully in mind from the beginning.

In fact, assessing the potential for local buy-in should be done carefully before becoming involved. No amount of training and equipping of local forces will succeed without spiritual local buy-in. Indigenous forces, institutions, and the population must be willing to fight for their cause while respecting human rights. Sincere, not rented, local partners are indispensable. If at any time sufficient local buy-in is judged as impossible to achieve, prudence suggests avoiding entanglement or speedy withdrawal.

What to do in order to improve local buy-in will always vary depending on the situation. In general, populations tend to support those that offer them the best alternative. Keeping inflated expectations in check, and meeting promises that are made, also encourages local buy-in.

### **Ninth: Create jobs, jobs, jobs**

Being an insurgent is a job. If you are a teenager, poking at dirt with a stick and someone offers you an AK-47—that’s an upgrade! A young insurgent can then loot the things he has dreamed of, often raping and pillaging without bounds. Poverty breeds insurgency. And, even after peace is made, unemployed ex-fighters are like living nitroglycerin.

According to the Central Intelligence Agency, after more than a decade of Western military and civilian presence, and hundreds of billions of dollars invested, Afghanistan’s roughly 40-percent unemployment rate in 2006 moved only slightly to about 35 percent by 2010.<sup>17</sup> The failure to sufficiently improve employment in Afghanistan amounts to a strategic error. Amazingly, the labor pool for the Taliban and others to cheaply recruit insurgents is still intact.

Even in complex situations where there is no insurgency, economic factors, especially high unemployment, often is the crux of the problem or part of it. Significant job creation can do a lot to resolve rather than warehouse serious societal differences, as the international financial institutions know well. Early multilateral efforts in this area can result in cost-effective conflict prevention.

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<sup>17</sup> *CIA World Factbook*, accurate as of February 19, 2010.

## **Tenth: Worry about the rule of law, fight impunity and corruption, and build honest policing capacity**

These interrelated problems are usually the most enduring ones but are absolutely essential to address. Often, they are swept under the rug in order to achieve local cooperation on shorter-term or counterinsurgency objectives.

But, how can successful SSR be done within the framework of a horribly venal government? How long will trained police stay honest in that environment? Will newly created armies stay loyal when their salaries are skimmed or when they see their own government officials stealing rapaciously?

The international community had to deal dramatically with these issues in Liberia—a deep sea of corruption by the end of the rule of Charles Taylor in 2003. Yet, rather than ignore this host of extreme corruption and rule-of-law problems, a program of detoxification was created to start to free Liberia from its kleptocratic binging.

The heart of the effort was known as the Government Economic Management and Assistance Program (GEMAP). GEMAP was a tough, externally led, dual signature financial control system that tracked Liberia's resources and began the process of making reasonably certain that Liberia's income would be spent on Liberians, not stolen. As testament to its efficacy, the elected government of Liberia volitionally decided to retain the GEMAP system for years after it came to power in 2006 in order to facilitate greater financial transparency.

Of course, corruption anywhere in the world is ameliorated, not eliminated. Important cultural differences and sensitivities must be kept in mind. Generally, however, corruption complicates and deepens the entire range of stabilization problems, whereas progress against corruption is welcomed by most and helps make strategic progress more feasible across-the-board. In sum, dealing with corruption, building rule-of-law institutions, including honest policing capacity, and attacking impunity are all extremely important for lasting strategic success. These areas must not be avoided, but included, in strategy creation and throughout operations on the ground. Regarding corruption as hopelessly endemic is a common and gutless excuse for inaction, which allows the cancer of corruption to weave its way throughout the entire body of a strategy and may eventually kill it.

Unfortunately, it must be noted that most of the parliaments of the world do not want to fund SSR, including reforming police forces needed to help address rampant local corruption. The constituents of many elected Western officials do not like to have funds spent on creating foreign armies or police forces. There is no easy answer to this political problem.

## **Lastly: Show me the money**

Leaders have the responsibility to punch away vigorously in order to try to get enough resources to design programs that can actually be executed and culminate in strategic success. In

particular, leaders in the field should be careful not to allow piecemeal budgeting from afar to create pseudo-strategy on the ground. Sound strategy can create budgets, but budgets alone can never create sound strategy.

Plans that can never be resourced are worse than nothing at all because they take attention away from that which is possible. Particularly in these austere times, determinations on what is realistically needed for success should be made initially, and periodically thereafter. If nothing like the proper means is going to be provided for addressing a complex situation, it is likely a mistake to become involved or to stay engaged.

In sum, these 11 elements of strategy creation for complex situations are not meant to be inclusive of all factors to be considered. For example, the matter of achieving internal whole-of-government collaboration is also critical. So is the process of selecting exceptional leaders for development and implementation of tailored strategies, especially those able to lead on the ground. These issues, however, deserve their own separate and more complete treatments. Although more elements could obviously be added, it is hoped that those facing new complex situations in the future will find this set of elements useful for strategy creation.

## **Conclusion**

The unique character of complex situations defies a single cookie-cutter approach, resists uniform sequencing, cannot be dealt with linearly, and is not always subject to causality, often requiring changing leadership strategies in midstream. These differing contexts often make direct transference of doctrine and past experience tough, but new strategic conceptualization will be greatly enhanced by appreciation of previous lessons learned.

Many factors must be considered when formulating multi-pronged successful strategies that anticipate and endure inevitable change. Generally, simplification of complex situations is helpful.

The quality of the art of strategy creation for complex situations will depend upon having creative, trained leaders and advisers. Those who can visualize holistically, implement tenaciously, adapt rapidly to the new, while drawing upon the old, will fare best.

The elements of strategy creation that have been suggested, like paint colors, should receive careful consideration and blend. Even they, however, cannot capture the universe of possibilities. The composition of each new, successful strategy will be a unique combination and a work of art.

## Chapter 3

### Lessons Learned in Conflict Prevention: The “Whole of Society” Comprehensive Approach

*Lisa Schirch*

Conflict prevention includes a wide range of efforts by diverse actors in government and civil society to address both the immediate and root causes of potentially violent conflicts. Conflict prevention can take place at the local, regional, or national levels before conflict becomes violent. These preventive diplomatic, economic, social, legal, and security sector reform programs address potential sources of instability and violence. Like an immunization, they build up resilience and resistance to the viral spread of violence.


In Somalia, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) facilitate the formation of local water management boards that help competing tribes manage scarce water supplies to help prevent violent clashes. In Kenya, the National Council of Churches uses a strategic communication campaign on billboards and radio shows before an election to urge voters to refrain from electoral violence. In countries like Indonesia, Nigeria, and the United States, local Christian and Muslim religious leaders hold public dialogues to build relationships and commitment that these leaders would join together to make public statements condemning inter-religious violence in the event of a crisis.

Intentional programs to prevent violent conflict over the past two to three decades are beginning to produce initial lessons learned. Many of these programs were “pilot” or exploratory. As with stabilization and other complex operations efforts with similarly short histories, there are few comprehensive research efforts that establish quantitative and qualitative descriptions of conflict prevention impacts. This chapter provides a short summary of five lessons on conflict prevention from global efforts.

#### **Whole of Society and Comprehensive Approach to Conflict Prevention**

Most of the conflict-prevention efforts over the past three decades were one-off programs lacking coordination of different efforts over time. Conflict prevention requires a diverse set of government, military, and civil society stakeholders to harmonize their efforts by building infrastructure for communication and coordination. The U.S. and other countries invest in building institutional capacity for interagency coordination for a more coherent whole-of-government approach. Yet a truly comprehensive approach would require an infrastructure to enable “whole of society” conflict-prevention efforts.

The diagram below illustrates why this comprehensive or “whole of society” approach to conflict prevention is important. Actors at different levels of this pyramid are unique. They have access and sources of power that allow them to contribute toward preventing violent conflict. Yet no stakeholders in this pyramid can prevent conflict alone. Coordination is essential.



Conflict-prevention efforts at the United Nations or by regional organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) or African Union (AU) have had some successes in preventing violent conflict, such as preventive diplomacy in Central America to manage disputes between countries at the earliest stages so as to prevent the violent escalation of conflict.<sup>18</sup> Individual states like the U.S. plan their own conflict-prevention activities in Central America to prevent violent conflict stemming from the flow of weapons and drugs. But some of these efforts lack coordination with the UN or OAS. Meanwhile, on the ground, a wide range of thousands of civil society organizations—ranging from the widely influential Catholic Church to labor unions, universities, and both local and international NGOs—conduct conflict-prevention programs across Central America. But again, these efforts are often invisible to the UN or

<sup>18</sup> See *Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results*. Report of the U.N. Secretary General. New York: United Nations. S/2011/552. August 26, 2011.

countries like the U.S. Moreover, these local actors often understand the root causes of conflict differently than those in the U.S. government. The disparity of conflict assessment leads to conflict between civil society and government approaches to conflict prevention.

At all three levels, diverse groups find it challenging to build horizontal social capital to coordinate with other similar actors. Interagency coordination in the U.S., for example, has proven so challenging and time consuming that it is still a challenge to form a coherent U.S. approach to conflict prevention in a small region like Central America. Given these interagency challenges, it makes it more understandable that vertical social capital or a “comprehensive approach” that links international, national, and local civil society efforts into a “whole of society” effort at conflict prevention is not yet a reality. Yet, conflict prevention requires action taken at all levels. The chart below details the diverse types of activities required to prevent the escalation of conflict in many regions.

| Conflict - prevention levels                               | Examples of programs to address conflict drivers |                            |                         |                                       |                              |  |
|--|--|----------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|--|
|  | Political  | Economic                   | Justice/<br>Rule of Law | Social                                | Safety                       |  |
| UN<br>Regional Orgs.                                       | Preventive diplomacy                             |                            | Judicial reform support |                                       | Preventive peacekeeping, SSR |  |
| Government   |  | Infrastructure development | Structural reforms      |                                       |                              |  |
| Civil Society<br>NGOs,<br>Universities,<br>Religious Orgs, | Linking local, informal governance to state      | Local economic development |                         | Mediation and dialogue between groups | Oversight of SSR             |  |

|      |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Etc. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|------|--|--|--|--|--|--|

There are some positive examples of successful whole of society conflict prevention. Ghana has become a global example of how a country can build a national infrastructure for conflict prevention. For several decades, Ghanaian NGOs such as the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANFP) has worked with local communities to train tribal and village leaders in mediation and conflict transformation skills.

These local peace committees were able to quell violence when tensions began over stolen property, inter-tribal conflicts, or disputes over land. But sometimes the local peace committee could not stop violence from escalating. In 2002, rival tribes beheaded a local king and riots broke out. Civil society groups called upon the government and military to intervene. From this experience, all level of Ghanaian society agreed to develop an infrastructure for conflict prevention. Now enshrined in signed agreements, Ghana’s local peace committees are the first resort if conflicts break out at the local level. If tensions escalate, regional peace teams are sent in to mediate and facilitate communication to address underlying grievances. If these efforts cannot stop the threat of violence, regional teams call upon national-level diplomats and parliamentarians to get involved. The Ghanaian military intervenes only as a last resort. When it does intervene in this final stage, it has then already gained the legitimacy and support from other leaders who consent to military action.<sup>19</sup> Ghana’s success in building a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention paid off during its 2008 elections. A coordinated effort between civil society leaders from NGOs and religious organizations worked with government and police forces to prevent rioting and the type of electoral violence that Kenya experienced.

But in many other contexts, too little trust, respect, or knowledge of civil society prevents government actors from fostering a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention. In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. efforts focused almost exclusively on building state structures. The U.S. approach largely ignored, excluded, or even undermined most local civil society efforts at preventing violent conflict.<sup>20</sup> Partly, this focus on building the Afghan and Iraqi state came from a weak understanding of civil society-state relations. An active local civil society is an indicator of a functioning and democratic state. Civil society organizations (CSOs) work in partnership with the state to complement and supplement its capacity and to hold the state to account for its responsibilities and transparent governance.<sup>21</sup> An active civil society presses a state for transparency and accountability, decreasing opportunities for corruption.

<sup>19</sup> Emmanuel Bombande. “Ghana: Developing an institutional framework for sustainable peace – UN, government and civil society collaboration for conflict prevention.” Joint Action for Prevention: Civil Society and Government. The Netherlands: Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. Pp. 46-54.

<sup>20</sup> *Iraq’s Civil Society in Perspective*. Amman, Jordan: NGO Coordinating Committee of Iraq (NCCI), April 2011.

<sup>21</sup> *High-Level Panel on UN-Civil Society, and Global Governance*, Paper by Panel Chairman Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 2004.



NGOs are a type of CSO. But too often governments think of including only the very large international NGOs rather than consulting with and coordinating with local civil society organizations. Civil society organizations are groups of citizens not in government that organize themselves on behalf of some public interest. CSOs are diverse, including all types of non-profit religious, educational, media, community-based organizations (CBOs), sports, business, artists and trade associations, traditional and indigenous structures, and more. CSOs carry out many conflict prevention activities, including economic development, human rights awareness, security sector reform, and conflict transformation between conflict groups, as well as disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and fostering moderation and coexistence. Some CSOs contribute to a comprehensive approach to countering extremism and terrorism by conducting conflict assessments, providing aid, development, and de-radicalization to vulnerable groups; helping reconcile divided groups; and fostering participatory governance and security sector reform.

Improving government knowledge of local civil society conflict prevention efforts is a first step in developing a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention. Building civil society-state relations and creating an infrastructure for whole-of-society comprehensive approach to conflict prevention is the ultimate goal. But building partnerships for a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention is more than just the logistical challenges inherent in any coordination. The next section addresses wider challenges of governments and civil society differing approaches to conflict prevention.

### **Operational versus Structural Approaches to Conflict Prevention**

The examples of successful whole of society conflict prevention are few and far between. Far more frequently, civil society and governments are in conflict over their basic understanding of the factors driving conflict. There are tensions and differences between CSOs and the U.S. government including the military that center on how they define and pursue security. Although civil society organizations and governments all see the need for stability and security, their definitions and approaches differ. When asked “conflict prevention for whom and for what purpose?” their perceptions diverge. A whole-of-society comprehensive approach requires first getting agreement on the goals of conflict prevention and stability missions. Civil society groups more often view conflict prevention as requiring long-term structural changes while governments tend to view conflict-prevention as a matter of mere short-term operational programming that can produce immediate results on specific drivers of conflict.

For example, in Kenya, where electoral violence threatens to destabilize the country and region, civil society groups are more likely than government actors to call for radical redistribution of land and government restructuring to reduce corruption and ethnic favoritism. Some governments (though not all) are more likely to see the problem of ethnic and electoral violence in Kenya as a law-and-order problem resulting from a youth bulge or ethnic tensions. Government programs then may target young men with job creation or educational opportunities or fund inter-ethnic tribal dialogues.

Similarly in Pakistan, local civil society groups working against militant extremism stress the importance of long-term investment in public education and government reforms to ensure that tax dollars fund public programs rather than military expenditures. However, the Pakistani government and its international allies are much more likely to take an operational approach to conflict prevention by seeking to eliminate or threaten militant groups with drones or military campaigns.

The structural approach to conflict prevention is more likely to see the context itself as the threat, whereas an operational approach to conflict prevention is more likely to see individuals or groups as threats that can be isolated and eliminated from the context. In both Kenya and Pakistan, civil society groups working at conflict prevention are critical of government efforts, noting the government is losing the war of ideas while targeting individuals and groups who are easily replaced by an ever-growing number of disgruntled citizens seeking structural change.

Both operational and structural approaches to conflict prevention are important. Operational programs to reduce threats of violence in the short term do indeed quell violence. These short-term efforts offer windows of opportunity for addressing the structural drivers of conflict. But too often, operational conflict prevention does not lead to structural conflict-prevention efforts and fails to address the core grievances fueling violence. Tensions over these two different approaches to conflict prevention make cooperation or coordination between civil society and governments difficult if not impossible in many countries.

### **Conflict Assessment for Conflict Prevention**

Tensions between operational and structural approaches to conflict prevention stem from divergent conflict assessments. Mainstream media often provide simple “cause-effect” analyses of conflicts with “good guys” trying to kill the “bad guys” to stop the conflict. A more complex “systems approach” recognizes that a simple identification and removal of an “enemy” is unlikely to change the dynamics of a conflict if underlying driving factors still remain. Rather, a systems approach to conflict looks at interrelated causes and effects and the interplay between groups.

Any comprehensive approach to conflict prevention cannot harmonize with nor have a unity of effort between governments and CSOs until there is a shared understanding of the causes driving conflict and violence and a discussion of mutually enhancing operational and structural approaches to conflict prevention. Building a sense of shared understanding starts with a more robust and comprehensive approach to conflict assessment, another important lesson learned from the past three decades.



Ideally, diverse stakeholders listen to and learn from each other’s perceptions of conflict’s root causes. An inclusive conflict- assessment process can help key stakeholders build a shared understanding of the conflict or at least begin to understand where they disagree. The second

lesson learned on conflict prevention is that a coordinated approach requires a shared understanding of the conflict enabling stakeholders to work together.

Conflict assessment shapes all conflict prevention strategy. Nongovernmental and civil society organizations have been conducting conflict-assessment processes for decades, building on the development field's use of "Participatory Rural Assessment" or "PRA" models to help villages identify development goals. More recent research from the field of conflict analysis and resolution and interdisciplinary study of conflict continue to help explain the causes and dynamics of conflict.<sup>22</sup>

Governments are beginning to develop conflict-assessment frameworks and processes such as the U.S. Government's District Stability Framework (DSF) and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). These complement other USG needs-assessment and intelligence-gathering processes. But conflict assessment is a distinct discipline and produces different types of information from existing assessment methods. Conflict prevention frameworks ask a different set of questions to map key stakeholders fueling or mitigating conflict, their worldviews and their sources of power. Conflict assessments identify driving and mitigating factors and issues, and the broader cultural context, as well as historical and regional trends and factors.

Too often, planners skimp on assessment, ultimately wasting both time and resources in ineffective programs that do not address conflict drivers and mitigators. Fears of "analysis paralysis" and policy imperatives to "do something!" press field-level personnel to develop programs quickly. But this top-down pressure can backfire. Wide research shows that NGOs that rush to establish humanitarian and development programs without assessing local conflict dynamics inadvertently do harm as humanitarian resources transferred into a local context fuel conflict between groups and can be hijacked by local armed groups to buy more weapons.<sup>23</sup> Military planners who act too quickly make the same mistakes. Counterinsurgency (COIN) planners, for example, critique mistakes made in the beginning of the Iraq war as a result of the faulty balance of 10 percent of time on assessment and 90 percent of time on action. COIN advisers recommended during the surge that military personnel value sitting and drinking tea with village elders and listening to local Iraqi perspectives of what was happening, reversing the ratio to 90 percent assessment and 10 percent action.

Mistakes or untested assumptions about what is driving conflict lead to ineffective conflict prevention efforts. Creating a successful conflict-prevention effort, program, or policy requires thorough assessment of the context, the conflict, needs on the ground, and the capacity that exists locally and internationally to address the challenges. Current conflict assessment methodologies

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<sup>22</sup> See Schirch, Lisa. *Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning Handbook*. MA: Kumarian Press, forthcoming 2012. And Cheldelin, Sandra. Druckman, Daniel, Fast, Larissa. *Conflict: Conflict: From Analysis to Intervention*. London: *The Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd*, 2008.

<sup>23</sup> *Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace – or War*. Mary Anderson. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.

are vastly irregular in terms of the quality and quantity of data collected and organized. Ultimately, the relational networks, cultural assumptions, biases, and perceptions of those carrying out an assessment heavily influence their data collection and data analysis, skewing their assessment outcomes. People reinforce preexisting views of what the conflict is about based upon personal experience or professional expertise. People also jump to conclusions about what is best to do in a conflict based on the programs or resources we already have available or what our organization would like to do. Without robust local input into assessments, too many current assessments overlook or fail to map local capacity for conflict prevention and/or come to vastly different conclusions than local people about what is driving conflict.

All conflict-assessment processes face time and resource constraints. But the process of sharing a robust conflict-assessment process is essential to foster a unity of understanding across government agencies and with civil society organizations before conflict-prevention planning or action begins. Currently, donor governments, outside interveners, and inside planners conduct separate, duplicative conflict assessments. A multiplicity of conflict-assessment processes by the United Nations; regional organizations; international NGOs; government diplomatic; development and defense agencies; local governments; and local civil society leaders can waste precious time and resources.

This third lesson learned on conflict prevention is that a coordinated approach is more likely to enable whole of society conflict prevention and foster coordination of donors' short-term, high-impact investments and local actors' interest in long-term, sustainable change.

### **Specialized Negotiation & Mediation Skills for Conflict Prevention**

U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton announced in December 2010 with the Quadrennial Development and Diplomacy Review that conflict prevention would become a central focus of U.S. policy. Some diplomats quietly chided that they in fact already spent most of their time on conflict prevention. In colloquial terms, this is true. All diplomats spend their time trying to head off conflict before it develops into violence. But the field of conflict prevention is far more specialized than normal diplomacy.

Decades of research on principled and interest-based negotiation have not yet made it into the skill sets of most career diplomats who are not required to update their training with this type of research-based skill.<sup>24</sup> Conflict prevention is not just normal diplomacy. Too many failed diplomatic efforts rely on mid-level diplomats without comparative experience in successful preventive diplomacy. Too often, diplomats use coercive bargaining to battle and seek compromises on the positions of armed groups or foreign governments. Conflict prevention requires highly specialized skill sets to identify underlying interests of all stakeholders and facilitate processes for addressing legitimate grievances through preventive diplomacy.

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<sup>24</sup> Doug Noll. *Elusive Peace: How Modern Diplomatic Strategies Could Better Resolve World Conflicts*. Prometheus Books. April 26, 2011.

Diplomats who take a “win-lose” orientation to peace are unlikely to achieve sustainable outcomes that can prevent a recurrence of conflict or violence. Newer methods look at three broad approaches to negotiation. “Soft” negotiation assumes that reaching agreement requires the acceptance of concessions, losses, and compromise. “Hard” negotiation assumes that winning requires making threats, demanding concessions, and sticking to strict public positions requiring the other side to lose. Successful conflict prevention requires “principled” or “interest-based” negotiation where the goal is to solve problems by finding options that meet the basic underlying interests (not public positions) of all stakeholders. Principled negotiation aims to create a “win-win” solution that all stakeholders can accept because they recognize that it meets their underlying interests, and it is preferable to the option of continuing the status quo.<sup>25</sup>

The fourth lesson learned in conflict prevention is that it requires specialized skills beyond most diplomats’ capacity. Specialized units with expertise in mediation, principled negotiation, and structuring comprehensive peace processes are forming in countries like the U.K. and at the United Nations and regional organizations like the Organization of African States. These specialized units can bring to bear comparative experiences in preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention.

### **Integrated Program Design and Conflict-Prevention Funding Pools**

Both governments and civil society recognize that conflict prevention works best when it integrates programming building bridges between sectoral silos to address conflict drivers. Conflict prevention requires innovative design of programs to ensure that education, health, development, agriculture, and other sectors integrate conflict sensitivity and prevention into their planning.

An Iraqi NGO—Rehabilitation, Education, and Community Health (REACH)—integrates conflict-prevention goals into all of their economic and social development programs. When it builds a well in a village or a slum, it first helps the community form a water-management board composed of Sunni, Shia, Arab, and Kurd or whatever other ethnic and tribal groups exist in that village. The water-management board designs methods for all people in the village to share decision-making and use of water resources, thus preventing violent conflicts over this scarce resource. When REACH carries out health education programs for women, it also ensure that its programs invite women of diverse ethnic and religious groups so that the women build social capital with each other as they also improve their health education. When REACH carries out micro-credit loan programs, it makes a precondition that any proposed business plan include a Sunni and Shia working together. This type of integrated program design ensures that both a development goal and a conflict-prevention goal can be achieved in the same effort.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Roger Fisher and William Ury. *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*. New York: Penguin Books, 1981.

<sup>26</sup> Interview with REACH Director Dana Muhammed in Erbil, Iraq. August 12, 2005.

Catholic Relief Service's handbook on *Integrating Peacebuilding into Humanitarian and Development Programming*<sup>27</sup> describes how to plan water, health, agriculture and other types of programs in such a way that it can build social capital between groups and address conflict drivers to contribute to conflict prevention. The handbook also describes how programs can be sensitive to the local context so the programs do not inadvertently cause further conflicts and divisions between groups.

Governments also aim to integrate their program planning so as to achieve multiple goals. Collaborative funding mechanisms provide incentives and a structure for integrated program design.<sup>28</sup> The UK's Conflict Prevention Funding Pools have both successes and failures in inspiring interagency collaborative action and planning.<sup>29</sup> The U.S. so-called section 1207 funds similarly incentivized interagency collaboration and shared assessment to jointly plan and implement conflict-prevention and stabilization activities. One of the common critiques of the UK Conflict Prevention Pool and the U.S. 1207 funds is that organizational cultures and planning processes made interagency efforts difficult and stymied true collaboration.

This fifth lesson learned on conflict-prevention efforts affirms that integrated planning is possible and can, in fact, save money by building in a conflict-sensitive approach to current programming, doubling the impact of a programming dollar. Lessons from incentivizing and planning integrated programming require more research.

## ***Conclusion***

In the scope of human history, conflict prevention is still young. But there is enough evidence to suggest that conflict prevention is a distinct approach requiring unique assessment processes, skill sets, planning processes, and integrated funding mechanisms. There is also enough evidence to suggest that one-off conflict-prevention activities conducted by governments or civil society do not add up to the kind of change required for sustainable prevention. Conflict prevention seems to work best when both short-term operational prevention activities complement long-term structural prevention activities. This type of comprehensive approach to conflict prevention requires skilled international organizations, governments, and civil society organizations to communicate and coordinate their assessments and planning. The way forward to building a whole-of-society, comprehensive approach to conflict prevention requires an infrastructure for shared conflict assessments, coordinated planning, and more effective relationships between governments, including their security sectors, and civil society organizations.

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<sup>27</sup> Mark Rogers, Aaron Chassy and Tom Bamat. *Integrating Peacebuilding into Humanitarian and Development Programming*. Baltimore, MD: Catholic Relief Services, 2010.

<sup>28</sup> *The Global Conflict Prevention Pool: A joint UK Government approach to reducing conflict*. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. August 2003.

<sup>29</sup> *Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: UK Government Response*. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. July 2004.

**SECTION III**  
**FUNDAMENTAL OBSTACLES—AND RESPONSES**

## Chapter 4

### The Impact of Culture on Complex Operations

*Stacia George*

When executing complex operations, it is easy to brush off a discussion of culture as something that would be nice to think about if there was extra time. This is why the “three cups of tea” concept was so novel when it came out. But it should not be novel at all. Culture and societal norms can significantly impact an operation, and how it may impact an operation must be discussed in the earliest planning stages. Even in the age of advanced warfare, winning wars still requires us, in Clausewitzian terms, to “*compel the enemy to do our will.*” This means neutralizing the enemy physically or—especially when what is meant by “winning” is political—getting the enemy and/or its supporters to behave in a manner that is to our advantage.

In complex operations, human terrain is the decisive terrain. How can we reduce support for an enemy if we do not understand what motivates its supporters and what it would take to change their minds? Frequently, culture influences the motivations and conditions that affect an individual’s or a group’s behavior. In fact, many critical errors in complex operations can be linked to not understanding the dynamics of local culture. Conversely, some great successes have resulted from leveraging knowledge of local culture.

A better understanding of culture and societal norms provides a gateway for identifying the most effective tactics to reduce support for the enemy either from outside or within. In Iraq, the United States may have mitigated significant operational problems if it had better understood the dynamics between the Shiites and the Sunnis before “de-bathification” or, at a minimum, before the new government was formed. Later, it was exactly this sort of understanding of tribal culture and members’ motivations that facilitated success in Al Anbar. Similarly, the U.S.’ understanding of Filipino culture led them to identify key local partners in the non-Tagalog community who had an interest in supporting the U.S. in order to fight back against Spanish and Tagalog subjugation.

Insurgent leaders, too, have sometimes failed to understand the motivations of the populations they seek to influence. For example, in Peru, Shining Path in the early 1990s failed to understand how angry the local population would become when faced with Shining Path’s increasing restrictions and regulations, including restrictions on holding markets. The population protested and removed its support because it perceived these changes as targeting its culture and way of life.

Latin America provides particularly rich examples of how culture determines both whom and what people support. It is not just chance that created a long line of individuals in Latin America who have governed with a strong hand. The cultural affinity for “machismo” (characterized by excessive masculinity and aggressiveness) has often, but not always, led Latin Americans to be attracted to leaders who possess those attributes, particularly when they are assertive about



taking charge and leading the country. This is why outsiders looking at Venezuela would think that Chavez would have minimal popular support because of his heavy-handed governing style, but, until recently, his aggressive leadership was actually attractive to a large portion of the population. Without an understanding of local culture, it would be easy to misconstrue who the Venezuelan people would support and why. It is this understanding of what motivates populations and individuals that gives clues to how to influence the enemy and its supporters. But not understanding local culture limits our capabilities to understand these motivations.

Pakistan provides a similar example of how culture impacts politics. An examination of Pakistan's strategic decision-making must include an analysis of how Pakistan sees the world. Indeed, Pakistan's constant concern that India is going to attack it or take it over is derived from a culturally ingrained fear derived from the concerns that the British Indian state would not take care of the Muslim population. These concerns were what fueled the creation of the modern Pakistani state. Even in the face of evidence to the contrary, Pakistani anxiety over India is a pathology that overrides what outsiders see as rational decision-making. The result is a foreign and domestic policy centered on these concerns, and any complex operation related to Pakistan must be based on this understanding.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo after President Mobutu's departure in the late 1990s, the limited action that people were willing to take to improve their own communities frustrated outsiders.<sup>30</sup> Outsiders perceived the idleness as laziness, but this lethargy was actually a symptom of the Mobutu regime's conditioning of the population to depend on the government by convincing them that the government would take care of everything for them. This passivity was an asset to Mobutu by making the population dependent upon him. It is only after understanding this cultural constraint that one can mobilize the population for action through methods such as teaching self-mobilization and group capabilities to respond to problems.

Making assumptions based on one's own cultural predisposition or what one observes without deeper analysis can cause mistakes in judgment. In short, everyone is encumbered by his or her own cultural baggage, and, thus, our observations are not necessarily objective analytical assessments. U.S., Scandinavian, German, and to an extent, British cultures are "low-context" cultures. This means that, in these cultures, words are the most authoritative form of communication, leading to a "what you see and hear is what you get" approach to analyzing what is happening around them. This works in their cultures, but not when they are working in "high-context cultures," which is the rest of the world. One example of how this plays out on the ground is the lament by American troops that locals overseas told them one thing and did another. This is not out of the ordinary in high-context cultures where what you say is less important. In this case, it may not matter to them what was said at all. Why? High-context cultures prioritize relationships over anything else and may say what they think you want to hear to preserve a relationship. Or they may lie in order to protect their own interests, which they see as an appropriate course of action. When this happens, Americans become outraged from feeling cheated or manipulated by their "friends." Meanwhile, their local counterparts are surprised that

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<sup>30</sup> For more on Mobutu's reign in Congo, see Michela Wrong, *In The Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz* (New York: Harper Collins, 2001).

the Americans care that much. This is just one example of the misunderstandings that occur when having to work in a high-context culture.

To avoid these missteps, people from low-context cultures must focus less on the words that are said and think first about what the motives and interests are of that individual, what you think they would want to do if you were in their shoes, and how the information is relayed (reluctantly? after a series of meetings? under conditions where they feel that they have to say “yes”? - which frequently occurs in complex operations with foreign forces). People from low-context cultures also need to be aware of the fact that their directness may not be prized and can even be offensive in the foreign culture where they are working.<sup>31</sup>

The British experience setting up the Aden Protectorate Levies (local policing units) in South Arabia provides a good example of how high- and low-context cultures clash. The British believed that the Levies were a successful and sustainable effort because people were signing up to participate in them. From their cultural perspective, they could conceive of no other explanation for why people would sign up for the Levies other than what they were saying, which was to support the British in providing security. However, the real motivation, in large part, was to hedge their bets with the British and protect their own interests. In fact, the mostly Moslem Levies did not effectively protect the Jewish population in Aden and disbanded upon the British departure in 1967 because those who joined the Levies had more of an affinity with protecting their tribe than with the government.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan provides another example of how cultural bias influences analysis. The international community frequently assumes that the FATA is lawless based on the observation that there is violence, and the Pakistani government does not appear to control large swaths of the FATA. In fact, a look at FATA’s culture reveals that the Pashtunwali system provides a strong local mechanism for governance through clear rules and procedures for how decisions are made within a tribe and sub-tribe. (It is weaker, but not absent in portions of North and South Waziristan and across the border in Afghanistan where militants have targeted tribal leaders to destroy these governance systems.)<sup>32</sup> This assumption of lawlessness is based upon a Western notion of governance where the government is the only form of providing governance and law and order. Instead, the analysis should have incorporated the local culture’s conception of governance.

Another example where a lack of understanding of local culture affected complex operations is in Afghanistan where Coalition troops observed that community members were not cleaning out their irrigation ditches and assumed that people must not normally do such work unless they

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<sup>31</sup> For more on high- and low-context communication, see the authoritative work by Edward T. Hall *Beyond Culture* (New York: Random House, 1976); or, for a quick summary, <http://mqjeffrey.hubpages.com/hub/High-Context-vs-Low-Context-Communication>

<sup>32</sup> For more on Pashtunwali, see “Doing Pashto: Pashtunwali As The Ideal Of Honourable Behavior And Tribal Life Among The Pashtuns,” *Afghan Analysts Network* <http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/20110321LR-Pashtunwali-FINAL.pdf> .

were paid to do so. They accordingly paid people to clean out the irrigation ditches. What they had not taken into consideration was the cultural legacy of community members coming together routinely to do community work without external support. If the troops had incorporated culture into their analysis of the problem, they would have learned that the community would have cleaned the irrigation ditches for free and that the reason that they were not was because of insecurity. People did not feel secure enough to group together and come out in the open to do the work. Not only did they end up spending funds to support an effort that could have been done for free, but they also disincentivized the community service that had helped to maintain much of the community in the absence of government support. More importantly, an understanding of this tradition would have given the troops an easy proxy metric to analyze the security environment—if community members were cleaning the ditches on their own, the security situation was getting better.

It is always challenging to find strong metrics for tracking the results and impact of a complex operation, but, as illustrated above, an understanding of culture can help with this. For example, if the local culture calls for arranged marriages, this usually requires mobility to arrange them. Therefore, the number of marriages in an area can be a proxy indicator for security. If marriages require dowries and/or festivities in that culture, the number of marriages could also be an indicator of an increase or decrease in wealth in a community. The number of marriage festivities that take place and the number of people who attend can also give a sense of security as these events tend to be postponed or arranged in smaller scale during times of insecurity.

Understanding a culture's normal observable behavior can not only help with metrics for evaluating the atmospherics, but can also help to pave the way in a navigating a foreign world. For example, as mentioned above, the Pashtunwali system in the FATA provides a general guidebook to what actions are needed to reach a specific objective and how the local population or enemy will respond to certain efforts. In this way, understanding what to look for in a culture can provide general information as to how, where, and with whom we can and should engage with in complex operations. Making the wrong or right choices can impact the outcome of the operation. For example, selecting the wrong "who" or setting up the wrong system can determine the rate or chances of success. In Yemen, it is known that, culturally, locals have long memories and are not forgiving of mistakes. Committing an early error in the way that one enters, engages with, or operates in a community could result in a political backlash that prevents any further operations from taking place in that area (at least any affiliated with those individuals and/or institutions). Thus, extra due diligence in planning and analysis is necessary before beginning an operation.

How do we figure out with whom to work? One of the first cultural factors to consider in complex operations is the rules for how individuals interact with each other and how decisions are made. For example, some places in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are rigidly hierarchical. This means that titles and rank are important, and delegation of authority is almost non-existent because power resides with the position and that which a position can control. In this case, foreigners must consider who represents their group to local counterparts. For example, do not be surprised or offended if a local counterpart is out of town, and the person acting for him or her will not make decisions until he or she return. Even if they conceptually

agree with delegating, they may be concerned that others will see them as weak. This can be extremely frustrating for those not from hierarchical societies and sometimes can be overcome by political pressure, but, more commonly, it simply ends up being a matter of planning for delays and making sure that one gets everything approved, signed, and decided before the person in authority leaves town.

This strong hierarchical structure requires that negotiators secure buy-in from the top leaders during a complex operation. Obtaining appropriate buy-in saves time because once the top of the hierarchy is on board, all others will follow. Conversely, not obtaining buy-in from the top before working with those at lower levels risks offending those in authority. For example, in most African villages, if the village chief is not consulted and met with immediately upon arrival to get his approval for an outsider's visit and activities, the chief will be offended and will not permit such activities to take place at all. Even more importantly, because it is a hierarchical structure, the lack of approval from the village chief means that no one else in the village will help—even if he or she desires to do so. This dynamic frequently emerges when national level actors stop or delay initiatives that the international community started at the local or regional level and did not consult with the national-level first. Sometimes, the international community does not seek top approval because they think it will take more time or is unnecessary since the work is local. However, a simple courtesy call or two can make all the difference, and, more importantly, the lack of such a meeting may undermine progress and success.

In another example, in India and Nepal, a caste system exists as part of Hinduism and assigns individuals to a specific social class (usually linked to a particular profession), which they inhabit for life. Caste systems clearly delineate who controls the power in society and, therefore, who one must and should work with on a complex operation. But caste systems can also impede the ability to bring lower caste members into higher-level discussions and initiatives. This can particularly be an issue when complex operations are addressing issues that relate to the lower castes (think of the appeal of the Maoists in Nepal to the lower-caste population). Also, in many countries of the world, culture dictates that women have specific roles and can be seen as a separate, lower class. This can limit certain means of engaging with them on complex operations. But there are usually other culturally acceptable means for engaging women that can be found, which is important because women can play key roles in complex operations, particularly related to dispute resolution and mobilizing populations.

In other places, decisions are made as a group rather than through a hierarchical structure. This is the result of a culture that values the relationships within a group over individualism and can be seen in places with traditional tribal structures or where councils of elders play a significant governing role. The benefits of the group decision-making process is that once the group comes to consensus, by virtue of the size of the group, the decision is more enduring and the group dynamic adds momentum to the force of the decision. Examples of how group decision-making benefitted operations are how tribes raise *lashkars* (local defense forces) in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan, how colonial forces have mobilized specific tribes to help to govern a colony, and how

coalition forces and local tribal leaders helped to mobilize the Sons of Iraq.<sup>33</sup> The downside of a group consensus model is that it usually requires more engagement and time to arrive at a decision. Tens of meetings might have to take place before a decision is made.

A less formal way of group decision-making is a hybrid where individuals representing a group—such as an ethnic or religious group—can sway an entire population one way or another. For example, during the war in the Philippines, the U.S. successfully capitalized on the tensions between the Tagalogs and the non-Tagalogs. The Tagalogs had dominated society economically and socially. The non-Tagalogs wanted equal opportunities. The U.S. saw how the non-Tagalogs had an interest in changing the existing system and used this to recruit from the non-Tagalog community. (The U.S. wanted to win against the Tagalog-Spanish government, and the non-Tagalogs wanted the Tagalogs out of power.) Once the U.S. was able to get some key non-Tagalog leaders on board, the rest of the group followed. Similarly, religious leaders can be engaged to mobilize the members of their group towards a specific decision once it has been made.

In other places, personal relationships, rather than hierarchy or tribal or group affiliation, are the drivers for why things do or do not get done. This means that transactions and deals are made around the person and not the position they are in. For example, in many places, to get the best deal on goods, one has to spend multiple trips to cultivate a relationship directly with the vendor. But they have to leave town and send another person to represent them to the vendor to continue the deal. In some places, the vendor will not sell to the person who is acting, and the deal will have to wait until the original negotiator returns. This is one of the reasons why procurement has been challenging in some areas of Afghanistan or why peace negotiations can stall when the participants change. In these contexts, building personal relationships over multiple meetings is necessary, and a high turnover of personnel in complex operations can impede progress by having to restart a relationship and agreements from scratch each time a new person arrives.

Societies and cultures are complicated, and one cannot expect everyone in a complex operation to be an anthropologist or have the time to become one. Instead, it is more efficient to triage and determine what types of questions are essential. In complex operations and warfare in general, incentivizing behavior is a necessary task. Therefore, planners and implementers of complex operations should ask these questions around why people behave certain ways. These are question such as, “What motivates behavior x?”, “What would change behavior x?”, and “What governs how people interact and make decisions?” The most effective and legitimate way to determine how to influence behaviors is to solicit input from a variety of local people on how it should be done. When questioning, do not just seek out the drivers behind people’s behaviors but more importantly, why those problems/motivations exist. Focusing on the reasons why will help to ensure that an operation is focusing on solutions to the cause rather than the symptom.

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<sup>33</sup> For more information on Pakistan’s *lashkars* and how they relate to the Sons of Iraq, see Mukhtar A. Khan, “The Role Of Tribal Lashkars In Winning Pakistan’s War On Terror,” *Terrorism Focus* Volume 40 (November 2008) 9-11. [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=34186](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34186).

Asking “Why?” and “How to fix it?” focuses analysis on causes and solutions. For example, some cultures see corruption as a bad thing, but if you were asking local Venezuelans how to start an anti-corruption campaign in Venezuela, they would most likely tell you that there is no point because Venezuelans do not see corruption as a problem. Asking in this case helped to avoid a costly, ineffective campaign. Or a very common assumption is that people support militants or gangs because they do not have jobs and are being paid. Frequently, the answer proposed is to pay them to do other things. But, even in places where the economy is doing poorly, poverty may not be the cause behind why people are supporting these groups. Instead, they may have joined because of a social grievance, were forced, bored, and/or are looking for a role/identity in their society. Also, the reasons why they joined may not be the same reasons why they are staying. In this case, providing jobs will not diminish support for the enemy. This is why one must be aware of our own assumptions (usually drawn from our own culture), that bias our analysis.

Not only should these questions be asked, but also the same questions must be asked from a variety of sources from different social, economic, and political strata, as every person has a bias. It is imperative that the understanding of what motivates local behavior be understood as early as possible in the planning stages of an operation. Preferably, locals would participate in the planning processes or, at a minimum, be linked through regular contact with people participating in the planning process.

An understanding of which and why certain motivations and behaviors exist is not just critical for designing the general concept of an operation but also in how it should be executed. Operations in hierarchical societies will have to pay extra attention to the organizational structure of the initiative. An entire operation can be slowed or stopped by something as basic as a title that is not authoritative enough. Also, collaboration between lines of efforts will have to be built into the organizational structure rather than depending on it happening organically. Otherwise, people will tend to report and work only up and down their chain of commands.

In cultures where familial or tribal ties are the strongest, it is important to pay careful attention to the composition of the local teams with whom one works. Although it is helpful (and sometimes a necessity) to have local personnel who are from a specific area working on a team, it is also important to recognize the culture of social pressures that they may be under, including the pressure to siphon benefits of their position to their family and/or tribe. Corruption frequently is a result of individuals not being able to overcome the external pressures to deliver. One solution is to have people in charge of the team who are not from that area. This way, personnel from that locality can always point to the “outsider” as the one who controls all the money. (The “outsider” does not necessarily have to control everything, but at least giving an option for the individual to fall back on as an excuse can be effective at keeping the external pressures at bay.) Also, visible public measures demonstrating strong oversight can help locals demonstrate to their family or tribe that it is impossible (or at least exceptionally difficult) for them to steal from the effort.

An example of how cultural considerations were incorporated into structure can be found when looking at the Frontier Corps (local military) in the FATA. The Frontier Corps is respected and successful partially because the Pakistani Government took culture into consideration when configuring it. In fact, it is that configuration that allows for it to work in the FATA at all. Tribal customs forbid troops to fire on their own sub-tribe, but the inhabitants of the FATA generally do not allow outsiders. The Frontier Corps units are composed of people from the FATA, but they do not serve where their tribe is located. This way they can avoid having to fire on their own sub-tribe and also have their presence accepted by the tribes. This cultural norm is an important consideration for setting up security structures in many countries, such as in Afghanistan, where the army and police sometimes deploy units that are not composed of the same ethnic group as the local population. Also, cultures with strong familial ties generally require people to stay close to home, prohibiting them from signing up for security services that may require a station far away. Restructuring the security services to allow for people to serve closer to their family units can create a broader recruiting pool, longer retention rates, and more effective security service.

Lastly, understanding culture not only helps to avoid pitfalls but also can be leveraged for gain. In Uganda, the international community was trying to get displaced persons to return to their communities. But after interviewing them, they learned that people were not returning because the people who had been killed there had not been properly buried. The displaced people felt that the disinterred family members were not only a bad reminder of the past, but their restless spirits would haunt the communities. The international community held cleansing ceremonies to clear the area of disinterred remains, provide a proper burial for them, and therefore, cleanse the area of restless spirits. Afterwards, the community members quickly returned. Without this understanding, the international community would have continued to offer various incentives to return, but to no avail. In this case, a quick consideration of culture brought a relatively easy solution.

Another example of how culture could be leveraged is how the Pashtunwali system in Afghanistan can help to eliminate grievances against coalition troops in areas where Pashtunwali is strong. Under Pashtunwali, if compensation for a grievance is provided through a third party, the aggrieved will forgive the grievance as part of the forgiveness principle of Pashtunwali. Solatia payments to compensate for losses are provided directly from coalition forces to the aggrieved, meaning that, despite accepting the payment, the recipient generally still holds the grievance (depending on the level of grievance). Revising the system for paying solatia through a third party could result in that grievance being forgiven, which could help reduce support for actions against coalition troops.

By considering culture when planning and executing complex operations, the U.S. is more likely to have an accurate assessment of the atmospherics on the ground, more realistic and appropriate objectives, and efforts that effectively influence behaviors on the ground. Sometimes, the need to incorporate culture into the design of complex operations will make itself obvious. For example, numerous complex operations planned by people from cultures with strict concepts of time and deadlines have been foiled when executed in a place where, culturally, time is flexible. This inability to count on meeting tight timetables must be incorporated into planning,

particularly where the host government and local involvement is critical for success (which is most of them). Others have experienced this when trying to run a complex operation in a Moslem country during Ramadan. Most activities will stop. Complex operations must be planned around it, and those implementing complex operations can gain allegiance by being respectful of the local custom to focus on the religious and familial obligations during this month. One must also consider that people will be exhausted from fasting during the day (particularly in places that are hot) and will be less productive. Or anyone who has tried to think about reintegrating former militants or encouraging members of the enemy to defect has had to consider what motivates them to start and what would motivate them to stop. In circumstances such as these, asking the right questions, putting our own cultural assumptions aside, and organizing operations in a way that take into consideration local culture will help not only to avoid inefficiencies and missteps but also make good efforts even easier and more effective.

Because understanding culture and society is one important component to a complex operations' success, what should an organization do to ensure this happens? This does not require a build-up of an entire cadre of people who understand every culture around the world to be called upon in the case of a complex operation. Nor does it mean that everyone needs to be an expert in the thorough analysis of culture. Not only is this logistically and financially not feasible, but it would be a waste of resources. Instead, focusing on basic efforts such as teaching people to be culturally aware, what questions to ask, how to incorporate culture into analysis, and how to go about navigating the environment in the least harmful way can make a difference. Also, even if experts in local cultures were incorporated into complex operations, they still would not be as knowledgeable as locals from that country/region. Incorporating multiple local points of view into planning discussions and complex operations design will help to identify potential obstacles, design effective and appropriate efforts, and help to give a clear understanding of the atmospherics that can lead to identifying those efforts that can most influence the capacity and support for the enemy. Given how difficult complex operations can be, taking a few moments to think about how culture can influence an operation positively or negatively can save months and sometimes years of less effective or wasted efforts.



## Chapter 5

### **Designing a Remedy for Illicit Power Structures: The Hidden Center of Gravity for Stabilization and Peace Operations**

*Michael Dziedzic*

#### **Introduction**

In designing our national security posture for “complex operations” in the post-Iraq and Afghanistan era, the United States should avoid the mistaken notion that future operations will be replicas of those experiences. The first premise of this chapter, therefore, is the uncontentious (we hope) assertion that unilateral or U.S.-centric intervention is neither the most likely nor the most desirable response to future complex contingencies. Accordingly, the U.S. should invest in developing capabilities that will enable it to operate effectively in a supporting role with partners in multilateral operations. The second premise has to do with the nature of the complex threat the U.S. and its international partners need to be prepared to confront: the criminalization of states—and of insurgent movements—by illicit networks that enrich themselves from conflict, sometimes forging a symbiotic relationship for mutual profit. These political-criminal structures are one of the “root causes” of violent internal conflict and state failure. They pose a grave but frequently overlooked challenge to peace missions and stability operations. To address this threat, criminal intelligence and robust international police forces are critically important capabilities, and to employ these capabilities effectively requires institutional structures for the conduct of intelligence-led operations. This chapter briefly elaborates on the essence of the threat that illicit power structures have posed to previous peace and stability operations and describes the multilateral capabilities and institutional structures required to address this threat effectively in a multilateral context.

#### **The Hidden Center of Gravity: Illicit Power Structures**

Whether the source of illicit revenue is blood diamonds, gold, coltan or other lootable natural resources in Africa; drug trafficking in Afghanistan and Haiti; smuggling of arms, drugs, petroleum products, and human beings in the Balkans; or armed extortion of “taxes” in occupied territory in a multitude of conflict zones, internal conflicts today cannot be properly understood and resolved unless the underground political-economic factors driving them are adequately addressed.

A brief review of the international experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti illustrates that a proactive posture to dislodge illicit structures from power is not only essential but can also be highly effective.

The Bosnian Federation—comprised of a landlocked, predominantly Bosniak region and Croat-dominated Herzeg-Bosna—was threatened in 1999 by a “Third Entity Movement” that sought annexation of Herzeg-Bosna with neighboring Croatia. Troops from the Stabilization Force

(SFOR), supported by robust police formations called Multinational Specialized Units (MSUs) that were comprised largely of Italian Carabinieri, mounted the WESTAR Operation in October 1999 against covert Croat intelligence activities. The MSU had been deployed to Bosnia in 1998 because SFOR lacked non-lethal force options, creating a vulnerability to “rent-a-mobs” that was exploited by Dayton obstructionists to thwart refugee resettlement and broadly undermine implementation of the Dayton peace agreement. Within a little more than a year, the MSU had conducted more than 260 interventions, all but two of which were resolved peacefully. The WESTAR Operation was one that was not. It exposed the parallel power structure in Herzeg-Bosna made up of corrupt nationalist Croat politicians, secret police, leading organized crime figures, paramilitary veteran’s organizations, and intelligence operatives. This intelligence-led operation provided a wealth of information about their aggressive efforts to penetrate the international community. The exposure and disruption of this Croat illicit power structure was essential to preventing the rupture of the Bosnian Federation which would have constituted a *casus belli* for Bosniaks.

When NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) began arriving in Kosovo in June 1999, nearly 100 civilians, mostly Serbs, were being killed by Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) extremists each week. Mitrovica represented the most serious inter-ethnic flashpoint owing to the dominance there of Serb paramilitary “bridge watchers” who were responsible for orchestrating acts of violence. KFOR’s MSU deployed in 1999 and, together with regular military units, responded to almost daily clashes between Serbs and Albanians in Mitrovica, aiming to de-escalate tensions. Another threat that shortly became evident was a potential civil war between the newly ascendant KLA and supporters of Ibrahim Rugova, the erstwhile pacifist leader of Kosovo Albanians. Elements of the KLA often acted in concert with organized-crime networks that sought to exploit the vacuum in law and order. One of the prerequisites for an effective peace process, therefore, was to confront sources of political violence and their links with organized crime. This required the capability to arrest dangerous KLA and Serb suspects and to contain resulting civil disturbances with non-lethal force. KFOR’s MSUs, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’s (UNMIK) Special Police Units (SPUs), and its special weapons and tactics team (Team 6) provided these essential capabilities. During 2002 UNMIK began making high-profile arrests, which led to convictions of KLA members responsible for the 1999 assassination of Ibrahim Rugova’s bodyguards, of a senior ex-KLA commander guilty of multiple assassinations, and of scores of other former KLA members for major crimes.

In Haiti, heavily armed gangs controlled the sprawling slums of Port-au-Prince and were operating with flagrant impunity in spite of the presence of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). In 2006, they carried out a campaign of kidnappings that touched every level of society, terrorizing city residents. They also engaged in murder, rape, extortion, and narcotics and weapons trafficking. Although ostensibly criminal in nature, the gangs of Port-au-Prince were an inherently political phenomenon. Powerful elites from across the political spectrum exploited gangs as instruments of political warfare, providing them with arms, funding, and protection from arrest. Thus, they threatened not merely the inhabitants of Port-au-Prince; the Préval administration and MINUSTAH were both brought to the cusp of collapse by the end of 2006.

In early 2007 MINUSTAH's military contingent, supported by the mission's Formed Police Units (FPUs), dislodged the gangs from Cite Soleil. FPUs performed a range of decisive roles including crowd and riot-control, hard entry, and high-risk arrest. The military contingent's initial foray into Cité Soleil in January 2007 was placed in jeopardy when gang members organized a demonstration of unarmed civilians. An FPU with non-lethal riot control capabilities quickly dispersed the crowd, and the offensive against the gang stronghold was completed successfully. A 40-person SWAT team from Jordan that MINUSTAH incorporated within the FPU structure was heavily employed in anti-gang operations. The vast majority of police-led operations involved the arrest of gang leaders or members as a prominent objective. FPUs were central to these highly successful operations, in particular the integrated use of MINUSTAH and Haitian National Police (HNP) SWAT teams. Overall, four of the five top gang leaders and 800 gang members were arrested in 2007, effectively ending the ability of the gangs to disrupt the peace process.

The Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti cases are cited because they demonstrate that it is possible for international interventions to confront successfully the threat that illicit power structures constitute. This phenomenon has been at the heart of many other conflicts, however, including the looting of blood diamonds in Liberia and Sierra Leone; the plundering of coltan, gold, and other precious minerals from the Ituri and North and South Kivu regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and opium trafficking by the Taliban and reportedly by President Karzai's brother in Afghanistan, not to mention the Kabul Bank scandal. The record of peace and stability operations over the past 15 years is thus replete with cases where the nexus between illicit wealth and the struggle for political power have been at the core of the conflict. In none of the above cases was this recognized prior to intervention. This suggests the need to invest in the capacity to gather criminal intelligence about these threats, to provide robust international police forces to accompany intervening military contingents to deal with it during the "golden hour" when international action (or inaction) is most decisive, and to develop the institutional structures to bring the two together effectively for the conduct of intelligence-led operations.

### **Criminal Intelligence**

A most basic prerequisite for stabilization is awareness of the sources of and motivations for conflict. Unless the mission leadership fully understands the drivers of conflict—and is provided a mandate that is equipped to address them—they will be unable to foster an effective peace process. The conflicts in the Balkans were initially viewed exclusively as ethnic in nature until experience revealed the rapacious and criminalized nature of the informal power structures involved in each of the ethnic communities. In 2000, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) nearly collapsed when hundreds of its troops were taken hostage by the Revolutionary United Front after the mission threatened its control of the diamond mines. General Martin Agwai, Deputy Force Commander for UNAMSIL, has asserted that the biggest challenge in Sierra Leone was lack of intelligence.<sup>34</sup> Intelligence has all too often been an afterthought, and, when it has belatedly been recognized as a necessity, the capability has been

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<sup>34</sup> *An Inventory of Field Practices for Use of Formed Police Units for Protection of Civilians*, Unpublished manuscript by Michael Dziejic, p. 36.

cobbled together *ad hoc*. An international intelligence pick-up team that rotates personnel on an annual basis is unlikely to gain the upper hand against entrenched illicit networks that are adroit at operating with impunity.

### ***Recommendations***

The following steps should be taken to provide missions with essential criminal intelligence capabilities to confront obstructionism by criminalized power structures.

- An assessment of the potential threat from illicit power structures should be performed prior to intervening

Clausewitz advised military commanders planning for battle to determine first what type of war they were about to wage. Confusing a conventional foe with an insurgency, for example, can have profoundly deleterious consequences, as was demonstrated in Iraq recently. Peacekeepers can suffer similar incapacitation if predatory competition for wealth and power is disguised, obscured, and misdiagnosed as ethnic conflict or the result of poverty. Thus, there is a need to assess “What type of peace is this?” Has the peace settlement come to grips with all the sources of conflict, including the underground political economy? Among the critical issues to assess are the following:

- Has the state been captured by a criminalized elite?
- Is power wielded by informal power structures with linkages to organized crime?
- Are violent opposition groups funded through illicit sources of revenue?
- Do the ruling elite and opposition collaborate to profit from the conflict?
- Has the legal system been suborned by illicit power structures and thus become an integral part of the problem?

These issues are embedded in the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) developed by the Conflict and Stabilization Operations Bureau at the U.S. State Department. The capacity of the intelligence community to contribute to this assessment, specifically with regard to illicit revenue streams, informal power structures, and linkages with transnational organized crime, should be fully exploited.

- Mandates should provide adequate authority and capacity to deal with illicit power structures

Pre-mission assessments should rigorously examine whether the legal system is part of the solution or part of the problem. If police, judges, and jailors are incapable of confronting threats from illicit power structures or are in collusion with them, immediate fixes are required. Under such circumstances, the notion that establishing the rule of law is purely a function of developing the capacity of local institutions is fatally flawed. The mission should seek the authority in the mandate to provide an appropriate “patch” for systemic defects in the local criminal justice system, until the threat of violent obstructionism has been dealt with or the local system has been reformed and has successfully demonstrated the capacity to confront impunity and

criminalization of the state. To allow this to happen, the mission itself will need to play at least a supportive role. This role could include use of international police forces, prosecutors, judges, and penal officials working in tandem with selected local counterparts to confront criminal elites. International or hybrid courts have frequently been established for human rights abuses. When illicit power structures have instigated the conflict, the mandates of international/hybrid courts should be expanded to include profiteering from the conflict that provoked the war crimes. To the extent possible, internationals should work with carefully selected local special police, prosecutors, and judges to confront political-criminal elites so as to pave the way for transition to local ownership once criminalized power structures have been emasculated.

A parallel effort should be mounted to enable legal systems *outside* the country striving to emerge from conflict to address the illicit activities of the criminalized power structures involved. This would include in the mandate the ability to seize assets derived from abuse of state power or transnational crime, the requirement to comply with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and international covenants relating to transnational crime, and the authority to seize assets derived from illicit sources and extradite those who have violated international treaties.

- An assessment of criminal vulnerability should be conducted

For any country where U.S. troops are engaged in combat operations and for any country that is a priority for the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, a criminal intelligence task force should be created to develop a criminal vulnerability assessment for the leading figures responsible for obstructing the rule of law and stabilization efforts. Customs, Treasury, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research should all be directed to contribute. The intention would be to identify admissible evidence that could lead to a conviction either in the local court system or in a country with a functioning legal system where extradition is possible. A related task would be to develop the capacity to mount intelligence-led investigations. The purpose would be to provide a mechanism for processing intelligence into admissible evidence against political criminals.

- UN missions should be deployed with a properly resourced Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC)

Associated with the threat assessment should be an analysis of the mission's intelligence requirements. For UN missions, this analysis should include how the JMAC will be resourced to meet these requirements. This does not require technical means of intelligence collection by the mission. The U.S. and any troop and police contributing country equipped to do so should contribute national intelligence to the pre-mission assessment and subsequently provide continuous warning about threats to the mission, including illicit power structures. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General should provide the JMAC with priorities for the mission collection plan based on the nature of the threat to the mission. The JMAC should establish an integrated collection plan for use by military, police, and civilian components. Owing to the frequent rotation of military and police contingents (one year intervals or less), it is vital that the

JMAC chief or deputy serve on extended tours to provide an “institutional memory” about the threats to the mission and peace process, their motives, networks, and vulnerabilities. The JMAC should also be trained and equipped to provide crime pattern analysis.

The foundation for success by the JMAC is rigorous human source management and evaluation, coupled with a systematic effort to pool and analyze all sources of information available to the mission. A JMAC support unit should be created in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) secretariat that is staffed to provide an experienced and rapidly deployable JMAC chief and head of source management for new missions.

The U.S. should make the provision of intelligence support to international peace missions and multilateral stability operations, especially those involving the UN, European Union, and African Union, a permanent function for the intelligence community. In exchange, the U.S. should use its leverage to promote the establishment of a professional and trusted cadre of intelligence professionals to engage with in these international organizations and the development of procedures needed to govern intelligence sharing and operational security in the field.

- Selection of key personnel.

Personnel responsible for intelligence functions should be selected on the basis of professional competence not geographic diversity. The Police Commissioner should be empowered to hand-pick a criminal intelligence cadre for the police component drawing upon experienced and highly professional personnel. This cadre should form the core of the JMAC or its equivalent for non-UN missions.

The U.S. should develop a cadre of criminal intelligence specialists who could be seconded to international peace missions and stability operations for this purpose. As President Obama noted in the 2010 National Security Strategy, “Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented. Our security also depends on ...intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, strengthen justice systems, and work seamlessly with other countries.”<sup>35</sup> Procedures for secondment of competent and experienced US personnel need to be established with the international organizations involved well in advance of a crisis.

### **Robust International Police Forces**

Two critical public security gaps recurrently confound multilateral peace missions and stability operations: a deployment gap and an enforcement gap.<sup>36</sup> Unless both are addressed, the capacity to cope with the challenges posed by violent obstructionists, especially those embedded in informal structures of power, will be negligible. The first is the time lag between deployment of

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<sup>35</sup> *National Security Strategy*, May 2010, p. i-ii. Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss\\_viewer/national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf).

<sup>36</sup> *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, Michael Dzedzic, Robert Oakley and Elliot Goldberg (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), pp. 8-13.

military contingents and police forces. As a result of this deployment gap, missions risk being severely tested by a concerted campaign to discredit and delegitimize the peace process through revenge killings, rampant lawlessness, and major civil disturbances when they are least equipped to respond effectively. With only military firepower to call upon during this “golden hour,” the response options are reduced to use of lethal force or merely observing the mayhem. With robust “stability police units,” however, the mission would possess the non-lethal force options, ranging from negotiations to crowd and riot control, to respond appropriately and effectively. (See “Recommendations” below for a description of “stability police”).

The other gap relates directly to the law enforcement challenge of confronting criminalized power structures that are the likely source of disorder in the first place. In the absence of specialized police formations capable of hard entry and high-risk arrest, the mission is essentially without a law enforcement capability to address the root causes of conflict. These are highly specialized skills that standard crowd- and riot-control units do not possess. Thus, in Kosovo a special unit, Team 6, was assembled, and, in Haiti, a 40-person Jordanian SWAT team was included within one of the FPU. The MSU concept, on the other hand, is explicitly designed to integrate such specialized teams into the unit. The two capabilities, civil order maintenance and high-risk arrest, are complementary since the standard crowd- and riot-control unit can secure the perimeter of the target area for a SWAT team to carry out the operation. The presence of crowd- and riot-control forces is also essential to manage the potential consequences, such as the “rent-a-mobs” that inevitably followed such police action in the Balkans.

The value of Formed Police Units for UN peacekeeping operations is reflected in the expanding demand for and increasing reliance on their specialized capabilities. The number of FPU personnel deployed has more than doubled in the past five years, from 3,105 in November 2005 to 7,687 in June 2011. As of 2012, they constituted more than half of all UN Police deployed (i.e. they outnumber individual UN Police officers).<sup>37</sup> Police Contributing Countries have been unable to keep up with the requirement for FPUs however, and only 85 percent of authorized FPUs have been deployed. Thus, if the requirement for a new mission were to arise in the near term (and Syria looms on the horizon), there would be no surplus capability to call upon to preclude another lengthy deployment gap. In the face of this dramatic increase in demand, fielding units that meet minimal UN standards has also been a daunting challenge.

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<sup>37</sup> *UN Police Magazine*, July 2011, 7<sup>th</sup> Edition, p. 18. Available at [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag\\_07.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_07.pdf); and “Bridging the Public Security Gap: The Role of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units in Contemporary Peace Operations, Michael Dziedzic and Chris Stark, USIP PeaceBrief, June, 2006.

### ***Recommendations:***

- Develop a surge capacity for robust or “stability police” forces by providing surplus U.S. Army equipment as an incentive for countries to offer units for peace and stability operations.

The term “stability police” is used as a generic term for robust, armed police units that are capable of performing specialized law enforcement and public order functions that require disciplined group action. They are trained in and have the flexibility to use either less-than-lethal or lethal force, as circumstances dictate. They are rapidly deployable, logistically self-sustainable, and able to collaborate effectively with both the military and the police components of a peace mission.<sup>38</sup>

Each international organization employing this type of police unit has adopted its own terminology: the United Nations has Formed Police Units, NATO uses Multinational Stabilization Units, and the European Union prefers the term Integrated Police Units. “Stability police unit” is meant to encompass all of these.

The United Nations has established equipment requirements for its company-sized (120-140 personnel) Formed Police Units. The big-ticket items are 3 armored personnel carriers (APCs), 12 jeeps with military radios, 8 2.5-5 ton cargo/utility trucks, 2 ambulances, and 2 water/fuel trucks. APCs are not typically found in most police forces, and the other items are not often abundant. Thus meeting these equipment requirements is a daunting barrier for most nations to overcome. Although the UN reimburses FPU contributors at the rate of more than \$4 million per year for each unit, the cost of purchasing equipment for an FPU is about \$6 million; so, the upfront equipment expense is a major obstacle. On the other hand, APCs, jeeps (or High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, better known as Hummers, a variant of which can be used as an ambulance), 5-ton utility trucks, and fuel trucks are surplus items in the U.S. Army inventory owing to the withdrawal from Iraq and the recently announced 80,000-troop downsizing of the U.S. Army.<sup>39</sup> Even prior to the announcement of the downsizing of the Army, there was a projected surplus of 6,000 M-113 APCs, 10,000 HMMWVs, and a total of 30,000 5-ton utility and 10K-liter fuel trucks. To provide a surge capacity of 10 companies of FPUs would entail divesting from the U.S. Army inventory a total of 30 M-113 APCs, 140 HMMWVs (for use as ambulances and 4x4 vehicles), and 100 trucks (5-ton utility and 10K-liter fuel trucks).<sup>40</sup> The primary financial impact on the Army would be to avoid the cost of mothballing these

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<sup>38</sup> *Bridging the Public Security Gap: The Role of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units in Contemporary Peace Operations*, Michael Dzedzic and Chris Stark, USIP PeaceBrief, June, 2006.

<sup>39</sup> *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices*, Department of Defense, January 2012, p.11. Available at [http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense\\_Budget\\_Priorities.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Budget_Priorities.pdf).

<sup>40</sup> This recommendation draws on a paper submitted by Scott Murphy, “Creation of an UN Police Equipment Block to Provide Incentives for Contributing Nations,” for Georgetown University course SEST 536 on November 19, 2011.



vehicles, but the potential benefit of avoiding future public security gaps at the start of new peace missions or stability operations would be incalculable.

The challenge for the U.S. is to find a way to parlay this surplus into a genuine stability police surge capacity. It would be best to avoid putting all our eggs in the UN basket, owing to the propensity of Russia and China to veto missions in countries undergoing ethnic cleansing or suppression of peaceful protestors by brutal despots. Perhaps five sets of equipment for FPU could be donated to the UN to be maintained in storage at the UN Logistic Base in Brindisi, Italy. The equipment would be allocated to countries willing to provide FPUs for new UN missions, with the proviso that they must first meet UN standards for proficiency. This would serve as a powerful incentive given that the UN reimbursement for each unit is more than \$4 million per year. Another five sets of equipment might be retained in storage in the U.S. to allow for flexibility in organizing coalitions of the willing when a UN mandate might not be forthcoming. In either case it would behoove the U.S. to coordinate with the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) as it provides a rapidly deployable headquarters for just such a robust police force. The EGF can be used to support the UN, European Union, or NATO. The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) is the other organization that could potentially be used to train stability police units in the use of U.S.-provided equipment for crowd- and riot-control purposes, as well as preparing commanders to meet UN proficiency standards as they do now. The EGF and CoESPU are collocated at the same facility in Vicenza, Italy, and could be engaged in a collaborative effort to train and equip units to provide an international surge capability. Ideally, the prospective recipients of the equipment could be integrated into the EGF structure.

- Provide a non-lethal means of disarming threats to the peace process

For missions where the peace process is challenged by gangs, organized criminals, militias, paramilitary organizations, and other agents of violence, a SWAT capability is a vital supplement to standard crowd- and riot-control capabilities. As their use by MINUSTAH demonstrates, this does not require executive authority. As recommended above, however, the requirement for their deployment should be carefully addressed prior to drafting the mandate to avoid an inordinate delay in deployment if they are required. (See above: “Mandates that provide adequate authority and capacity to deal with illicit power structures.”) The unresolved issue is how to mobilize this capability. One option might be to recruit individuals with the necessary skills from individual police deployed to the mission, as was done in Kosovo. This option leaves much to chance, however, and the need to develop unit cohesion is another liability. The preferred option would be to identify prospective sources for such a capability in advance. Again, the U.S. should coordinate with the EGF. It has both the flexibility to support the UN, European Union, and NATO, and it draws primarily upon gendarme-type forces in Europe that have a high degree of professionalism. Expanding on the potential range of contributors to include countries like Jordan, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Nepal, and others would provide desirable flexibility in adapting to the political constraints of different missions.

- Develop doctrine for confronting threats from violent obstructionists

The *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (The Brahimi Report) recognizes that when “the lingering forces of war and violence threaten a fragile peace or continue to prey upon a vulnerable population the mission may have to use force preemptively to implement its mandate and to protect civilians.”<sup>41</sup> Beyond the recognition that this is an essential component of peacekeeping, however, there are no precepts in the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*<sup>42</sup> published in 2008 to suggest how this most daunting of peacekeeping tasks should be conducted.

Doctrine should be developed to guide action by international organizations that are likely to find themselves confronting violence emanating from illicit power structures or any other violent armed group. At a minimum this doctrine would include the UN, EU, and NATO. Given that these are the intended “customers” of the EGF and that CoESPU has as part of its mission the development of doctrine for stability police, these organizations should be intimately involved in the process.

### **Institutional Structures to Support Intelligence-Based Operations<sup>43</sup>**

The most effective way to eliminate violent threats to a peace process is to obtain the intelligence that will enable mission leadership to seize the initiative when conditions warrant and mount intelligence-based operations to achieve one of three effects:

- Disrupt: prevent the use of violence against the mission or peace process.
- Dislocate: separate key individuals from the obstructionist network by attacking weak links or undermine popular support for it by exposing criminal linkages. Deterrence may result from dislocation.
- Dismantle: gather evidence, arrest, and successfully prosecute key actors in the illicit power structure.

The aim is to have military and police actions against violent extremism led by intelligence.

To debilitate violent threats to the peace process and arrest those responsible requires effective operational planning and unity of effort among the Head of Mission, the Force Commander, and Police Commissioner. It is highly unlikely that the Force Commander will have any operational experience in the use of non-lethal force, and the Police Commissioner is not apt to have experience mounting operations with military forces. The Head of Mission will almost certainly

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<sup>41</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations*, (New York: UN, 2000) A/55/305 (August 21), Available at [www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations).

<sup>42</sup> United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*, (New York: UN, 2008). Available at [www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone\\_Doctrine\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf).

<sup>43</sup> This section is derived in part from a briefing presented by Col Michael Redmond at a Command Development Seminar conducted for UN Formed Police Units commanders and coordinators at the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units in March 2006.

be unfamiliar with the role of robust police units such as FPUs. Effective operational planning is needed to integrate military, police, and civilian activities. Coordination between military and police components should always take place on major operations so that the need for police support (e.g., crowd and riot control or evidence collection) can be anticipated and prepared for. Operations may need to be followed by civilian quick-impact projects, which will need to be planned well in advance. Integrated planning is an alien concept, however, for most military and police forces and development agencies. The mission leadership should insist that planning for operations be consolidated and that unresolved differences be settled at the Head of Mission level. Not only does the effectiveness of operations hinge on shared planning, the safety of the forces involved depends on it.

***Recommendations:***

- Develop standard procedures and a training module for integrated military and police planning and command and control

Most military establishments are taught to organize their planning in a standardized manner (i.e., Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, and Command and Control); however, police forces are not. Thus, each mission is left to develop procedures for integrating military and police planning *ad hoc*. The issue of command and control—when the police should be in the lead and the military in support and vice versa—also needs to be clearly articulated and standardized. In particular, it is imperative to have a clear understanding of the conditions that would cause primacy to be transferred from the police to the military in the midst of an operation. Either the police or the military should be designated as the lead for an operation, contingent on whether sustained use of military weapons is anticipated. This allows military and police commanders to work operationally together while commanding their distinctive capabilities according to their own specific roles and mandates. For police-led operations, the on-scene police commander should have tactical control of all personnel situated within the boundary of the police operation (sometimes called the “Blue Box”). This might include individual military personnel temporarily assigned for the duration of the operation, such as bomb-disposal specialists. Outside that boundary, the military commander should have tactical control of personnel performing supporting tasks (or the “Green Box”). The reverse would hold true for a military-led operation. A control point should be established where both military and police commanders can be collocated.<sup>44</sup>

The U.S. should work with key stakeholders and partners—including the UN Best Practices Unit, the European Union, the African Union, the European Gendarmerie Force, the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, and the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers—to develop integrated planning and command-and-control procedures and a training module to be used in military and police training centers for peace missions and stability operations.

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<sup>44</sup> See *Policy (Revised) Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support*, Ref. 2009. 32, para 69, p.16.

- Establish decision making architecture

Owing to wide variation in the configuration of peacekeeping missions and stability operations (e.g., military commanders are sometimes subordinate to a civilian Head of Mission but at other time they operate independently; some missions are under UN supervision and others are hybrids or parallel missions), suggestions for a decision making architecture must remain generic. Two basic functions need to be accomplished:

- At the “strategic” level of the mission, an infrastructure is needed to obtain agreement about strategic goals, specifically whether to undertake intelligence-led operations to disrupt, dislocate, or dismantle obstructionist power structures, and what the priority targets should be. This entity should include the civilian Head of Mission, the military force commander, the police commissioner, the head(s) of intelligence, and the senior legal advisor.
- At the operational level, resources for intelligence collection, investigation, prosecution, and planning should be allocated according to the strategic priorities. Recommendations for action should be developed at this level for presentation to the strategic-level body to decide when to act.

Perhaps the most important role for the U.S. is to take an interest in ensuring that there is an effective decision making structure in place to support intelligence-led operations.

- Conduct an annual contingency planning exercise for dealing with the “worst case” threat that the mission is likely to confront

Each mission challenged by violent obstructionists should conduct a contingency planning exercise as soon as the mission’s strategy has been completed. The exercise should address the “worst-case” threat that the mission is likely to confront and how it would respond to intelligence that provided advanced warning of such an eventuality. Owing to the constant rotation of senior leadership, this process should be repeated on an annual basis.

The U.S. has supported development of a course for integrated police, military and civilian planning at the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units. To provide an incentive for missions to undertake an annual contingency planning exercise, the US could allocate a portion of the funds for Global Peace Operations Initiative to allow CoESPU to work with missions to develop and conduct these exercises annually.

## **Conclusion**

Conflict pays for elites in a position to capture available resources through illicit means. To stabilize these situations, it is vital to create vulnerability to criminal prosecution and incarceration. Simultaneously, adherence to the peace process and use of peaceful means to

manage the competition for wealth and power must be made more attractive than exploitation of violence and criminality. The purpose of this chapter has been to suggest how to develop the capabilities and institutional structures to do the former, while acknowledging that the latter is equally essential. Owing to the sub-rosa nature of illicit power structures, however, this critical challenge has frequently been overlooked. To expose this root cause of conflict and deal with it requires the capacity to gather criminal intelligence about the nature and vulnerability of these threats, to provide robust police forces to work together with intervening military contingents, and to develop the institutional structures to bring the two together effectively for the conduct of intelligence-led operations. *None of the recommendations outlined above for accomplishing this would require additional funding.* All can be accomplished using existing resources. The benefits could be enormous. If missions come equipped with the advanced knowledge, capability, doctrine, and procedures to confront the hidden nemesis of illicit power structures successfully, international interventions will prosper far more rapidly and frequently, not to mention at far less expense.

## Chapter 6

### The Centrality of the Rule of Law: Lessons on Corruption from Iraq

*Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.*<sup>45</sup>

Throughout history, governments controlled or conquered markets to acquire wealth. With the advent of democracy in the West, rulers became leaders, guiding constitutional governments toward the stewardship - rather than the ownership - of markets.

Perhaps the most crucial agent of change for this evolution was the West's revolutionary empowerment of the rule of law and its operative mechanisms – legislative authority, executive enforcement, and judicial review – and its essential values – equal protection, social justice, and due process. These mechanisms and values became the means by which modern democracies sought to civilly manage citizen behavior. Over time, they strengthened sufficiently to circumscribe even the behavior of dominant but corrupt leaders, a development unthinkable in ages past when the King was seen as next to God. This evolution superseded the long-accepted (and, in the modern view, corrupt) notion that “If the ‘King’ does it, then it’s legal.”

Rejection of the rule of law leads to corruption. It is particularly insidious in the context of modern stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO), within which achieving state legitimacy is a key goal. If permitted to persist, incipient corruption by government officials during an SRO can metastasize, sickening societal life and threatening the state's long term health. While it is self-evidently not the only issue governments in transition must address during irregular conflict—security and economic development are also essential--establishing the rule of law is the cornerstone, the *sine qua non* to achieving enduring stability, justice, and peace.

Corruption takes many forms but can be categorized generally as grand or petty. Grand corruption – the theft of substantial public wealth by venal insiders - robs a nation of its potential for prosperity. Petty corruption – usually local demands for functional pay-offs – vitiates trust. Regardless of whether grand or petty, corruption is incompatible with a sound rule of law system. But it is the grand version that threatens states, particularly those suffering through the paroxysms that unavoidably accompany SROs.

Corruption undermines a democracy's credibility, reducing its effectiveness. A central feature of successful democratic governments has been their capacity to mediate the interests of opposing parties and, when replaced by the electoral process, to peacefully transfer power to successors. Grand corruption damages these processes, creating discord and injustice that could catalyze insurrection. At the very least, it undermines governmental operations by emasculating the validity of institutions and eviscerating the citizens' trust. During stabilization and reconstruction operations, an overarching goal is strengthening government institutions so they

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<sup>45</sup> Thanks to Vincent Foulk for his assistance on this chapter.

can meaningfully respond to citizens' needs. The path to reaching this goal must include implementing effective rule of law institutions that counter the corrupting influences inevitably unleashed by major systemic change.

### **Rule of Law at the Battlefield**

Societies with weak rule of law systems create vacuums that corruption fills. This happened in Iraq. In 2012, Transparency International ranked Iraq as the eighth most corrupt country in the world; it has held this position or worse since 2003.<sup>46</sup> The Iraq experience demonstrates not just the difficulties in defeating an armed insurgency. It manifestly illustrates the deeply complex challenges inherent in overcoming a legacy of corruption, an enemy within that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki rightly dubbed the "second insurgency."

Prior to 2003, Saddam Hussein used systemized and repressive corrupt practices to control the Iraqi population. After U.S. forces decapitated the regime in the spring of 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority was established to stabilize and rebuild Iraq's government and society, implementing an electoral democracy. Over the next year, the CPA Administrator, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, enacted three important Orders to promote new rule of law systems designed to fight the legacy of corruption that still suffused Iraqi society. Order 55 created the Commission of Public Integrity; Order 57 established a new and unprecedented (in the Middle East) Inspector General system; and Order 77 empowered the existing Board of Supreme Audit's mandate with an expanded role in auditing the government's accounts. Once the Iraqi government achieved full sovereignty in mid-2004, it assumed the duty to implement these orders. But, with the exception of the Board of Supreme Audit, the government's efforts have had little positive effect. Corruption remains dominant and is, according to many Iraqis, "worse than it has ever been."<sup>47</sup>

Defeating a large corruption problem requires first recognizing and accepting its scope. That appears to be a current challenge facing Iraq. The October 2012 Quarterly Report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction states that, while "both Prime Minister al-Maliki and Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud concede that corruption remains a problem, both state that the pervasiveness of corruption has been exaggerated."<sup>48</sup> Adverting against this is a report from the Board of Supreme Audit that up to \$800 million a week is lost to money-laundering in Iraq. The figure strikes one with incredulity – perhaps it is exaggerated - but whatever the actual number, grand corruption now afflicts Iraq, and the government must act or lose credibility, which would soon be followed by the loss of stability.

The Iraqi authorities did take important action in October 2012 by removing the Governor of Central Bank of Iraq and most of his senior staff, charging them with corruption. The CBI has the duty to address money-laundering, a duty it shirked for years. The head of the Board of Supreme Audit now leads the CBI; this is a productive development, a first front, if you will, in a

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<sup>46</sup> Transparency International, Corruptions Perceptions index 2012.

<sup>47</sup> Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, October 2012 report, at p. 76

<sup>48</sup> Id..

new and perhaps initial genuine fight by the Government of Iraq against grand corruption. Contra Maliki and Medhat, it is a fight against a mammoth problem, aptly recognized in the State Department's Human Rights Report for 2011, which noted that the country is "rampant [with] corruption at all levels of government and society."<sup>49</sup>

The State Department's report further describes difficulties that have confronted and impeded implementing the rule of law in Iraq:

Effective joint action by anticorruption institutions did not take place. Their interaction was uncoordinated because of a lack of agreement about their role, ineffective legislation, and insufficient political will. The absence of accountability continued, reinforced by several statutory provisions, unclear regulatory processes, and limited transparency. Many IGs claimed that their ministers resented and stifled their efforts at oversight and that some openly thwarted IG staff with threats of dismissal for the basic functions of oversight. Ministers ordered major corruption investigations dropped. As in previous years, ministries effectively stalled investigations by failing to comply with requests for information or officials to appear in court.<sup>50</sup>

The October 2012 SIGIR report reaches similar conclusions:

In recent interviews with SIGIR, numerous senior Iraqi officials, advisors to Iraq's anticorruption institutions, and program implementers have pointed to a clear evolving pattern of corruption that has become institutionalized within the government and political system of Iraq. In the view of several officials, corruption has transformed from controlled corruption under a dictatorship, to corruption out of control during a period of lawless violence, to the current situation, where corruption and the patronage it allows has become a means of governing.<sup>51</sup>

SIGIR further amplified the impact corruption has had on governance:

A repeated complaint, even among the supporters of the current government, has been the "Quota System," which is shorthand for the allotment of government posts according to political blocks. Officials who owe their positions, and thus loyalty, to their political sponsors are compelled to siphon government largess to political backers according to arrangements made outside of public view. In some cases, this practice has nearly swallowed up entire projects and programs, leaving the public to benefit from a small fraction of the money spent.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Department of State, Iraq Country Report at p.1 in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186638.pdf>

<sup>50</sup> Id. at p.30.

<sup>51</sup> SIGIR report, supra note 2, at p. 76.

<sup>52</sup> Id.



All of these weaknesses accrue to the great detriment of the Iraqi people and are precisely what the CPA orders and the anti-corruption institutions they established were designed to preclude. The severe shortfalls that instead ensued broach a fundamental question: what lessons should be drawn from the generally poor results of U.S. and Iraqi efforts to implement the rule of law in Iraq?

### **What Must be Done: Lessons Learned**

There are at least six lessons on rule of law and corruption to draw from the Iraq experience.

First, the problems of corruption are ultimately problems the host nation must resolve. They are not easy to fix, even in more peaceable and prosperous societies.<sup>53</sup> Crucial to this resolution is the engagement of the citizenry. A public effort focused on promoting greater transparency must be an essential part. Without transparency, accountability is impossible.

Second, ensuring transparent institutions requires political and technical effort. Effective best practices with respect to the flow of money, including competent accounting and auditing efforts, must be implemented. Outside expertise is usually needed, and these experts require sufficient resources and the authority to effect systemic change. Ensuring the sustainability of effective transparency programs may call for enduring engagements by outside agencies. Further, requiring progress on transparency from the host nation as a prerequisite to continuing external support and resourcing could be a useful tool with which to coerce meaningful change.

Third, agencies bringing rule of law assistance should prioritize at the outset attacking the problems of corruption and poor accountability. Initially limiting the flow of assistance funds might be necessary, if the host nation's institutions are weak. Outside contracting practices should include terms to help ensure that moneys go where they should.

Fourth, sustained external support may be necessary to build systems that reduce corruption over the long term. In Iraq, there were substantial U.S.-provided rule of law assistance activities administered by the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The DOJ focused on the Iraqi judiciary, helping to establish a relatively competent one. The DOD spent billions training the Iraqi police; today's Iraqi police is the best equipped in its history. USAID spent billions promoting civil government reform across the country, including investing in an anti-corruption academy in Baghdad. These programs the United States instituted were entirely sensible, but proved to be less effective than desired. They illustrate that a broader engagement beyond education and training may be needed to arrest the corruption problem. Planning for such requires resolving multiple issues ahead of time, including scope of available resources, the nature of needed expertise, the limits imposed by host-nation sovereignty, and the trade-off between addressing corruption and improving security (the latter comes first but the former is tied to it).

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<sup>53</sup> China's multiple anti-corruption campaigns are illustrative of the difficulty.

Fifth, establishing the rule of law may take time and warrant some agreed-upon limitations regarding certain host nation prerogatives. As noted, significant outside supervision over the flows of money may be necessary to reduce fraud; that may also be true regarding the development and implementation of organizations such as inspectors general devoted to promoting the integrity of fund use

Sixth, outside agencies should integrate their assistance efforts. A recent SIGIR report on lessons learned stated with respect to the piecemeal anti-corruption effort in Iraq:

The same predicament afflicted anticorruption programs. Many agencies conducted efforts without sufficient coordination with or oversight by the U.S. Embassy. In 2006, SIGIR recommended that the U.S. Ambassador establish a policy that would require all agencies conducting anticorruption programs to vet their programs through a joint executive steering group and direct a joint executive steering group to conduct a complete review of each U.S.-funded anticorruption program, assessing how that program helped achieve the U.S. government's anticorruption strategic goals.<sup>54</sup>

## **Conclusion**

A crucial lesson from Iraq is that, during stabilization and reconstruction operations, establishing effective rule of law institutions must be the cornerstone of any assistance program. It is essential to set the necessary rule of law foundation upon which a thriving democracy could be built, one sufficient to withstand the inevitable upheavals that accompany systemic change within nations.

Corruption in most countries is simply a crime; but corruption in fragile states is a matter of national survival. Once corruption infects a system, rulers will not easily give up power, legitimate opposition will be undercut, and the citizenry will not be served. The infection of corruption in Iraq continues to threaten the state's well-being.

Unless the means for establishing strong and reliable rule of law system are well-planned at the outset of a stabilization and reconstruction operation, a fragile state could easily fail. In contingency settings, the United States has many goals. But ensuring the effective rule of law is the most critical. Ultimately, establishing sound rule of law institutions is more important than finding the right "strong man" to lead the country. Only security ranks higher; and security and the rule of law are inextricably linked.

President John Adams said, during the early years of our Republic: "We are a nation of laws not men." This wise predisposition towards the rule of law still has boundless applicable merit. Today, it should infuse all SRO planning so that future assistance efforts for fragile or failing states invariably incorporate robust and effective rule of law programs.

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<sup>54</sup> Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons from Auditing U.S.-funded Stabilization and Reconstruction Activities* October 2012, at p. 10.

## Chapter 7

### Lessons from Social Psychology for Complex Operations

*Rosa Brooks*

“Complex operations” are, as the term implies, complex—which is generally a polite euphemism for “really hard.” Counterinsurgency operations are hard; stability operations are hard. They are particularly hard in the context of cultures that are rife with corruption, factionalism, tribalism, and extremism. Well-meaning efforts to promote rule of law and good governance run up against popular mistrust and entrenched forms of nepotism; funds for economic development projects vanish into the pockets of local powerbrokers; efforts to inculcate a sense of unified national purpose run afoul of tribal dynamics that pull people in the opposite direction. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands have lost their lives, but prospects for future peace and stability remain doubtful.

It would be wonderful if social science could offer simple recipes for turning the hard into the easy, but no such recipes exist. Nonetheless, examining some insights from social psychology can help explain just *why* it is so difficult for outsiders to bring about cultural change (particularly rapid cultural change). Most important, understanding the social dynamics behind tribalism, extremism, and factionalism may help us make some modicum of progress, against the odds.

Social psychology is the branch of psychology that looks at how individual human beings interact with each other. It is concerned with questions of social perception, social influence and social interaction: how individuals understand themselves in relation to groups, how individual behavior is influenced by others, and how group dynamics work. Individuals may view themselves as free agents, basing decisions about what to think and how to behave on their individual preferences and individual reasoning. Social psychology tells us that this view is, at best, incomplete: much of the time, at least, individual beliefs and behaviors are shaped far more by the social settings in which we find ourselves. Our families, friends, colleagues, neighbors, teachers, leaders, and even our enemies influence our reasoning and our behavior, often in ways we don't fully realize—and sometimes in ways that would dismay us if we understood them fully.

This short essay looks at several social forces that powerfully affect human behavior, often trumping individual “character,” personality, knowledge, and even deeply held moral beliefs. Specifically, this essay looks briefly at issues of obedience, conformity, and group polarization, discussing the ways in which they can affect and distort individual behavior. Ultimately, this essay suggests, understanding these dynamics can have important implications for how we think about counterinsurgency and stability operations.

## Obedience

At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the idea of “moral progress” was popular; in Europe and the United States, serious intellectuals and political leaders spoke confidently of the dawning of an age in which violent conflict, war, and killing might be utterly eliminated.

The following decades destroyed that optimistic fantasy. Two World Wars demonstrated that humanity was less advanced than utopians had believed, and the willful atrocities of the mid-twentieth century left many formerly optimistic thinkers reeling. The Nazi death camps killed six million civilians, and in Stalin’s Russia and Mao’s China, millions of “counter-revolutionaries” were executed or sent to their deaths in hard labor camps.

In 1961, far away from the battlefields and the death camps, Dr. Stanley Milgram of Yale University’s Psychology Department struggled to understand the Holocaust and similar mass atrocities. How could people have *done* such things to other people, Milgram wondered? How could ordinary people turn on their neighbors, their colleagues, their friends? During the Holocaust, how could so many Germans “just follow orders” and participate in the killings, and so many others turn a blind eye?

Assuming that the German nation had simply produced a disproportionate number of evil people seemed far too simplistic an answer. Dr. Milgram suspected, though, that there might be some characteristics that rendered particular cultures more susceptible to “going bad” than other cultures. Perhaps, Milgram hypothesized, Germans were socialized to obey authority more than, say, Americans or Englishmen or Frenchmen. If Germans were brought up from an early age with an unusually high degree of respect for authority, he reasoned, a political leader like Hitler could readily bend that to evil purposes. A “culture of obedience” might help explain the Holocaust.

“From 1933 to 1945 millions of innocent people were systematically slaughtered on command,” wrote Milgram. “Gas chambers were built, death camps were guarded, and daily quotas of corpses were produced with the same efficiency as the manufacture of appliances. These inhumane policies may have originated in the mind of a single person, but they could only have been carried out on a massive scale if a very large number of people obeyed orders.... Facts of recent history and observation in daily life suggest that for many people obedience may be a deeply ingrained behavior tendency, indeed, a prepotent impulse overriding training in ethics, sympathy, and moral conduct.”

Milgram set out to evaluate varying cultural levels of obedience through a series of carefully designed experiments. His plan was first to evaluate levels of obedience in a control group of American subjects, and then repeat the same experiment with German subjects. If it was indeed the case that Germans were uniquely prone to offering unquestioning obedience to authority figures, thus explaining why so many Germans had been willing to inflict pain on others during the Nazi era, then it ought equally to be the case that people from less authority-oriented cultures would be more likely to resist orders to inflict pain. Americans, reasoned Milgram, prize

independence and freedom. As a result, Americans should be particularly resistant to blind obedience.

The experiments Milgram conducted to test his hypothesis are now considered classics of social psychology. Milgram recruited several assistants and then advertised for undergraduate volunteers to participate in what was purportedly a study of educational methods. The volunteers were offered a “cover story” to keep them from knowing in advance that their obedience levels were going to be evaluated, which might have distorted their response. They were told instead that they would be participating in an experiment designed to see if threats of punishment would induce “learners” to concentrate more effectively on simple academic tasks. The volunteers were placed in a room with a small electrical device in it and told that they could set the device to deliver electric shocks of varying intensity to other volunteers—the “learners”—who were in a separate room, from which they could be heard but not seen.

The other “learners”—who were actually Milgram’s assistants, unbeknownst to his volunteer subjects—were asked to complete simple mathematics problems. Milgram’s volunteer subjects were told that if the learners completed a problem incorrectly, they should administer a small electric shock, with shocks to increase in voltage if the learners continued to come up with incorrect answers. The voltage on the electric shock machines could be dialed up by the volunteers, from mild shocks to 450 volts, a voltage marked “lethal” on the machine.

Of course, the machine was a fake: it delivered no electric shocks at all, because Milgram’s feigned interest in the effect of punishment on learning was only a pretext for his real experiment. Instead, Milgram wanted to find out how obedient to authority the average person was: would ordinary American volunteers be willing to administer painful or potentially lethal electric shocks to total strangers for no reason except that a man in a lab coat told them to? Or would they refuse?

Before conducting his experiments, Milgram took it for granted that most normal Americans would refuse to inflict serious pain on complete strangers—in fact, prior to conducting his experiments, he asked 40 other psychologists to estimate the percentage of American volunteers they believed would willingly administer the full 450 volt “lethal” shocks. His colleagues estimated that less than 1 percent of the volunteers would do so.

But neither Milgram nor his 40 colleagues got it anywhere near right. In his first experiment, a full two-thirds of his subjects were willing to administer the maximum 450 volts to “learners” who repeatedly offered incorrect answers, even in the face of loud cries of pain and increasing desperate pleas from the “learners.”

Milgram was astonished and appalled. He repeated his experiment almost twenty times, each time varying a few details. Would housewives or plumbers or carpenters be less willing to inflict pain than undergraduates? Had he inadvertently conducted the experiment on a group of sadists? Would it matter if the experiment was conducted in an old warehouse rather than in a building on Yale University’s campus? What if the volunteers could see, rather than just hear, the “learners”?

Would obedience be reduced if orders were not given by a respectable-looking Yale professor in a white lab coat?

In the end, through all the variations of the experiment, an average of two-thirds of the American volunteers were willing to administer potentially lethal shocks. Depending on how the experiment was structured, Milgram found, his subjects' average obedience levels could be ratcheted up or down slightly: up when the gradations between shock levels were smaller and the increase in voltage more gradual, for instance, and down when the volunteers were informed repeatedly that they did not have to continue and that many other volunteers had decided against continued participation. But the bottom line was depressing. Even in the lab, even when nothing more than an educational experiment was at stake, Milgram found that two-thirds of ordinary Americans could be readily persuaded, in under an hour, to deliberately administer a potentially lethal shock to an innocent stranger.

Would Americans have been more likely than Germans to have resisted Nazism? Ultimately, Milgram was forced to abandon his initial assumptions about "cultures of obedience." As he put it, assessing his experiments, "Stark authority was pitted against the subjects' strongest moral imperatives against hurting others, and, with the subjects' ears ringing with the screams of the victims, authority won more often than not."<sup>55</sup>

Milgram's experiment was repeated by other psychologists around the world, who reported almost no significant regional or cultural variation. From Europe to Asia to Africa, roughly the same percentage of people could be quickly induced to inflict grievous harm on innocent strangers.

Other experiments on the effects of obedience on perceptions and behavior were conducted by social psychologists elsewhere, and generally produced results consistent with Milgram's findings. At Stanford University, for instance, Dr. Philip Zimbardo created a mock prison, assigning students randomly to play the roles of prisoners and guards. The "prisoners" had to wear prison garb and stocking caps and were assigned numbers in lieu of names; the "guards" were issued truncheons and mirrored sunglasses. After only a week, Zimbardo was forced to end the experiment prematurely: the "guards" had begun to humiliate and abuse the "prisoners," and several "prisoners" seemed close to experiencing mental breakdowns. Zimbardo's conclusion: most people automatically begin to play the social "roles" that they're assigned, and those roles can quickly trump their individual personalities.<sup>56</sup>

At Princeton, psychologists John Darley and Daniel Batson conducted a famous series of experiments known as the "Good Samaritan" experiments. The experimental subjects were Princeton Theological Seminary students, who were told that as part of a study of vocational preferences, they should prepare a short practice sermon that would later be delivered in a building a short walk away. Some of the students were then instructed that they were running

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
<sup>55</sup> Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View* (1974).

<sup>56</sup> Craig Haney, Curtis Banks and Philip Zimbardo, "Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison," *International Journal of Criminology and Psychology*, I, 69-97 (1973).

late, and should rush to deliver their practice sermon. Others were told that they had plenty of time to get to the location at which they would deliver their sermon. Darley and Batson had an assistant planted along the route the students would have to take, and when each student approached, the assistant feigned sudden illness, slumping over, coughing and groaning. Darley and Batson found that although 63 percent of the students who had been told there was no rush offered to help the apparent victim, only 10 percent of the divinity students who had been instructed to hurry offered to help. Even those students who had just finished preparing sermons on the parable of the Good Samaritan were more influenced by the experimenter's instructions to hurry than by the ethical lesson of the story on which they planned to preach.<sup>57</sup>

## Conformity

A decade before Stanley Milgram began his experiments on obedience, another psychologist, Solomon Asch, asked his volunteers to look at a picture of a line, then at another picture of several lines of varying lengths, and identify the line that most closely matched the line in the first picture.



When assessed individually, his subjects effortlessly and correctly performed the simple task. But when they were placed in groups, and the other members of the group (confederates of the experimenters) provided false answers, Asch's subjects were shaken. Although most of them continued to offer the correct answers, about a third of Asch's subjects began to doubt the evidence before their own eyes, and changed their answers to agree with the other members of the group.<sup>58</sup>

Asch was troubled by his findings: either a third of his subjects had literally ceased to trust their own perceptions simply because others expressed different views, or, perhaps worse, a third of his subjects had lied about their own perceptions in order to go along with the group. Either way, it was disturbing. It was of course true, Asch acknowledged, that "Life in society requires consensus as an indispensable condition. But consensus, to be productive, requires that each individual contribute independently out of his experience and insight. When consensus comes under the dominance of conformity, the social process is polluted and the individual at the same time surrenders the powers on which his functioning as a feeling and thinking being depends.

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<sup>57</sup> John M. Darley And C. Daniel Batson, "From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of Situational And Dispositional Variables In Helping Behavior," *Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology* 1973, Vol. 27, No. J, 100-108.

<sup>58</sup> Solomon A. Asch, "Opinions and Social Pressure," *Scientific American*, 1955.

That we have found the tendency to conformity in our society so strong that reasonably intelligent and well-meaning young people are willing to call white black is a matter of concern.”

His concerns were not misplaced. Later experiments conducted by others provided additional support for the idea that being in a group could substantially alter an individual’s perception and behavior. In 1968, for instance, psychologists John Darley and Bibb Latane found that people in groups were substantially less likely than people on their own to help someone else who seemed to be in distress: those in groups tended to assume that someone else would help, or that if no one else was helping, there must be some good reason not to help.<sup>59</sup> In another series of experiments, Darley and Latane found that, if left alone in a room that appeared to be filling up with smoke, most individuals would promptly raise the alarm. But if left in a room in which other people seemed undisturbed by the smoke, individuals would ignore the smoke themselves.<sup>60</sup>

In many ways, this is not particularly surprising: humans, like all social animals, are highly attuned to the reactions of others in the herd or pack. When we’re in groups showing alarm, we feel alarmed; when others in our group seem relaxed or indifferent, we tend to assume that there’s nothing to worry about—even if that means selectively ignoring the evidence of our own eyes and ears. Conformity is a very powerful influence.

### **Group Polarization**

Group dynamics can profoundly influence individuals in other ways as well. Individuals within groups of similar people reinforce each other, for instance. When groups are made up of individuals who start out sharing similar attitudes, studies have found that after group discussions, the individual attitudes of group members tend to intensify.<sup>61</sup> In other words: if a group is put together from individuals who are politically conservative, individual attitudes after group discussion of politics are even more conservative. Conversely, when groups are made up of moderately liberal individuals, group members will each express even more liberal views after spending time in group discussions.

Internal dissent can make a difference: if experimenters plant a confederate in a group who is instructed to start out agreeing with other group members and then gradually shift to express doubt, group members will often modify their views.<sup>62</sup> This effect seems to be largely dependent on the degree to which group members view the dissenter as “one of us,” however: placing a

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<sup>59</sup> See, e.g., John M. Darley and Bibb Latane, “Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 1968, Vol. 8, No. 4, 377-383.

<sup>60</sup> Darley and Latane, “Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1968, Vol. 10, No. 3, 215-221.

<sup>61</sup> See, e.g., Myers, David G.; G.D. Bishop (1970). "Discussion effects on racial attitude." *Science* 169 (3947): 778–779; Walker, Thomas G.; Main, Eleanor C. (December 1973). "Choice shifts and extreme behavior: Judicial review in the federal courts". *The Journal of Social Psychology*. 2 91 (2): 215–221.

<sup>62</sup> See Robert Baron et.al. *Group Process, Group Decision and Group Action* (1999).



single self-identified liberal in a conservative group, or vice versa, merely reinforces polarization, in which other group members take on even more extreme versions of the attitudes they held at the beginning.<sup>63</sup>

## **The Social Self**

The discussion above barely scratches the surface of what social psychologists have come to understand about social perception, social influence, and social interaction. Other studies have examined phenomena such as “priming” and found, for instance, that when trusted peers or authority figures inform individuals that a new person or group possesses certain characteristics (trustworthiness, kindness, brutality, bias, etc.), individuals will tend to ascribe those characteristics to the new person or group even in the face of conflicting evidence.<sup>64</sup>

Similarly, a conservative presented with a paragraph offering a conservative political analysis of an issue will tend to agree with the statements if told that they come from a respected conservative, but will tend to disagree with the statements if told they come from a prominent liberal. (The same is true for self-identified liberals, whose agreement or disagreement with statements can similarly be manipulated.)

The bottom line? Although we tend to see ourselves as rational individuals, making decisions based on reason, factual information, and moral principles, we’re often wrong. Much of the time—perhaps nearly all of the time—our beliefs, decisions, behavior, and even our perceptions are invisibly but powerfully influenced by those around us. Our families, friends, colleagues, superiors, and subordinates all change how we engage with the world. What is more, these social factors are so powerful that they can trump even our deepest individual convictions. As Stanley Milgram found in the 1960s, it takes remarkably little to convince ordinary people to violate their deeply held moral beliefs.

## **Implications for Complex Operations**

What implications does all this have for how we think about complex operations? The implications aren’t earth-shattering: we already know that stability operations, counterinsurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare are difficult, complicated and slow. These insights from social psychology don’t offer any magic bullets. Instead, they help us understand the reasons our efforts so often fall short.

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<sup>63</sup> Dominic Abrams et al., “Knowing What to Think by Knowing Who You Are,” 29 *British J. Soc. Psych* 97 (1990).

<sup>64</sup> See, e.g., Snyder, M., Tanke, E.D., & Bersheid, E. (1977). “Social perception and interpersonal behavior: On the self-fulfilling nature of social stereotypes,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35, 656-666.

In Afghanistan, for instance, we are frequently frustrated by the persistence and resilience of traditional power structures and belief systems. All too often, elections fail to alter the role of local warlords. Tribal loyalties continue to trump national loyalties. Governance and development projects have little impact on local support for extremism or the Taliban. Costly information operations efforts make no dent in local attitudes.

If we cling to the belief that individuals are free agents, making decisions based on reason and facts, the persistence of what we view as self-destructive behavior seems irrational, foolish, and stubborn. We've all heard this frustration expressed: "What's *wrong* with these people? Why don't they understand that we're trying to help them? Why can't they see that they'll be better off if they stop supporting the Taliban [or use courts rather than rely on tribal elders, or send girls to school /vote, etc.]"

But Afghans (or Pakistanis, Yemenis, Somalis, Iraqis) are no more free moral agents than the Yale undergraduates Milgram studied, the Princeton Theological Seminary students in Darley and Batson's "Good Samaritan" experiment, or the Stanford undergraduates in Zimbardo's mock prison. Like the subjects of these famous experiments, and like all humans, Afghans exist in a social context, and that context influences them profoundly. Deciding not to support the Taliban seems like an "easy" decision when viewed from a conference room at the Pentagon or the State Department. Viewed through the lens of social psychology, it's much more complex. Assuming that a simple injection of new people and new information will trump life-long relationships, assumptions, and patterns of behavior is naïve.

This does not mean that social context is destiny. Cultures and behaviors do change, and sometimes they change quickly and unexpectedly. Sometimes, individuals defy every expectation and dissent; creative and principled leaders and dissenters can emerge out of the most homogeneous and authoritarian societies and can serve as powerful agents of change.

We still have only a limited understanding of the factors that lead to rapid change or that enable some individuals to break free of the herd. This is an exciting area of research, and perhaps, in years to come, we will have a more nuanced understanding of the social factors that enable change. For now, though, the main lesson from social psychology is that we should keep our expectations low and avoid making easily avoidable mistakes. This has several concrete implications for complex operations.

First, we shouldn't expect rapid change. Our own imperfect American democracy developed through centuries of struggle — we shouldn't imagine that Afghanistan or any other society will transform overnight. Modern communications and transportation technologies may have accelerated the pace of cultural change, but enduring change is still generally a project of generations.

The World Bank's 2011 *Report on Conflict, Security and Development* offers some cautionary numbers. Looking at states that have undergone significant institutional transformations in the 20th century, it finds that the twenty fastest reformers took an average of 27 years to meaningfully control corruption, 36 years to attain substantial government effectiveness, 17

years to reduce the military's role in politics to acceptable levels, and 41 years to achieve significant progress on core rule of law indicators.

That said, we shouldn't give up on the idea of reform, and we should be wary of slipping into the assumption that Afghans (or Iraqis or Somalis or Serbs, or any other group) "aren't ready" for democracy or human rights. No society is entirely homogeneous and, as individuals, may long for things their groups prevent them from obtaining. Stereotyping other societies as "primitive" or unchangeable is just as naïve and dangerous as assuming that change can always be rapid.

Second, and relatedly, we should look for low-hanging fruit and focus our efforts on areas where there is already internal debate and some momentum for reform. For instance, changing entrenched patterns of low-level corruption may simply be impossible in the span of a few years—but cracking down hard on egregious examples of high-level corruption may be more likely to succeed, since ordinary Afghans may identify far less with corrupt senior officials and be more likely already to condemn their behavior. A single successful reform may empower internal reform advocates to press for more. At times, small changes in some areas can trigger rapid change in many areas at once. Consider the Arab Spring, for instance: change was slow in coming, but when it came, it came in a tidal wave. Third, we should continue and expand existing efforts to enhance the linguistic and cultural know-how of our military and civilian personnel. It's not feasible to teach every enlisted soldier Dari and Pashto or other local languages, but we should certainly be able to insist that everyone representing the United States government learn enough about the cultures with which they will work to avoid unintentionally insulting host nation residents—even if it's only a matter of learning twenty words such as "hello," "please," "thank you," and the like.

Similarly, we can and should train all U.S. personnel in the basics of culturally appropriate behavior. How many times have we all seen American soldiers cursing, in English, in front of Afghans, on the apparent assumption that the Afghans won't understand? Thanks to the globalization of media, if there are one or two English words virtually every person around the world now understands, they're probably four-letter words. Small acts or omissions such as the failure to remove sunglasses when speaking directly to someone may be perceived as insulting, while offers of food or drink can be an important sign of respect.

There are a multitude of simple ways we can communicate respect or insult, and though these vary from culture to culture (and even from region to region and tribe to tribe), we should bear the burden of making sure we know and abide by the basic local rules of courtesy. There will be circumstances in which the niceties of local etiquette simply can't be followed—but there's no excuse for not observing the courtesies when it's possible to do so. We should insist that leaders hold their subordinates accountable for behaving with respect—including through making it clear that derogatory terms for locals are unacceptable. ("towelheads," "ragheads," and so on). Such terms dangerously dehumanize the people we must work with or win over, thus increasing the risk of abuse.

Fourth, we should discard the "war of ideas" metaphor once and for all. It badly misunderstands and oversimplifies the relationship between ideas, attitudes, and behavior. To paraphrase the

National Rifle Association: ideas don't kill people, people kill people. Viewed through the lens of social psychology, we know that "ideas," in the abstract, may play very little role in people's behavior. Reading a book, hearing a sermon, or watching a video is unlikely to turn an ordinary young man into a committed terrorist, for instance, unless quite a few other factors are pushing him in the same direction. "Ideas" and emerging ideologies aren't entirely irrelevant, but neither are they necessarily central to what makes a particular individual support the Taliban or al Qaeda.

The "war of ideas" metaphor is dangerous, for it leads us to fixate on the notion that behavior will change only if we can come up with the right "message" or better "counter-narratives." But as foreigners, we're the least likely people to persuade locals simply through our messaging. If anything, our messaging may be counterproductive.

Fifth, we should redouble our efforts to identify and empower credible local change agents. Conformity, obedience, and group polarization studies all tell us that those who are perceived as "outsiders" are far less likely to change a group's attitudes than those perceived as insiders. But dissent from "insiders" can be extremely powerful, profoundly altering group dynamics. We can't manufacture "insiders" by simply anointing some favored local interlocutor as our emissary to those who differ from us—groups can easily distinguish between "true" insiders and false ones. Insiders need to be found, not created. Once identified, however, access to external resources (whether informational, logistical, technical or financial) can help increase the effectiveness of internal change agents. The United States didn't create credible leaders such as Burma's Aung San Suu Kyi—but, at crucial moments, support from international actors may have been vital in helping ensure her message could be widely spread.

Relatedly, we should keep in mind that there is no single "Afghan culture," just as there is no one "American culture." Every society has some degree of internal heterogeneity, though it may be hard for outsiders to see it. Different regions, different tribes, different professions—each may have its unique internal culture (or cultures). The old saw that "all politics is local" applies in spades to COIN and stability operations: tactics, rhetoric, and people persuasive to one group may have the opposite effect in another. Identifying and empowering local change agents is key, but effective only if we understand that the determinants of credibility may vary substantially from sub-culture to sub-culture.

A sixth lesson from social psychology is that we should be as attentive as possible to issues of institutional architecture. Understanding the situational factors likely to influence individual perceptions and behavior not only helps us comprehend why others behave as they do, it also helps us design better institutions as reforms move forward. Milgram and those who followed him found, for instance, that even a small amount of internal dissent could dramatically change the behavior of individuals and groups. This insight has practical implications. Whether we are advising partners on restructuring police units or developing new local governance structures, we should consider institutionalizing mechanisms for fostering internal debate and protecting dissent. Such mechanisms can take many forms, from institutionalized "red-teaming" built into strategic, operational, and tactical planning; to developing anonymous "dissent channels" that, when used, can trigger automatic reviews.

## Conclusion

Social psychology offers no panaceas, but it sheds light on why even the most seemingly counter-productive beliefs and practices can be so enduring and resistant to change. Individuals don't exist in a vacuum: all individuals are profoundly influenced by their interactions with others, often in ways they don't recognize. Understanding this can allow us to develop more finely calibrated tools for promoting change and reform.

A final cautionary note: we too are products of our social context in ways that may not be apparent to us. Just as much as Afghans or Iraqis or anyone else, we Americans are influenced by social factors. Stanley Milgram's most fundamental finding, perhaps, was that few people are immune from the situational pressures he explored in his famous experiments. We too can succumb to the invisible forces of authority, conformity, group polarization, and priming; we too have our own tribalisms and our own forms of factionalism and extremism; we too are shaped and constrained by the institutional cultures we inhabit. Like the subjects of Solomon Asch's experiments on conformity, our perceptions may be subtly altered by invisible pressures from our social groups. Our understanding of what is necessary, appropriate or acceptable is shaped (and perhaps distorted) by our peers, superiors, and subordinates.

No one can entirely escape these invisible pressures. But recognizing them is a necessary first step towards understanding—and ultimately changing—not only “other” cultures, but our own.

## Chapter 8

### Reconsidering “Nation-Building Under Fire”

*William Rosenau*<sup>†</sup>

Thanks to the looming global economic catastrophe and the burdens imposed by a combined 19 years of intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States, and the West more generally, is losing both the wherewithal and the will to engage in what one leading counterinsurgency (COIN) theorist once termed (apparently without irony) “armed social work.”<sup>65</sup> Yet, when it comes to stability operations, conflict prevention, nation-building, and related activities, some analysts, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and policy-makers remain in a kind of mental anaerobic chamber, largely undisturbed by developments in the outside world. As two representative proponents of nation-building declared in 2011, state weakness in the developing world lies at the heart of a “systemic crisis” that can be resolved only by continued state-building and “a long-term commitment of considerable resources by donor states, as well as from organizations such as the United Nations . . . and the World Bank.”<sup>66</sup>

This chapter considers the past, present, and future of what has been termed “nation-building under fire.”<sup>67</sup> It considers how the perilous internal economic climate and the collision between overweening modernizing ambitions and stubborn reality in Iraq and Afghanistan will likely check the impulses that led the United States to embark on misguided, large-scale state-building ventures in conflict zones. To provide historical context for understanding the deep roots of armed nation-building’s appeal, the chapter looks briefly at modernization theory, a mid-century set of American notions about political development, change, and violence that would provide the theoretical and ideological underpinnings for twenty-first century nation-building enterprises. The chapter concludes by suggesting that although enthusiasm for armed state-building is likely to remain subdued, it is too early to write its obituary.

To be sure, there is some recognition among practitioners and specialists that the precarious nature of the global economy, shrinking government budgets, and the public’s intervention fatigue are likely to impose limitations on the peace-building and development agenda. In the joint U.S. State Department-U.S. Agency for International Development *Quadrennial Diplomacy*

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<sup>†</sup> The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of CNA.

<sup>65</sup> David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” *Small Wars Journal*, March 2006, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/28articles.pdf> [accessed 10 November 2011].

<sup>66</sup> Michael G. Smith and Rebecca Shrimpton, “Nation-building and Interventions and National Security: An Australian Perspective,” *Prism* 2, no. 2 (March 2011), p. 102.

<sup>67</sup> James Gibney, “Masters of Peace,” *Wilson Quarterly*, [http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/blog/index.cfm/Current\\_Books/2011/2/7/masters-of-peace](http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/blog/index.cfm/Current_Books/2011/2/7/masters-of-peace) [accessed November 15, 2011].

*and Development Review* (2010), for example, the authors acknowledge that “budgetary constraints” are likely to be with us for some time to come, and that every effort must be made to “minimize costs” and “maximize impacts.”<sup>68</sup>

After issuing these caveats, the authors move on to more comfortable ground, declaring, among other things, that “[i]nternal violent conflict, weak or failed governance, and humanitarian emergencies in numerous states around the world have become a central security challenge for the United States.”<sup>69</sup> The authors offer a variety of technocratic and rationalistic nostrums for dealing with this disorderly landscape. Prominent among these is the call to repair the supposedly malfunctioning “interagency” machinery required to develop and carry out palliative programs abroad. Unrecognized in this discussion is the fact that this bureaucratic apparatus is “broken” largely by constitutional design, namely, the separation of powers among the branches of the U.S. government.

### **The Deepening Economic Crisis**

That we are in the midst of the gravest global economic downturn since the Great Depression is all too apparent. A sample of recent headlines from the U.S. and international news media reflects the pervasive atmosphere of unfolding economic calamity:

- “New Signs Point to a Global Slowdown”
- “Eurozone Crisis 'Toughest Hour Since World War II,' Says Merkel”
- ”British Economy Braced for Double Blow: £50bn to Kick Start UK, But Growth and Jobs Misery Deepen”
- “Market Rout Deepens Global Economic Crisis”
- “US Poverty Rate Soars to Highest Level Since 1993”

With the leading industrial countries facing little or no growth, widespread and persistent unemployment, a sovereign debt crisis, and the very real prospect of economic contagion, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which politicians would be willing to make substantial contributions to stability operations, peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, or related activities.

“Conflict prevention,” in the world of “peacebuilders” and “stakeholders,” necessarily takes place in countries and regions of only marginal (if any) importance to the United States. Preventing a conflict of real strategic consequence—say, a nuclear crisis between India and

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<sup>68</sup> U.S. Department of State [DOS] and US Agency for International Development [USAID], *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (Washington, DC: DOS and USAID, 2010), p. 17.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

Pakistan—is relegated elsewhere, leaving NGOs, academic specialists, and policy entrepreneurs free to focus on averting fresh outbreaks of instability in places like Kosovo, Liberia, and Timor-Leste.

The prospect of an economic catastrophe may have one salutary effect: it could compel our leaders to make the hard strategic choices they have avoided since the end of the Cold War. Between 2002 and 2007, international donors sank \$50 billion of security and development assistance into Afghanistan.<sup>70</sup> Today, with the United States and Western Europe essentially broke, the capital and the political will required to fix “fragile” states are in ever-dwindling supply.

American decision-makers will be compelled to ask (and at least attempt to answer) difficult questions about where, when, and how to intervene. A teetering Mexico would almost certainly make the cut. The public and political will to respond to large-scale natural disasters abroad—to include what Barry Posen calls “armed philanthropy” seems likely to endure.<sup>71</sup> But in an environment of severe constraints, U.S. policy-makers will no longer have the luxury of acting on urges to reconstruct tattered polities in the American image.

### **“Mandarins of the future”**

Recent studies by a younger generation of historians explore what might be considered the “pre-history” of today’s attempts to erect Western-style polities in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Scholars have drawn our attention to the considerable influence on Cold War era U.S. foreign policy exerted by a group of academic theorists and policy salesmen that Nils Gilman calls the “mandarins of the future.”<sup>72</sup> Deeply grounded in American optimism, scientism, and a faith in progress, modernization theory offered a framework for understanding and managing the difficult but inevitable transition of “primitive” societies to modernity, as embodied by mid-twentieth-century America.

However, leading lights such as Walt W. Rostow, Daniel Lerner, and Gabriel Almond did more than simply theorize. They translated their ideas into American policy action in what were then called the “underdeveloped areas.” The strengthening of the administrative and repressive apparatus of the state lay at the core of the U.S. approach. Because modernization and counterinsurgency share important traits, it is worthwhile to consider them together. Central

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<sup>70</sup> Serge Michailof, “The Challenge of Reconstructing ‘Failed’ States: What Lessons Can Be Learned From the Mistakes Made By the International Aid Community in Afghanistan?” *Field Actions Science Reports* (FACTS), 2010, available at <http://factsreports.revues.org/696> [accessed 5 November 2011].

<sup>71</sup> Barry Posen, “The Case for Restraint,” *The American Interest*, November/December 2007, available at <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=331> [accessed November 14, 2011].

<sup>72</sup> Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).



among these common attributes is what one historian calls “overriding focus on the expansion of state power, government control over a state’s territory and population, and political stability.”<sup>73</sup>

In settings as diverse as Iran, Indonesia, and South Vietnam, theory was made concrete through economic assistance, military aid, and support for local internal security forces. Ultimately, modernization theory functioned as an ideational weapon in the global struggle between Western liberal democracy and communism. In seeking to transform the developing world by exporting to it a particularly American set of ideas, norms, and institutions, modernization theory offered a plausible alternative to the Soviet and Chinese communist models of development. Inexorably linked to the Vietnam War, and excoriated as an instrument of U.S. repression, imperial hubris, and long-distance social engineering, modernization theory fell from official and academic favor in tandem with the collapse of South Vietnam and the U.S. position in Southeast Asia. However, it was to find new life in the aftermath of the Cold War.

### **Rekindling the romance of nation-building**

Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis helped revive the corpse of modernization theory by reintroducing to a new generation of government officials and analysts the notion of a universal trajectory of development, with liberal democratic capitalism as its apogee. Along with so-called complex emergencies and interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans in the 1990s, nation-building crept back into policy discourse. Post-9/11 fears about weak, failing, and failed states as wellsprings of violent Islamist extremism led to a renewed focus on state-building, this time as a weapon in the arsenal of counterterrorism.<sup>74</sup>

In Iraq and Afghanistan, military officers, civilian officials, NGOs, and policy specialists rediscovered the romance of nation-building and its apparently indispensable role in counterinsurgency. For all intents and purposes, nation-building and COIN became interchangeable terms. As one military analyst announced, counterinsurgency is “nation-building in a violent environment.”<sup>75</sup> The joint Army-Marine Corps COIN field manual (FM 3-24), published to great acclaim in 2006, insisted that “the prime objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.”<sup>76</sup> The legitimacy angle was somewhat fresh—the theorists and practitioners of the 1960s seldom bothered with such niceties—but the underlying message was familiar: only strong, administratively competent

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<sup>73</sup> Daniel Weimer, *Seeing Drugs: Modernization, Counterinsurgency, and U.S. Narcotics Control in the Third World, 1969-1976* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2011), p. 6.

<sup>74</sup> Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, “Fixing Failed States: A Dissenting View,” in Christopher Coyne and Rachel Mathers (eds), *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), p. 382.

<sup>75</sup> Adam Shilling, “Nation-building, Stability Operations and Prophylactic COIN,” US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, May 5, 2010, available at <http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/perspective/perspectivereview.cfm?perspectiveID=10> [accessed October 13, 2011].

<sup>76</sup> U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 37.

states capable of delivering public goods can successfully “outbid” insurgents for the public’s support (or at least its acquiescence).

The U.S. government’s enthusiasm for nation-building in conflict environments reached a climax of sorts in 2009. Early that year, the Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative issued the *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide*. Contributors included not only the departments of defense and state, which have an obvious interest in such a guide, but the departments of labor, transportation, and homeland security. If this document is any indication, most of the federal government joined the COIN caravan.

This guide offers ample evidence that counterinsurgency-as-state-building (or is it state-building-as-counterinsurgency?) was no less ambitious in the early twenty-first century than it had been in the 1960s. The guide demands nothing less than long-term programs to “develop the infrastructure and capacity for legitimate agricultural, industrial, educational, medical, commercial and governmental activities.” In a darker vein, the document refers to the need for counterinsurgents to establish total “control” in every realm—the physical environment, information, infrastructure, economic assets, and, most important, the local population.<sup>77</sup>

Writing in 2008, one leading expert insisted that “victory in the Long War requires the strengthening of literally dozens of governments afflicted by insurgents who are radicalised by hatred and inspired by fear.”<sup>78</sup> But aspirations and reality collided in Iraq and Afghanistan. The new world’s counterinsurgents hoped to fashion failed to appear. In Iraq, the largest nationbuilding-under-fire program since the Vietnam War, the end-state was the *status quo ante bellum*, namely, a corrupt, sweltering dictatorship. In Afghanistan, dreams of speeding up history and midwifing the birth of a modern state and society foundered fatally amidst industrial-scale corruption, Pakistani meddling, and Pashtun resistance.

## Conclusion

Whether the ramshackle Afghan state will survive the U.S withdrawal is an open question. But as the end game unfolds, one thing seems certain: after a decade of development, armed technical assistance, and “capacity-building,” and with a worldwide economic storm looming, further demands to shore up the weak, feckless, and corrupt juridical entities that make up almost all of the developing world are likely to go unheeded. The death of Osama Bin Laden and the waning potency of the al-Qaeda “brand”—as suggested by the terrorist movement’s utter irrelevance to the revolts that have coursed through Islam’s Arab core—undercut the rationale for fixing failed states in the name of counterterrorism. In sum, once-powerful incantations about

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<sup>77</sup> Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, January 2009, available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf> [accessed September 25, 2011].

<sup>78</sup> John Nagl, review of Brian McAllister Linn, *The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War*, *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, vol. 153, no. 2 (April 2008), p. 83.

the urgent need to promote what the United Nations termed “political stability, trust in government, and reconstruction” have an increasingly quaint ring.<sup>79</sup>

The focus of U.S. nation-building activities, according to President Obama, should be on America itself.<sup>80</sup> Perhaps it is premature to write an obituary for armed social work. The United States may not be “all-important in the long-range tides of particular peoples' histories.”<sup>81</sup> But the desire to “refashion other worlds” may be more deeply ingrained than we suspect.<sup>82</sup> After all, the intellectual carcass that staggered back to life after being pronounced dead in the mid 1970s went on to exert a powerful influence on a whole new generation of Americans in the twenty-first century.

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<sup>79</sup> UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs and United Nations Development Programme, “The Challenges of Restoring Governance in Crisis and Post-Crisis Countries,” 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government, 26-27 June 2007, Vienna, available at <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan025512.pdf> [accessed November 14, 2011].

<sup>80</sup> Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, “Obama Will Speed Pullout From War in Afghanistan,” *New York Times*, 22 June 2011, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/asia/23prexy.html?pagewanted=all> [accessed 3 November 2011].

<sup>81</sup> Gary Wills, *The Kennedy Imprisonment: A Meditation on Power* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 285.

<sup>82</sup> Jonathan Nashel, “The Road to Vietnam: Modernization Theory in Fact and Fiction,” in Christian G. Appy (ed.), *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), p. 135.

**SECTION IV**  
**FOCUSED SOLUTIONS AND STRATEGIES**

## Chapter 9

### The Hole in Whole of Government Needs Leadership and Learning Organizations

*Ronald E. Neumann<sup>†</sup>*

The much vaunted “whole of government” approach rests on the unexamined but seriously flawed premise that technical experience is readily transferable between cultures. In practice the theory has serious flaws. To improve results requires acknowledging the defects in the theory, instituting new kinds of training of Foreign Service and developmental professionals, adjusted structures in mission leadership, reevaluation of risks appropriate for civilians, and lengthened tours by military and senior leaders to put political and cultural learning into practice.

The experience of stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan has illustrated again the need to deal with reform in diverse areas: justice, health, jobs, and policing to name only a few of the many ways governments need to serve citizens to promote the sense that the government is just and fair and thus to create stability after conflict or in confronting ongoing insurgencies. The skills needed from foreign advisors are as diverse as the fields involved. The realization that all such skills could not reasonably be housed in the U.S. military created a demand to utilize other government departments whose normal tasks and experience lie in such subjects. This demand, for comprehensive expertise in stability operations, has led to an approach summarized in the somewhat cliché phrase “whole of government approach.” It is defined as an approach “that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.”<sup>83</sup>

This paper contests neither the need to address areas broadly defined as part of stabilization nor the need for special expertise to do so. However, as I have seen it practiced in Afghanistan and Iraq, the whole of government concept has suffered from two flaws. Neither is anywhere stated, but the premises are evident from the way we have applied the whole of government concept and from the fact that training, orientation, and assignment policies evidence no recognition of the problems. The first flawed premise is that expertise can be directly applied on its technical merits, that is, if one is an expert in the U.S., one can perform the same function abroad. The second flaw is that experts are so interchangeable that they can be rapidly switched and rotated. The first is false. The second makes it impossible even for good people capable of learning to produce their desired results.

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<sup>†</sup> The opinions in this chapter are only those of the author and do not represent those of any organization with which the author is affiliated.

<sup>83</sup> *FM3-07The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual*, University of Michigan Press, 2012, page 6.

Note: The opinions in this chapter are only those of the author and do not represent those of any organization which the author is affiliated but his opinions are his own.

### **Why technical expertise is culturally dependent**

Part of the problem is that technical experts are used to operating in open societies. When building a road, for example, there may be strong differences of view from local communities, environmentalists, or others, but the opinions are out in the open. One can at least seek compromises and solutions. In many societies differences may not be expressed openly. Noah Coburn, in his book, *Bazaar Politics: Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town*, describes an incident in which engineers try to get agreement on the route to pave a road. The villagers propose an alternate but unsuitable route. There is no real argument, but the discussion is inconclusive and the road is not paved. Only after months of living in the village did Coburn gain sufficient confidence from the villagers to discover that the only logical route from an engineering standpoint would raise the land value and prestige of someone the villagers felt was on the wrong side in previous fighting. But, because they all live in one village, they wanted to avoid zero sum disputes that may leave scars or even create feuds. So the discussion remained unresolved and the road was not paved. A perspective that thinks the question is only about where to pave a road cannot begin to understand why local resistance prevents the issue from being resolved.

This incident also illustrates that gaining necessary local understanding—essential for the “community buy-in,”—may take a substantial time. Community involvement is broadly understood as a necessity in both the developmental and military communities. However, it can rarely be achieved by those in a hurry or governed by inflexible deadlines.

My experience has shown me numerous examples of the limits of technical expertise un-joined to foreign cultural and political sensitivity. In one case in Afghanistan, acting on recommendations from our technical experts about the need to move forward on certain issues that were holding up electricity projects, we put a great deal of pressure on certain Afghan ministries to agree to form an inter-ministerial committee to deal with problems that were being kicked back and forth between ministries. I went so far as to withhold \$10 million and withdraw our experts from one ministry. Still, the dispute remained until I was led to understand that the relevant minister was attributing my pressure to a desire to weaken him and cause his removal. Only after I found a trusted intermediary who was able to broker an indirect solution that assuaged the minister’s fears and gave us the desired technical results were we able to resolve the problem.

In Iraq, I saw numerous cases of “experts” proposing solutions based on technical issues that failed to understand local sensitivities about tribal or ethnic politics. The result was often a lack of Iraqi buy-in and projects begun with foreign funding became “white elephants” that remained uncompleted after sovereignty was passed to the Iraq government in 2005. When I returned briefly to Iraq in 2008, I met with a coalition energy fusion cell that combined military and civilian energy experts. This group was intelligent, motivated, and working hard to coordinate

with their Iraqi counterparts. Yet they were no match for Iraqi suspicions that were so deeply grounded that the ministry of petroleum would not hire even Iraqi experts who had worked for foreign petroleum companies on the basis that they might become spies for their previous employers. These, and other stories, convinced me that the Iraqis would not maintain their cooperation with the fusion cell once they had a choice, and that was what happened despite all the plans and efforts of our experts to construct a mutually beneficial relationship.

In the reform of Iraqi courts there were cases of U.S. deputy prosecutors from the Department of Justice who found themselves at odds with Iraqi judicial officials because the prosecutors were trying to push solutions too strongly based on U.S. case law procedures and precedents rather than the Iraqi traditions of civil law that draw more from European procedures. In Afghanistan, early western attempts at judicial reform alienated both Afghan religious and civil judicial professionals because they felt they were being lectured by individuals unfamiliar with their history and laws.

Some of the cases mentioned were exacerbated by personality conflicts, but there are far too many such cases to look only to personnel selection for solutions. Sometimes the technical “solution” is fine for the U.S. but wrong for the country to which it is being applied, e.g., building dual fuel gas generators in Iraq when there was no gas pipeline system to deliver the natural gas. Often the problem is that the technical solutions are not wrong but rather that they met local resistance the foreign experts did not understand and hence could not take into account in their planning and proposals. Development creates economic winners and losers. Such changes greatly affect local political balances, something technical experts lack experience in understanding or taking into account. Rapidly flowing money into a poor society often expands corruption and crime. Neither technical experts nor military contracting officers in Afghanistan had much time to pay attention to these problems until they became large and difficult to control. In Afghanistan, NATO and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are now struggling mightily to rectify these mistakes but progress is slow.<sup>84</sup>

It is my observation that too often the foreigners proceed to study problems on their own and then present “solutions” without having taken the time to learn from their counterparts the local understanding of the full nature of a problem or the obstacles to solution. The fact that the solutions were frequently presented in Power-Point to non-native English speakers, often using stylized graphics that were incomprehensible to local audiences, only made the difficulties worse. In sum, my experience and discussions with others who have worked in these areas have led me to believe that the concept of transferable expertise is insufficient unless it is combined with deep understanding of the legal and political culture in which the technicians must operate.

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<sup>84</sup> See, for example, ISAF News Letter, *New task force stands up to combat contract corruption*, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/new-task-force-stands-up-to-combat-contract-corruption.html> and Hearing: *Rep. Tierney Says Contracting Corruption in Afghanistan Still Rampant*, Project on Government Oversight, September 15, 2011, <http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2011/09/hearing-rep-tierney-says-contracting-corruption-in-afghanistan-still-rampant.html>.

Such knowledge needs to be more than historical. It must be local and constantly updated by trained observers to understand shifting political realities.

### **Short Tours vs. a Learning Organization**

In her book on successful UN stabilization missions, Dr. Lise Morag  Howard,<sup>85</sup> finds that one of the repeated characteristics of successful missions was that they were learning organizations, able to learn why there were difficulties and adjust their approach to succeed. But this took time. And time is what our personnel on the ground generally do not have. In Iraq in the early days personnel were sometimes rotated in as little as three months.<sup>86</sup> In Afghanistan most of my staff rotated every year, a practice still being followed; that is the institutional equivalent of ten one-year wars with little cumulative learning.

Although U.S. military tours are generally no longer, and sometimes shorter (Marine units, for example deploy for 9 months vs. 12 for the Army), the military is better at having long training periods in which incoming units are able to liaise with their predecessors for an extended period before deployment. Yet it is rare to find a unit at any level with a detailed understanding of what their predecessors once removed learned or tried. Seven ambassadors and nine generals have succeeded each other in ten years in Afghanistan. Divisional headquarters turn over once a year and sometimes more frequently. The rare State Department officer who remains longer than a year may be celebrated for his knowledge but not replicated<sup>87</sup> in other districts, provinces, or the capital despite the fact that, in nearly 200 interviews conducted with military and civilian returnees from provincial reconstruction teams the most prized quality in civilians was their ability to work in the local political culture.<sup>88</sup>

The result of the frequent turnover of personnel, many of whom do not have deep backgrounds in the region before arrival, is that military and civilian officers end their tours just as they begin to understand their tasks. In fact, in 37 years of serving in many counties less critical to the United States than Iraq or Afghanistan, I often felt that I was much more effective in my second year at a post and was really mastering my job in a third year. Various efforts at compiling “lessons learned” do little to fix the problem. The civilian agencies are not staffed to devote significant time to training before a deployment, and officers in the field are working such long hours that they will rarely read the copious lessons learned that are sent to them. The military is somewhat better at putting lessons into training, but the problem is that so much of what needs to

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<sup>85</sup> Lise Morag  Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, Georgetown University 2007.

<sup>86</sup> U.S. Inspector General for Iraq, *Hard Lessons; The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, U.S. Government Printing Office 2009 contains lengthy discussion of this problem.

<sup>87</sup> Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Afghanistan’s Garmser district, praise for a U.S. official’s tireless work*, *Washington Post*, August 13, 2011, discusses the effectiveness of State Department officer Carter Malkasian, who achieved much by staying two years in just one district. There are 364 districts in Afghanistan; such stories are rare.

<sup>88</sup> Studies conducted by the Center for Complex Operations in cooperation with the U.S. Institute for Peace and the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training; not publicly available but reviewed by the author.



be understood is so specific to an area or an issue that replication elsewhere may be more trouble than solution.

The problem is made still worse by the fact that our extensive intelligence community does not contribute to the larger issue of creating a learning organization. So much of our intelligence collection and political reporting is tactically oriented that we constantly fail to understand the broad political and social context in which we have to operate. This was a central point of a celebrated 2010 paper by former Chief of NATO/ISAF intelligence MG Flynn.<sup>89</sup>

“Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy...the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade. Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the power brokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers—whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers—U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeing the knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency.

Yet, in May 2012, when I last visited Afghanistan, I saw little sign of the problem being fixed. So-called Human Terrain Teams have a mixed record for various reasons. Even the good ones are almost entirely dependent for effective utilization on the maneuver unit commander’s understanding of the team’s function, and that too has proved uneven. Our understanding of political and patronage networks of Afghan military and civilian leaders is lamentable from my observation. That we have not established a better mapping of the political terrain is a further illustration of the point. In short, in some places and with some individuals, there is enough progress to show that we could do better. But in no case is there the institutional change to make us truly a learning organization.

An additional cost of rapid personnel rotations involves failure in getting local support, or “buy-in” for foreign designed programs. Frequent command rotations result in Afghans often experiencing major changes in strategy or programs every year. The result is that they become wary of working hard to support a program that is in constant flux.

### **What Is To Be Done? Technical vs. Cultural Knowledge**

Although the problems of tour lengths and cultural/political understanding overlap, they require very different solutions. In one of the workshops preceding this paper, former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley noted that the Bush Administration was aware of the problem but thought it was more feasible to train technicians to go abroad than to train Foreign Service officers to be technical experts. This judgment remains correct in its latter aspect; we cannot

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<sup>89</sup> Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, Center for New American Security, January 2010.

expect to train State officers in all the numerous technical disciplines likely to be needed in the future. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is so tiny, with fewer than 3,000 permanent personnel worldwide, that it cannot hope to meet the full need for stabilization personnel required for large-scale deployments.

Yet at the same time, the experiences noted earlier in this paper testify to the conclusion that a limited amount of training cannot make technical experts effective in unfamiliar political cultures. The people who have that skill are Foreign Service officers and some USAID personnel, particularly those in the sub-disciplines of disaster relief and stabilization (the technical names for these are respectively, the Office of Foreign Disaster Relief (OFDA) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). The problem that needs to be solved is how to combine the understanding of one group with the technical knowledge of the other.

The short answer is training and structure, but, as always, the devil will be in the details. The starting point is the recognition that the technical experts should not work on their own, reporting only to those who share their lack of understanding of local politics and culture. The experts need to be embedded in command structures, whether civilian or military, that require them to either report to or pay serious attention to the views of political and developmental experts who, in turn, must be charged with gaining the necessary knowledge and giving the necessary direction on tactics and strategy to advance projects and broad developmental objectives.

However, if State and USAID officers are to play leadership roles, they, in turn, need much more explicit training in how to work with technical experts and military officers. It is not enough to insist that things have to be done slower, or studied more, or only move at a pace consistent with 20-year development perspectives. These sorts of cultural differences, somewhat exaggerated here for purposes of example, have generated military complaints that the civilians are too slow to deploy and to decide. The resulting acrimony, which I have seen repeatedly, hampers cooperation and unity of effort and leads to a thoroughly dysfunctional atmosphere. The answer lies in training and in careful selection of the type of State and USAID officers who thrive under the intense pressure of the stabilization environment. Not everyone is cut out for it.

This has been understood in the concept of the Crisis Response Corps (now raised to a bureau under an assistant secretary) led by State but including personnel from USAID and many other agencies. But there is no guarantee that when a crisis comes the civilian officers already on the ground or available for a deployment will have the necessary training in how to work with and guide technical experts for maximum effectiveness. That will require much more extensive training at the mid level of Foreign Service and USAID officers. Such training should include exercises with military counterparts. It requires role playing and coaching. State and USAID officers need to learn how to function with different agency and technical cultures just as well as they do in foreign cultures. At times, the officers about to deploy to a particular situation may need short courses in particular technical areas, ranging from electricity to counter-narcotics. The objective would not be to make them technical experts but to give them enough general background in lessons learned from other, related stabilization situations that they will be able properly to evaluate technical and contractor advice in a stabilization context.

All of this needs to be developed. And none of it will happen unless Congress provides the funds and the personnel expansion to take officers out of immediate responsibilities and devote them to training and professional education.<sup>90</sup> Without proper staff and funding these recommendations will be stillborn.

### **What is to be done? Tour Length**

President Eisenhower famously remarked that, “In preparing for battle, I have always found that plans are useless but planning is indispensable.”<sup>91</sup> This quote also applies to training. It is indispensable but it is not sufficient. Training, like planning, is never sufficient for the actual challenges of a particular crisis. To take advantage of training, tour lengths need to be extended so that experienced and trained personnel remain in sufficient numbers and at sufficient levels of seniority to produce organizations in the field that truly can be called learning organizations.

Achieving this requires also that the State Department be willing to accept somewhat greater risks to personnel. Neither State nor USAID officers are soldiers, but, if they cannot get “outside the wire” to interact with the locals, they will not be able to learn or do their jobs. This is not a cultural problem. My experience is that the officers concerned chafe bitterly at restrictions they find excessive. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the problem has been avoided to some extent by placing civilians with military units and allowing the military to decide on when it is safe to move. As we reduce military forces, the clash of security standards is coming into higher relief. The risk-benefit calculations of any individual trip will always be difficult. Yet the fact that so many civilians deployed with the military have traveled and survived under lower restrictions than imposed by the State Department shows that there is a margin for intelligent change. Without change, there will be little point in sending better-prepared civilians out and then preventing them from using their skills.

Yet although it is simple to state that tours need to be lengthened, it is enormously difficult to bring this about. At top levels, the problem is simpler. Commanding generals and ambassadors need to remain longer in their posts, preferably at least three years unless poor performance dictates earlier transfers. Major military headquarters need to remain in place, even if many of their personnel rotate over time. The notion that divisional headquarters need to rotate yearly is one that has been practiced only in this century, and the results do not justify the continuation of this practice.

But to solve the problem of longer tours at the mid-level is much harder. Both civilian and military career paths are based on the ability to move to more senior positions and

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<sup>90</sup> The need for staff and professional education are covered in two reports by the American Academy of Diplomacy (full disclosure, the author is the President of the AAD); *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future* (2008) and *Forging a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Diplomatic Service for the United States through Professional Education and Training*, <http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org> .

<sup>91</sup> Quoted in *Six Crises* (1962) by Richard Nixon and Quotation number 18611 in *The Columbia World of Quotations*.

responsibilities. If the best civilian and military officers are to remain longer in demanding positions or return to positions they have held in the recent past, ways must be found to keep these people on track for promotions at the same pace as their contemporaries. To ignore this means that those who are asked because of their competence to take on the hardest jobs and endure the longest separations from their families have also to be willing to give up the future prospects of their careers. The absurdity of this proposition is self-evident. Yet, to break established institution career patterns will take study and commitment by the most senior leaders of our military and civilian services.

Even if such changes are attempted, it clearly will not be possible to keep everyone in place for extended deployments to dangerous and hardship posts. Therefore, each situation requires careful consideration to identify a limited number of positions that require longer tours to direct and coordinate the full force of the endeavor. If the concept is accepted, some of this can be done in advance planning if there is time to plan. But many crises and stabilization situations come unannounced and without time for extensive planning, especially highly complicated interagency coordination and planning at which we are still learning our way as a nation.

To deal with the unanticipated crises, there will need to be a way to examine the issues of tour length in the field as operations progress; and to make demands that are institutionally possible and that can be filled with reasonable dispatch. On the Washington level, this requires an understanding and willingness to respond that is often absent. Willingness must be backed by the personnel resources so that Washington agencies have an ability to respond; all the understanding in the world will not help if there are no people with whom to respond.

In the field, both civilian and military leadership must have the staff to examine this issue, along with others of a strategic nature, without being so submerged in operational requirements that no time exists for such long-range thinking. The U.S. military, in my experience, usually has staffs sufficient for such thinking if command levels demand it. Civilian deployments, particularly of State and USAID, are usually under-resourced to allow time for such thinking. Demands for operational planning pile up and consume both the field and Washington. Certainly, tour lengths are not the only strategic requirement for which the field organizations need to have the staff resources to think deep and long. Yet they are one of the critical pieces. Without having the right kind of people, with the right training and experience, prepared to remain long enough to learn the intricacies of particular countries and situations, we are unlikely to do better in the future than we have done in the past.

## Chapter 10

### Culturally Sensitive Capacity Building

*John Inns*

It takes more than bricks and mortar, modern equipment, and technical competence to give the rule of law a fighting chance in post-conflict states. It's great to have cops who know the tools of the trade, but what's the point of sending trained police officers to work in a police force that doesn't work at all? We wouldn't put up with this in the West, but all too often we look the other way when this problem rears its head in the developing world.

This issue was extremely apparent in Afghanistan with the National Police. The ANP has soaked up billions of Western training dollars in the past decade. There have been a few success stories, but huge problems remain like wide spread corruption, human rights abuses, low morale, attrition, drug abuse, and the list goes on. These are not technical issues, they are management problems. Learning to shoot straight is important, but it's only part of building effective police organizations.

Throughout the post-conflict world, donor nations must learn to afford the same priority to management and organizational development in the security sector as they do to policing skills. They also have to learn that management training, leadership, and organizational development work is different and often more challenging than helping people improve their marksmanship or their ability to process a crime scene. Generally, there is a right and wrong way to carry out these technical functions, and they are going to be pretty similar in Kabul or Kansas City. However, the picture is far less black and white when it comes to helping people learn how to run an organization, how to motivate others, delegate work effectively, do strategic planning, measure and manage performance, and so on. All of a sudden, the cultural context of the host country becomes hugely important. Ignored, it can be a formidable barrier. Acknowledged, understood and incorporated into training programs, it can be a huge source of leverage. That's what our culturally sensitive approach to capacity building is all about.

Management trainers and organizational development specialists who expect good-old-fashioned prescriptive teaching methods to work on the other side of the world are bound for disappointment. Sadly, that's an apt description for a lot of the western-funded work in the Afghan security sector and elsewhere over the past decade. We've not only treated the management training and organizational dimensions of capacity building as an afterthought; where we have gone about it, we used the wrong approach.

My work in Afghanistan began in June 2007 with a call from a friend of a friend of a friend who worked at the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, or CSIS for short. Essentially, she said: "We're looking for someone to do "western-style," middle management training at the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in Afghanistan. Most of the participants can read and write in Dari or Pashtu, but they don't speak any English, and you will be working with 3rd

string translators because the good ones have all been scooped up by the UN.” “So, are you interested?” she asked, and like any good management consultant with a thin order book, I said sure. “Great,” she said, “You start in Kabul in November.”

That was about it for our marching orders. There was no time to conduct a needs assessment. We were just to get something together and go. I had delivered all kinds of middle-management and leadership programs for companies and governments in Canada and the United States. So I had lots of material to work with, but how do you teach people who don’t understand a word you’re saying? And what about the specific reference to “western-style” management? Apparently, those words had originated with NDS Director, Amrullah Saleh, but he wasn’t going to be teaching the course. Would the students relate to western management concepts and to a foreign trainer who had just stepped off a plane?

Four months later, we were on the ground in Kabul, and we had answers to these questions. Most of the Afghan students were happy to embrace western ideas on how to run an organization and get the most out of people. However, it became clear very quickly that their willingness and enthusiasm had as much to do with our approach as with the content we presented. After wondering for decades, I finally understood what Marshall McLuhan meant in saying “the medium is the message”.

The toolkit we took to the NDS Training Academy on the outskirts of Kabul included two and a half hours of Dari and Pashtu language video that we produced over the summer months in Toronto. We had no trouble finding Afghan Canadians to work as actors, editors, translators, and also as cultural consultants. At the pre-production stage, our Afghan crew reviewed the video scripts very closely. We took every conceivable step to avoid cultural or religious faux-pas and to ensure that the video content reflected the concerns, governing beliefs, and even the humorous elements of the typical Afghan workplace.

The video program included four components:

First, we depicted scenes of middle managers in offices, mines, and factories doing what middle managers do every day— things like delegating tasks, setting goals, and measuring performance. Some of the episodes showed them doing it well and others, not so well. In all, these real-life scenarios covered the 12 basic management concepts that we wanted to convey through the course.

We used video to summarize key learnings for each of the 12 modules and to give out homework assignments that participants were to complete and hand in to their supervisors once they returned to work.

We also had four or five video “ice-breakers,” which told the class a bit about Canada and a bit about their instructors. They touched on everything from traffic chaos in Montreal, to maple syrup, and of course, to the requisite ice hockey scenes.

Finally, we used video to bring the “voice of the boss” into the classroom. Every training session began with a video message from NDS Director Amrullah Saleh telling students that their career advancement would depend on applying the lessons they were about to learn. The video program paid off in a number of ways. Kicking off each of the eight-day training sessions with “the voice of the boss” turned out to be highly motivating to the 20 or so students in the classroom. To participants from far-flung Afghan provinces who had never met the NDS Director, this brief presentation said, “I have taken the time to get involved in this program, so you had better take this seriously.” It also introduced me as someone they could trust and transformed me instantly from being the foreign guy at the front of the class to being the Director’s friend. Then, I would follow up with an “ice-breaker” showing me struggling to learn some rudimentary Dari, and, suddenly, I became their friend, too.

When I played these first two video pieces in the first class, the participants were almost speechless. NDS is an elite agency and this was far from the first course they had taken with western instructors, but they had never seen anything like this before. The old hands recalled lectures from the KGB delivered in Russian while younger officers had all suffered through lessons delivered in English through sketchy translators. Not only was their boss involved, but the instructional materials from the 200-page course guide to the video program and other training aids were all custom made and in their own languages. First impressions are important and we had made a very good one.

The video material was also key to our teaching methodology. As the instructor, without a word of Dari or Pashtu except for “good morning,” I knew exactly what the class was hearing. In terms of the foundation principles, nothing was lost in translation. For each of the twelve modules, I would introduce the subject with some brief remarks through one of the translators whom I had briefed in advance on my message. Then, I would roll one or two videos showing a manager at work doing a poor job on a basic task like assigning work to subordinates. Then, again through translation, I would ask: What did you see in this scene? Is this what happens in an Afghan workplace? Was this a good approach or a bad one? How could this boss be more effective? Then they would break into groups to answer my questions and develop a little report. Back in the classroom, we’d discuss their ideas and then I would show them a scene of how an effective boss assigns work, at least in the West. But I wouldn’t tell them this is how you do it. They had to figure that out for themselves when they’d go back into their groups to build an optimal model for a boss to assign work to Afghan intelligence officers.

In almost every instance, the model they came up with was pretty close to what you’d find in a Management 100 text book in Canada or the U.S. So, we fulfilled our mandate to teach “western-style” management techniques, but in a backhanded way. We didn’t teach as much as facilitate and provided materials and scenarios that helped the students come up with Afghan management concepts that they could apply in their own workplaces.

Our initial inclination to use local language video was largely to get around translation problems. In retrospect, we realize it did much more than that. It established our bona fides as friends of Afghanistan, and by reinforcing our non-prescriptive approach, pushed the classes into an active

learning mode. Were I to do it over again, I would not stray far from this approach even if the participants were fluent in English.

With 20 years' experience in management training, I can tell when I am reaching my students and I know the sinking feeling you get when you realize you are talking over their heads. Some students really "get it;" others don't. The vast majority of the 400 middle managers I met at NDS in 2007 and 2008 got it! Most were turned on by the process and excited about putting what they were learning to work. We got a lot of very positive feedback, not just on the smile sheets where Afghans politely give every instructor 10 out of 10, but also from Director Saleh who had spies in every classroom and met regularly with me to discuss the project.

Of course, the purpose of the whole exercise was to make NDS a better functioning organization. We certainly got a lot of middle-level managers, the NDS leaders of tomorrow, thinking in new and different ways. But did we make a difference at an operational level? It's hard to be categorical on this account, but the anecdotal evidence certainly pointed in that direction. Several months after our initial deployment in Kabul we had a chance to visit with course graduates in some of the NDS regional offices to evaluate whether they were applying what they learned and how it was working out. In one memorable instance, the deputy director in a major regional office, an enormous Pashtun straight from central casting, hugged me off my feet, kissed me on both cheeks, and introduced me as the originator of the management training program that he was now teaching to his colleagues using the study guide we gave to all our students. On top of that, he told me that productivity in his unit was up by 50 percent from applying the lessons he had learned.

I don't know how he got that number, but the fact that he was measuring performance in any way was a breakthrough and showed he had taken something away from our course. I remembered that this fellow had been a strong student, and, if he was actually applying the simple tools he had taken away from our classroom, you would expect to see impressive improvements. Even a little bit of strategic management can make a difference quickly in a low performing organization. Unfortunately, many of our graduates were not as fortunate as my Pashtun admirer. Time and time again, we heard them complain that their bosses were the real barrier to change at NDS.

There was little doubt that Mr. Saleh had already reached this conclusion, and, when I raised this issue with him, he not only asked us to develop an "executive leadership program" for his top people, he also convinced CSIS to pay for it. To me, this was proof positive that we were making an impact on NDS, and this is where things started to get really interesting. The "executive leadership program" included a condensed version of the middle-management course, but the bulk of the time was spent on fundamental questions around vision, mission, mandate, and management accountabilities. Surprisingly, for the elite agency in the Afghan security sector, these topics had never really been discussed in any formal sense, and there was a surprisingly broad range of views among senior executives of what their mission was or ought to be.



We found most leaders welcomed the idea of clear accountability for achieving specific results, but others wanted no part of it. We got some real pushback from people who were horrified at the kind of change they would have to digest to build a modern organization. Even Director Saleh talked about difficult changes he would have to make in his own leadership and management style to move the NDS toward the more “western-style” organization he envisioned.

After 100 of his most senior people had gone through the executive leadership program on a pilot basis, I sat down with Mr. Saleh in November 2008 to talk about the future. It was clear that he had already debated various options behind closed doors with his senior people. They were prepared to move forward with an organizational change program that would reshape NDS over a period of two to three years. Sensibly, we would start at the top, with another 400 top executives from Kabul and all of the provinces going through the executive leadership program. Through this process, he hoped to clarify questions about mission and mandate and where NDS should be in relation to other agencies such as the army and the Afghan National Police. It would also be an opportunity to shape a new management culture around concepts like accountability for results, performance-based promotions, respect for human rights, and fighting corruption. Once this top level work was completed, the plan called for 2,000 more mid-level officers to go through our middle management program. The Director believed that middle-management training could be an effective vehicle for driving his message about change down through the ranks and produce the critical mass of new thinking and behaviour that would take his 10,000-person organization in a productive new direction.

My colleagues and I were truly excited about what amounted to a mandate to reshape an important Afghan organization from top to bottom. Unfortunately, the plan never made it off the drawing board. We were pulled out of Kabul in the run-up to the 2009 presidential election as NDS needed every able-bodied person to look after election security. We left with every indication that we would return to finish the big job that Mr. Saleh had approved. However, by the time NDS officially requested that we resume our work, Canadian priorities had changed. Canada was about to cut and run from our combat mission, and development assistance budgets were focusing more than ever on bricks and mortar projects. The 1,000 strong Canadian training mission would continue its work with the ANP and army, but, again, the emphasis would be on technical skills despite evidence that these organizations lacked the capacity to properly deploy technically trained personnel.

It was very frustrating to watch a good idea get nipped in the bud by people who don't seem to understand what capacity building involves. Surely it is absurd for western nations to expect that safe and just societies will rise from the ashes of war without investing in the institutions that post-conflict states require to secure their streets and enforce their laws. I believe the culturally sensitive approach we pilot-tested in Afghanistan can make a real contribution to building institutions that work in the security and broader public sector of the developing world. The other great advantage of this approach is cost. Throughout the western world, years of leaner budgets lie ahead for development assistance of all kinds. Institutional capacity building is expensive, and the models we have been using, relying heavily on mentoring, have run up huge bills and delivered inconsistent results. The approach we developed at NDS is far more

cost-effective and offers huge potential economies of scale by moving to a “train the trainer” delivery model and harnessing the latest mobile learning technology. For example, we are now working on a management-supervisory training program that can be delivered to participants across vast urban and rural areas through Android phones and tablet computers.

Capacity building is a domestic team sport. Foreigners cannot tell local leaders what they must become. Foreigners must work *with* local leaders to help them define what is needed and shape their organizations to meet those needs. The “Yo, listen up” approach that has been the hallmark of western management and technical training must give way to a much less prescriptive approach to gain the confidence of local leaders and generate a sustainable commitment to organizational improvement throughout the ranks.

Currently, the IPA Group is working with American partners and recruiting personnel in Canada and the U.S. to offer culturally sensitive capacity-building services on a turnkey basis in Asia and Africa—principally Libya, South Sudan, Rwanda, and Somalia.

## Chapter 11

### Formal and Informal Governance in Afghanistan: Cultural Perceptions

*Karim Merchant and Lisa Schirch*

Though often conflated, the concept of “governance,” is distinct from the concept of “government.” Governance refers to traditions and institutions that exercise political authority and resources to manage society's problems and affairs. In the long history of organized societies and communities, the Westphalian state system is still a relatively new form of governance. Prior to this system, populations governed their affairs through various affiliations, e.g., religious, tribal, patronage, businesses and other civil society organizations, to manage resources to address social problems and meet human needs. In Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and elsewhere, these traditional governance units continue to play major roles in the absence of a central state extending to the sub-district level. Thus, calling these places “ungoverned spaces” is misleading and shows cultural blindness. More accurately, regions of these countries experience non-state or informal governance in a variety of shapes and forms, some more functional than the state governance structures. In Western industrial countries, informal, non-state governance structures complement or exist outside of formal state governance.

Governance requires a hybrid approach, including a citizen-oriented state and an active civil society, and a robust private business sector. Together, these three pillars create a foundation for stable governance.<sup>92</sup> An active local civil society is an indicator of a functioning and democratic state. Civil society both works in partnership with the state to complement and supplement its capacity and to hold the state accountable for its responsibilities and transparent governance. Ideally, state governments coordinate formal and informal governance structures.

But an elite-oriented state that serves a private business sector and excludes or represses civil society creates instability. Judging the degree of functional or “good” governance is then a combination of a variety of factors, including the degree to which people participate in decisions that affect their lives and the degree to which governance institutions serve all people with equal opportunity. Asking basic questions best assesses governance: “Governance for what purpose? Governance for whom, by what process, and with what resources?”<sup>93</sup>


The degree of functional and legitimate governance is a function of three factors, illustrated below. These include the governance capacity or bureaucratic structure and revenue; the

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<sup>92</sup> Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Speech on Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society 2012 Summit., <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/05/190179.htm>.

<sup>93</sup> This chapter draws from Hamish Nixon's multiple publications on governance in Afghanistan over the past ten years. See, for example, Hamish Nixon. “The Dual Face of Subnational Governance in Afghanistan” in DCAF Afghanistan Working Group, *Afghanistan's Security Sector Governance Challenges*, DCAF Regional Programmes Series # 10 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011.)

governance performance in different sectors such as providing for transportation, education, healthcare, economic stability, security, and other human needs; and the public perception of how well their economic, social, political and other needs are met through these governance structures.




In Afghanistan, multiple structures exist to perform governance functions. Each of these governance sectors or structures illustrated in the “map” below reflects a different set of actors that manage and make decisions. This chapter surveys and maps six different categories of governance in Afghanistan, including traditional Afghan civil society,<sup>94</sup> the Afghan state, the International Security Assistance Forces, International Assistance, modern Afghan civil society, and insurgent and criminal networks. Each of these six sets of actors wants some sort of governance, but their perception of what is good governance differs. Even armed insurgent groups complain bitterly about government corruption, but their idea of governance would eliminate democratic processes and install conservative religious authorities to make decisions for others.

Good governance has become a guiding principle for international forces in Afghanistan, as it is seen as an integral foundation for peace and stability in the region. But inadequate Western understanding of non-state-based governance has been a significant limitation for developing effective strategies in Afghanistan.

There are three broad approaches to governance in Afghanistan. First, many policy makers formulate the key problem of governance in Afghanistan as one of needing *to extend the reach of the central state*. This approach then focuses on increasing the power and resources of the current Karzai administration. Reconstruction efforts aim to win the hearts and minds toward supporting this same administration and opposing armed insurgent groups. But this approach is too narrow and has shown to have significant limitations with widespread perceptions of government corruption. The second approach, sometimes paired with the first, focuses on *reducing corruption*, so as to foster *legitimacy* for the central government.

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<sup>94</sup> The authors are grateful to Christian Dennys, who lays out three types of civil society in Afghanistan: traditional, modern, and international – in his chapter in the following: Christian Dennys. “The Role of Civil Society in Security Sector Oversight” in DCAF Afghanistan Working Group, *Afghanistan’s Security Sector Governance Challenges*, DCAF Regional Programmes Series # 10 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011).



A third approach to governance aims to *coordinate formal and informal governance* efforts among the first of the five actors mapped above. This chapter first describes these governance actors and then offers the Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program (NSP) as an example of a program coordinating formal and informal governance structures while putting in place a system to challenge and reduce corruption.

## Governance Structures in Afghanistan

### 1. Afghan state (GoIRA) vs GIROA

A centralized Afghan government with Kabul-based ministries is not a new endeavor. Various models of a centralized state began in the late nineteenth century. The current manifestation of an Afghan central state is in the form of an Islamic Republic with clearly defined executive, judiciary, and legislative functions. The current Afghan central government calls itself the Government of the Islamic Republic of *Afghanistan* or GoIRA. In a symbolic illustration of the gap between insiders and outsiders in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and other outsiders use a different acronym—GIROA.<sup>95</sup>

Afghans re-elected the Afghan Parliament in 2010. The parliament is, by necessity, a representative body with broad and varied membership ranging from mujahedeen, Islamic fundamentalists, reformists/modernisers, communists, and Taliban. The only way the

<sup>95</sup> ISAF refers to this government using the acronym GIROA, just another symbol of the disparate terminology between governance actors.

government can compensate for its current lack of outreach is to ensure these disparate representatives have an opportunity to not only participate in key political issues, but also lead regional and provincial-level facilitation and service delivery.

The government's National Ministries have adequate outreach at the provincial level, with a planned devolution of a currently centralised fiscal management and funding system for priorities identified by Provincial Development Councils. The next tier below is the District Development Assembly (DDA), of which there are more than 360. As these are not constitutionally recognised entities, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) manages and facilitates district-level priorities through another national program known as the National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP). At the lowest sub-district level, education and health are the most visible and consistent services of the central government. At the local level, Community Development Councils (CDC) provide the main hub for social development activities and the only contact with the central government for many communities. Together, the DDAs are facilitated by the NABDP and CDCs, which are part of the National Solidarity Program (NSP), both run by the MRRD, described further later in this chapter. The NSP is an innovative governance and development program that links the central government, international donors like the World Bank, international NGOs, Afghan NGOs, and traditional civil society.

The outreach of various government and bilateral projects tend to be uncoordinated. Foreign political pressure and donor strategies link development and security, with greater emphasis on the latter. For example, the southern provinces facing greater levels of insurgency receive a greater concentration of development funds from some bilateral donors, such as the United States.

Overall, the main challenge facing this central state is its intrinsic inability and inflexibility to manage and control a more traditional and complex set of power structures and decision-making mechanisms. The very aim of legitimising and formalising such fluid, and occasionally personality-based, lines of influence and political leverage puts it at odds with itself. However, with the gradual shift in national identity and perception partially brought about by the positive social impact of international assistance, a stronger regional presence, inroads into the establishment of key state instruments like the National Solidarity Program, and a largely youthful population, there is a hybridization taking place between the two approaches. As context takes over and inculcates more traditional perceptions with modernist views and aspirations, the face of a modern Afghan state is taking shape.

## **2. Traditional Afghan Governance structures**

Local traditional forms of Afghan governance are fluid, shifting over time as cultures evolve. Outsiders often conflate tribal, cultural, and religious influences. But various local patronage systems compete with each other and simultaneously co-exist as methods of power preservation and perpetuation. For example, local councils commonly referred to as Shuras, Jirgas, and Jalasas use various versions of local codes of law to manage decisions affecting individual households and entire communities. Layered on top of this is the tenet of Shari'a law, which is

separate from and sometimes conflicts with tribal codes of law called Rawaj. (Pashtunwali is one tribal code, but there are others.)

Three broad forms of local Afghan civil society governance—religious, tribal, and asset-based patronage networks related to class, caste, conquest, or political alliances—operate in different ways even within provinces and districts. Patronage systems draw on significant assets acquired over generations to earn people’s allegiance and loyalty. If the assets are broad in scope and scale (e.g. large tracts of land and transport companies, etc.), the patronage is within the sub-tribal/tribal parameters. If the assets are more localised, the parameters are more sub-tribal or valley/community-based (like a Qum). Tribal governance is historical and hierarchical with an evolving power dynamic that strengthens through local cultural practices, such as marriage and economic ties. More recently, religious councils such as the Shura-i Ulema oversee decisions from the sub-district to national level. During the past century’s intense warfare throughout Afghanistan, commanders of local militias gained power and in turn de-facto power and decision-making. Militia commanders, although usually from the same tribe or area, may not be local and may be acting under the patronage of a rival to the area they are now occupying. Militia leaders may also come from a different background or class and take over by force, without an incrementally evolving process. These locally anchored power structures tend to rely on alliances to exert influence over a greater geographical area.

Although foreigners refer to these traditional structures as “informal” governance, many locals put more authority and formality on these processes than they do on the official Afghan state. Foreigners also tend to belittle traditional Afghan civil society, not recognizing the equivalent roles played by religious leaders, business leaders and patronage networks operating in small and large cities across Western countries themselves. There are both strengths and challenges to these local forms of governance. Insiders understand these better than outsiders. Yet outsiders intent on strengthening governance design most of the governance programs, often with a fundamental glossing over of the intricate, complex, and unique local governance structures operating through religious, tribal, and asset-based patronage networks.

### **3. Modern Afghan Civil Society**

Modern civil society organizations (CSOs) form the third governance sector. CSOs include non-governmental, voluntary groups of citizens that organize themselves on behalf of some public interest. Civil society includes groups outside the market and state: university and educational organizations, professional and trade associations, religious groups, and NGOs focusing on humanitarian assistance, development, human rights, women’s rights, peacebuilding, and the environment. Modern Afghan civil society’s strengths are its understanding and experience working in the local cultural, religious, linguistic, political, economic, social, and historical context. CSOs carry out a wide range of governance programs, from simple service delivery of humanitarian assistance to enabling communities to offer educational, health, and transportation services, monitor corruption, foster human rights and women’s empowerment, and promote rule of law. Civil society has access to regions where the government, international assistance, and ISAF cannot reach. Many civil society organizations enjoy trust and legitimacy with local populations due to long-term relationships and commitments made to these communities.

The challenges of Afghan modern civil society organizations are in its diversity. There are vast differences in the capacity of their staff, the level of their funding and the strength of their ties to local constituencies. Tensions and mistrust exist between government and civil society organizations because of the pressure CSOs put on government for transparency and legitimacy.

ISAF has been eager to collaborate with modern Afghan civil society. But there is widespread belief among Afghan NGOs and international NGOs that direct contact with ISAF personnel makes them “soft targets” for armed opposition groups that view them as proxy implementers of ISAF policy.<sup>96</sup> An increasing number of NGO deaths and kidnappings between 2001 and 2011 bolster this perception.<sup>97</sup> There are also many tensions between ISAF and Afghan civil society organizations such as NGOs and universities on fundamental differences in perception of how to deal with the shared concern about armed insurgent groups. Collaboration requires shared assessment of the root causes of the problem at hand and a shared understanding of how to address the problem with shared planning. Lack of consultation, different understandings of drivers of conflict, and concerns for security mean that most CSOs do not want to collaborate on the ground. Although they are reluctant to collaborate on a strategy they see as misguided, many groups are open to communication and advocate more consultation of Afghan civil society and cultural sensitivity.

#### **4. International Assistance Community**

A fourth governance sector is international assistance. There are three broad categories of international assistance, including international and regional organizations, bilateral donors, and international NGOs.

International and regional organizations include the United Nations, World Bank, World Trade Organization, Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA), ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), IOM (International Organization for Migration), and many others. The World Bank runs a donor pool (the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund) that earmarks funds to Afghan ministries. The benefit of this approach is that a more strategic, coordinated approach to funding allows better monitoring and evaluation to track funding and projects.

Bilateral donors such as the U.S. do not generally contribute to donor pools, but rather direct their assistance through geographical preferencing areas linked to counterinsurgency strategy. The U.S. gives approximately two-thirds of its assistance to southern Afghanistan where active

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<sup>96</sup> “Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds: Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil Military Relations.” Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Mirwais Wardak, Idrees Zaman, Annabel Taylor. Research conducted for the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA) and the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG), 2008. <http://www.cpau.org.af/docs/Afghan%20Hearts%20Afghan%20Minds%20%20Exec%20Sum.pdf>.

<sup>97</sup> Afghanistan NGO Safety Office. Quarterly Data Report. Q4: 2011. Kabul, Afghanistan. December, 2011.



combat takes place and one-third to the relatively peaceful north of the country. The perceived benefit of this approach is that assistance is tied to the counterinsurgency strategy of “clear, hold, build” where assistance helps with the “build” phase. The challenge of this approach is that those regions that are most peaceful perceive that, in order to get development assistance, they need to demonstrate a security risk. Funding unstable regions can incentivize violence in order to draw such donor funding.

Third, international NGOs like Oxfam, Mercy Corp, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, Medicin sans Frontiers, and many other relief and development organizations also play a significant role in governance. In 2001 and early years, due to the nascent state of the government, international NGOs provided most of the service provision in Afghanistan. As government capacity increases, some are becoming donor driven and others have found a unique niche of work in order to survive in this fluid environment.

## **5. International Military Forces**

With the removal of Taliban governance in Kabul in 2001, international military forces have had an evolving approach to governance in Afghanistan. From the start, the international community recognized the need for some sort of legitimate governance structure and supported Afghan opposition leaders at the 2001 Bonn Conference to set up an Afghan Transitional Authority. With an initial mandate to provide security in and around Kabul in October 2003, the United Nations extended ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510).

The mission of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) evolved to include “support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.” ISAF’s mission statement reads that it “conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.”<sup>98</sup>

Governance is seen as a key “line of effort (LOE)” in this mission. ISAF’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are responsible for implementing governance programs. According to ISAF’s website, PRTs “help the Afghan Authorities strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and rule of law and to promote human rights. The principal mission of the PRTs in this respect consists of building capacity, supporting the growth of governance structures and promoting an environment within which governance can improve.”<sup>99</sup> This can mean that PRTs approach local village elders to identify their perceptions of community needs. PRTs then try to match or bridge the needs identified by community elders with ISAF resources.

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<sup>98</sup> Website for the International Assistance Mission in Afghanistan on March 12, 2012. <http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html>.

<sup>99</sup> Website for the International Assistance Mission in Afghanistan on March 12, 2012. <http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html>.

ISAF's strengths are its vast resources and sheer magnitude of effort. Its challenges are the lack of understanding of the cultural, religious, political, social, linguistic, historical, and economic context; the challenge of earning legitimacy in a country previously devastated by "foreigners"; and the challenging economic and political costs in the home countries supporting ISAF.

PRTs aim to foster governance via projects that connect the Afghan government to local communities, thereby, in theory, increasing the legitimacy of both the Afghan government and the international military forces. For example, in the Afghan district of Yosuf Khel, the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) supported an Agricultural Training Program to support the district-level Afghan government's agricultural extension system. The project supported Afghan advisors to the district government, where they would offer training and engage local communities in simple projects such as building and maintaining water tunnels. The communities supplied labour. The district governor would monitor and inspect projects and hand out the CERP-funded project payments to the community.<sup>100</sup> In theory, projects like this garner public support for the Afghan government and reduce support for armed insurgent groups.

There are examples of where this approach both has and has not worked to support governance. In regions where citizens view their government representatives negatively as forces of corruption and repression, these types of programs seem to do little to win public support. In contrast, qualitative research finds that local citizens may resent ISAF from propping up what they perceive as corrupt local officials. And they may see these projects as fuelling local corruption, with contracts going to a limited number of people in the patronage networks of key local elders rather than benefiting the community as a whole.<sup>101</sup>

This points to a problem in methodology. PRTs assessing local needs tend to ask groups of elders what they perceive as local priorities. Depending on the legitimacy of these elders, they may direct CERP funding to legitimate or illegitimate programs. Wide research in the field of development documents that any external influx of resources into a community has the potential to cause greater harm than benefit.<sup>102</sup> Although human terrain teams attempt to map communal divisions, without knowing in more detail about local power dynamics and competing interests, and without a robust democratic process where diverse local community representatives all help to decide community development priorities, support for governance and development can do more harm than good.

## **6. Insurgent and Criminal Networks**

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<sup>100</sup> COIN Analysis News. "Effective Civil Partnerships: Community Project Yields Unlikely Find." August 25, 2011. Found at <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/coin/effective-civil-partnerships-community-project-yields-unlikely-find.html>

<sup>101</sup> Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder. "Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan." Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center at Tufts University. January 2012.

<sup>102</sup> Mary Anderson. *Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace – or War*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.

This complex patina of groups has one overriding feature that allows them to be categorized for the purposes of this piece - they do not respect or recognize the current Afghan administration and are essentially Anti-Governmental Elements (AGEs). The manner in which AGEs challenge the authority of the administration can be fundamentally divided into ideological and economically driven agendas. Although leadership and linkages may involve direct contact, communication, or coordination with other types of AGEs, aside from the sharing of information and a level of resources for the purpose of buying obligations between groups, these AGEs tend to act individually a great deal.

### **Good Governance Programming**

International processes have set out standards and principles of best practices in governance programming. The 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States documents that governance transformations take about 20 to 40 years. Key principles of work toward good governance involve country-owned and country-led strategies, with broad civil society input into a transparent, multi-stakeholder process that is conflict-sensitive so as to not inadvertently cause more harm than good.<sup>103</sup> Many governance programs in Afghanistan do not follow these lessons learned. Using money as a weapons system where development efforts are measured not for the degree to which they improve governance but solely by the amount of money spent seems to both fuel violence and harm authentic development and governance efforts. But the National Solidarity Program (NSP) is an example of a governance program that is designed on these New Deal principles. The anatomy of the NSP program illustrates these principles.

Although the reality and complexity of implementation means the program is not always implemented as designed, the NSP receives accolades for its design precisely because it focuses on coordination between many of the formal and informal governance structures in Afghanistan. The NSP is one of the few programs in Afghanistan supported by all six of the governance structures. Even the Taliban seem to support NSP activity in some regions, or at least to leave the NSP project alone and do not target it. In essence, NSP builds social capital by fostering relationships and interdependence between different types of governance structures in Afghanistan.

The Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) created the National Solidarity Program (NSP) in 2003 to develop the ability of Afghan communities to have local ownership and local leadership to identify, prioritize, plan, manage, and monitor their development goals. Through promotion of local governance, the NSP works to empower rural communities to make decisions affecting their own lives and livelihoods. Empowered rural communities collectively contribute to increased human security. The program supports even the poorest and vulnerable communities.

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<sup>103</sup> International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding. "A New Deal for engagement in fragile states." Busan, Korea. December 2011.

**Management structure and outreach:** MRRD runs NSP through a core operational structure that, at its peak, employed nearly 600 national and some international staff in Kabul. NSP has strong presence countrywide with 6 Regional and 34 Provincial Management Units covering all 34 provinces. MRRD has contracted around 30 National and International NGOs, called Facilitating Partners (FPs), to work directly with targeted communities to implement NSP activities at the local level. With the support of FPs, communities elect their leaders and representatives to form voluntary Community Development Councils (CDCs) through a transparent and democratic process to implement their development initiatives. The NSP encourages communities to elect female CDC representatives or to form separate female CDCs.

**How NSP works:** The NSP builds capacity at the community level to enhance the competence of CDC male and female members in terms of financial management, procurement, technical skills such as conflict management, and transparency. Once communities elect CDC members, they use an inclusive dialogue process that marries participatory democratic principles with traditional tribal circle-based dialogue and inductive model to develop a Community Development Plan (CDP). Formulating a CDP is an exercise that allows the CDC to map out its development requirements and prioritize them. The process follows a secret ballot in which all community members above a given age may cast an individual vote for their representatives. Each CDC was required to elect a certain percentage of women members. Especially in urban and peri-urban areas, communities elected a surprising number of younger community members. Drawing on the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund set up by the World Bank, the NSP provides direct Block Grant transfers to a bank account established by the CDCs to support rehabilitation and development activities planned and implemented by the elected CDCs. The funding takes the form of Block Grants calculated at US\$200 per family, with an average grant of US\$33,000 and maximum of US\$60,000 per community. The NSP releases portions of the Block Grant for procurement and phased implementation of the approved subproject(s).

**The Advantages of Afghan-led local governance:** Over the past eight years, NSP has continued to evolve in response to the needs of the Afghan rural population. Complex sub-projects are now moving beyond basic development needs such as building schools and health centers into the realms of women's empowerment and larger-scale peacebuilding through the clustering of CDCs to pool their collective resources for sub-valley level activities, thereby bringing together a number of local communities around a larger project. In addition, the flexible approach used for this exercise in building social capital, allows the NSP to use different versions of its "insecure areas approach." This operational model allows the NSP to optimize its outreach into areas where international and even some national programs cannot gain political leverage or secure corridors to begin implementation, even in areas strongly opposed to the current administration.

It is now a well-documented fact that NSP-funded construction projects are not only more economically viable<sup>104</sup> but are also less likely to be targeted by insurgents. This is due to several key factors: (1) the choice of projects and their prioritization is demand-driven and arrived at in a

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<sup>104</sup> Barakat, S. 'Mid-term Evaluation Report for the National Solidarity Programme' PRDU, University of York. May 2006

consensual manner; (2) the communities make an in-kind contribution of at least 20 percent of the total project cost; (3) through the promotion, wherever possible, of community-based contracting, there is a significantly higher guarantee that the project will be of a higher standard and more timely in delivery than through any other channel of funding to date; (4) with the community having main oversight and accountability to its members, transparency and anti-corruption is greatly enhanced; and (5) communities felt a stronger sense of national identity through the NSP and were able to respond to possible security threats to their power structures.<sup>105</sup>

**Challenges to the NSP:** Despite all its current success, as with all complex undertakings, there is a gap between the NSP design's intent and the reality on the ground. This is partially attributable to several key factors. First, the NSP had a limited number of trained and capable staff. Ironically, INGOs, the UN, and donor countries attempting to build their own programs to support the Afghan government often "poached" staff from the Afghan government's NSP program, resulting in a frequent turnover in NSP provincial management.

Second, direct fighting between insurgents, ANA, and ISAF forces or internal disputes directly or indirectly resulting from an ISAF or NATO presence delayed the establishment of CDCs in some districts, due in part because the NSP's Facilitating Partners were risk averse and also because, in insecure areas, there is still either stigma or just outright personal danger in working for the government; so staff are hard to recruit. In some insecure regions, CDCs operated under the radar. In these regions, the NSP's advances in participatory, democratic, gender-inclusive community decision-making reverted to traditional, less formalised, and less participatory structures in the most volatile areas. More traditional structures tended to disenfranchise women from the decision-making process.

**Formalisation of sub-national governance (IDLG and constitutional obligations):** The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) and MRRD are central government initiatives resulting from a debate on how to approach sub-national governance. In line with the current Afghan constitution, regulatory improvements and resource transfers will rationalize existing district and community-level mechanisms and representative entities to become district and village councils. Ministries can then decide how they will develop a system of budget-based transfers to communities and the regulations required to ensure transparency and accountability.

When it came to local governance, the donor community was split between backing NSP and a different, more politically oriented Afghanistan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP) run by the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). For a time it appeared as if international donors funded these differing approaches to engendering stabilization deliberately almost as a hedge-betting exercise just in case one came out on top of the other. Hence, as an emerging priority, the move towards sub-national governance was made into a National Priority

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<sup>105</sup> Beath, A., Christia, F., Enikolopov, R., *Winning Hearts and Minds through Development Aid: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan*. Working Paper 166, October 2011. Centre for Economic and Financial Research at New Economic School.

Programme through the “Kabul Process.”<sup>106</sup> One of the government’s efforts was the development of a National Priority Programme for Local Governance (‘Strengthening Local Institutions’) to be led by the IDLG. In this program, the government will phase out ASOPs councils and develop an overall sub-national governance program with formalized structures that integrates relevant elements of the ASOPs and NSP.

Using the already existing DDAs and CDCs as platforms for these District and Village Councils would be the most cost-effective manner in which to achieve this by taking advantage of the significant social capital already available. With NSP now in its third phase, it has pro-actively applied a number of lessons in establishing local representative bodies (i.e., CDCs) over the past eight years. As such, NSP can provide evidence-based and well- documented lessons in local conflict resolution, the inclusion of women in decision-making and as primary beneficiaries, coordinating social development activities, and working closely with diverse stakeholders in a given area. The CDCs remain the lowest-level decision-making platform for social development. However, the constitution states the creation of village councils to be civil-service platforms undertaking the roles of the state. This will mean having to think through a new role for the current social development activities being carried out by CDCs.

However, the devolution of fiscal responsibility and decision-making to the district, and then community level, will be a gargantuan task requiring pragmatic timelines, manageable costs, and the consideration of the complex implications over the local power dynamics.

The NSP is likely to continue evolving in both its quality and quantity. The design of the NSP allows a triple focus on extending the reach of the central state, building mechanisms for accountability and reducing corruption, and achieving better overall coordination between both traditional and modern Afghan civil society, international assistance and the central government. As such, the NSP is an excellent example of how to improve governance with integrated programming using all three approaches.

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<sup>106</sup> The Kabul Conference of July 2010 spawned the ‘Kabul Process’ in which one of the tasks undertaken by the Government of Afghanistan was a prioritisation and review of the ANDS and associated benchmarks in order to foster stronger ministerial coordination and improve its ability to deliver its development agenda over the next 12-24 months. The findings and subsequent targets were then divided on a sectoral basis and placed under the responsibilities of ministry clusters to provide institutional and programmatic responses. Each Cluster is chaired by a single Minister drawn from the member ministries and, with the support of the Cluster Secretariat (housed in the Ministry of Finance), acts as a facilitator, ensuring full coordination and integration amongst ministries. A full menu of national priority programmes has been circulated within the international community; feedback is in the process of consolidation for final endorsement by the GoIRA.

## Conclusion

Too often, approaches to state building assume governance should stem from the authority of a central state. Slow progress toward good governance in Afghanistan results from a plethora of challenges. These include competing local approaches to governance between uncoordinated sectors that duplicate and conflict on the ground. Without an analysis of the complex governance processes in place, foreigners too often assumed that their mission should be to “extend” the state into “ungoverned spaces” rather than to coordinate governance approaches between Kabul and the provincial, district, and sub-district levels. In addition, international assistance and ISAF efforts lack deep cultural knowledge of existing governance structures, the long tradition of tribal, religious, and patronage networks supplying governance across Afghanistan. Moreover, the ISAF strategy of winning support for the central state seemed disjointed from widespread belief and antagonism toward a strong central state perceived as corrupt and predatory. Instead, a more effective approach to governance in Afghanistan may be focusing more broadly on creating better coordination and relationships between different forms of formal state-based governance and informal governance structures, particularly those in traditional Afghan civil society.

Shifts in Afghanistan’s patronage and governance systems over the past 30 years are eroding societal foundations and hierarchical structures, replacing both with newer elements, such as imported religious ideology and the constant realignment of militias. As such, acknowledging the complex and fluid dynamics of power and decision-making requires a re-evaluation of appropriate ways for outsiders to support governance and development. Outsiders too often make decisions without cultural understanding of the complex governance systems in flux within Afghanistan. A model and structure of governance that involves the close interaction of diverse and apparently conflicting doctrines already co-exists with the “internationally recognized” democratic model. Many Afghans think it is perfectly acceptable to have two conflicting groups working together, such as the religious insurgents (Taliban) and NSP or the economically driven anti-governmental elements and the PRTs. The interface between the six different governance sectors described in this chapter happens daily across Afghanistan. Sometimes these approaches complement each other, other times they conflict with each other. Hence, it is just not enough to accept that the current national administration does not enjoy full national coverage. It is also important to acknowledge that complementary formal and informal governance by multiple sectors of society is already a working model and framework of Afghan-owned governance.

Analysis to date has been constrained by simplistic analysis undertaken under unrealistic time constraints with a variety of uncoordinated and narrow objectives. This, in turn, has led to a series of diverse and ill-timed responses that do not account for the complex context, suffering from (1) a fundamental lack of historical perspective (e.g. most analysis and literature commences from 2001); (2) the adoption without adequate adaptation of existing models applied elsewhere; and (3) setting unrealistic timelines lacking a genuine appreciation of the actual environmental opportunities and constraints and the realistic timeline of governance transformation taking 10 to 20 years in other contexts.

Future efforts to foster governance should begin by mapping existing governance institutions with local cultural expertise. ISAF's Human Terrain Teams could not make up for the widespread lack of cultural understanding of unique and disparate local Afghan contexts. Afghan civil society experts in governance from Afghan universities and Afghan NGOs expressed dismay at the use of outside anthropologists when they themselves, the true experts and translators of Afghan culture, were almost entirely left out of any assessment or consultations on governance for most of the years between 2001-2011. The outsider's views and solutions for what to do with so-called "ungoverned spaces" created an assumption that extending the central state was the only or best solution to addressing governance challenges. Furthermore, ISAF's approach to Afghan culture seemed to view it as exotic, primitive, and backwards, making it even more difficult for outsiders to develop effective governance programs. At the same time, the lack of self-critique or self-assessment for how Afghans would view a foreign force with very different ethics and morals for how to interact with women, religious texts, how to show respect to local people, etc. meant that many viewed themselves as culturally superior, making it more difficult to gain trust and respect from Afghans to work in partnership with them. A cultural approach that begins with a self-assessment enabling an understanding of diverse sources of governance actors within Western countries may have made it easier for foreigners to understand the unique and often conflicting approaches and interests of Afghan local governance actors.



## Chapter 12

### **U.S. Efforts to Enhance Domestic Capabilities through Justice Sector Development: Criminal Justice Systems and War Crimes Accountability**

*Sandra L. Hodgkinson*

Over the past two decades, the United States has significantly increased its support to the domestic criminal-justice systems in key post-conflict nations and for allies and partners around the world, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and myriad African, Latino, Asian, and former-Soviet countries. As a result of lessons learned, the U.S. government is becoming more effective at justice sector development every year and has increasingly relied on domestic capabilities—rather than creating new international solutions—to provide the most sustainable and valuable support.

Similarly, in areas that have traditionally favored international institutions, such as war-crimes accountability, the U.S. government has begun to move towards domestic options over the international solutions that have dominated the field since the creation of the first UN-backed war-crimes tribunals in 1993-1994 to address the unfolding atrocities in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In these past two decades, the U.S. government has supported various models of international justice, beginning with purely international Chapter VII UN tribunals,<sup>107</sup> to mixed “hybrid” tribunals,<sup>108</sup> and, more recently, to more domestic tribunals, such as the Iraq High

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<sup>107</sup> The two most notable examples of this are the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). *See* S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb 22, 1993) (establishing the ICTY); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (Statute for ICTY); S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (May 13, 1998) (amending the ICTY); S.C. RES. 1329, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (Nov. 30, 2000) (further amending the Statute for the ICTY); and S.C. RES. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8. 1994) (ICTR).

<sup>108</sup> Two good examples of “hybrid” domestic and international tribunals are the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in Cambodia. *See* Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on Establishing a Special Court for Sierra Leone, United Nations-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137; and Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, United Nations-Cambodia, Jun. 6, 2003, 229 U.N.T.S. 117; G.A. Res. 57/228 B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228 B (May 22, 2003) (approving the draft agreement).

Tribunal (IHT),<sup>109</sup> which incorporated international law into an Iraqi domestic war crimes statute. This Chapter addresses first some of the best practices for harnessing and enhancing the existing domestic capabilities in this growing trend. Next, it argues the benefits of strengthening domestic capabilities in lieu of creating new international institutions.

### **Best Practices for Enhancing Domestic Capabilities**

Across the spectrum of justice-sector activities, from pure criminal-justice-sector development, to war-crimes accountability, and even prosecutions for crimes such as piracy, the U.S. government provides a significant amount of “rule of law” support and assistance for domestic institutions. As examples, the U.S. participated in the UN effort to develop a domestic criminal-justice system for the new government of Kosovo following the Balkans war. The U.S. government has also established justice-sector development and rule-of-law programs around the world as part of its regional developmental programs, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. These programs generally include new legislation; courthouse renovations; training for judges, prosecutors, and other court personnel; creation of defense bars; development of case and evidence tracking capabilities; and refurbishment of prisons, and are generally tailored to the specific needs and requests of the country. Across the spectrum of these domestic justice programs, a number of factors should be considered when tailoring a specific program. Although the Inspector General’s Reports on recent U.S. rule of law programs in Iraq and Afghanistan have concluded that the U.S. should establish a clearer vision and better-coordinated, integrated justice system (with less interagency squabbling)<sup>110</sup> some other common-sense factors should be considered.

### **Assessment**

The first step in nearly all justice sector development programs is “assessment.” Determining who will conduct the assessments is one of the most important aspects of the program overall. Sadly, it is often done haphazardly based on who is available or has “legal” or “international” experience rather than with the strategic forethought of who would be the most appropriate person for the particular justice-sector development program. The right team composition is much more significant than how quickly or available a team can be brought in. As an example, an Iowa state court judge who has never left the state of Iowa (but is nonetheless a judge) is probably no more suited to assess the needs of a local court in Diyala Province, Iraq, than a recent law school graduate who may excel at online legal research, but is incapable of using hard

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<sup>109</sup> Law of the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court Law, Al-Waqaeḥ al-Iraqia [Iraqi Official Gazette] 4006 of 2-5, available [http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST\\_statute\\_official\\_english.pdf](http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf) (the Iraqi High Tribunal was originally called the Iraqi Special Tribunal, but was renamed the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court or Iraqi High Tribunal (two translations) in 2005 when passed by the Iraqi Transitional Legislature.

<sup>110</sup> See U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors, OIG, Report No. ISP-I-08-09, Jan. 08, at 8; and Inspection of Rule of Law Programs for Embassy Baghdad 2005, OIG Report IST-IQO-06-0 (2005) at 9, as examples.

copy books and paper filing systems (which is all they have). For civil code countries in particular, it is crucial to have team members who are familiar with civil law and how it is administered. A team member with no appreciation for the role of an investigative judge not only wastes time, but undermines the credibility of the entire effort. For war-crimes tribunals, it is absolutely essential to find individuals who understand international criminal law, such as the elements of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war-crimes, and who have experience in the establishment and operation of international and domestic war-crimes mechanisms. They will be best suited to make recommendations as to whether the local justice system is capable of handling a war-crimes trial, with some international support, or whether a more international solution is warranted to ensure a fair trial. Court administration experts are also essential, especially if the new court is being built from the ground up.

Equally important as team selection is educating the team on the type of country's justice system, its history, and local laws prior to arriving in country. Interactive training, using discussion problems and scenarios, and even some limited role playing, will best ensure that these team members are ready to address the unique challenges associated with rule-of-law training abroad in a foreign culture with its own legal traditions. It is also important to ensure as much continuity of personnel as possible. On the U.S. government side, there has been a lot of turnover in these justice development programs, as many U.S. personnel prefer short tours abroad. This lack of continuity slows progress significantly as each incremental step requires intricate knowledge about the local criminal-justice system and may take months for a new expert to get fully up to speed. Further, the critical relationships with domestic senior justice officials necessary to move the process forward may take much longer to forge.

### **Due-Process Standards and the “Chicken and Egg” Problem**

The initial judicial assessment generally reflects upon the existing standards of due-process in a national jurisdiction. That is to say, it reaches a conclusion about the state of due process protections as they exist on day one. In many countries, these due-process protections are much less robust than in the U.S. Although many developing or post-conflict nations do have long lists of due-process protections that are allegedly “consistent with all applicable human rights treaties,” they are often not well enforced. Clearly, there are instances where a local justice system is heavily tainted by corruption, or influenced by harmful elements within the government. In these extreme cases, it may be appropriate to refuse assistance until such time as due-process protections increase. In most cases, however, the domestic justice system on day one is simply imperfect, with a strong need for international assistance and support to raise the level of process provided. Unfortunately, there have been many cases where an initial assessment team, or advocacy group, has found one particular aspect of a country's due process standards to be offensive enough that they will not provide support to that country. A good example is the death penalty. Few donors will contribute funding or assistance to a death-penalty wielding court on principle. Many European countries believe that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) bars them from providing assistance to any court that could provide the death penalty. This creates a “chicken-and-egg” problem that in fact undermines justice more than it enhances it. Donors will not assist in strengthening capacity of the justice system because of something they find offensive or that recent jurisprudence has

found offensive. Of course, the best way to change an offensive element of a justice system is to actually come in and help fix it. Hence, the “chicken and the egg.”

In the case of Iraq, after the U.S. invasion in 2003, most countries boycotted support for the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), its domestic war-crimes court, and the regular criminal justice system in Iraq because it had a death penalty. Although several European countries ultimately did find ways to help aspects of the Iraqi justice system consistent with their ECHR obligations, this was after they boycotted the IHT until near the bitter end. In order to strengthen domestic capabilities in the justice sector, one must be willing to aid a system that is less than perfect at the start. If one cannot do this, those who will suffer the most in these instances are not the government officials one is seeking to punish, but rather the victims of crimes that are not addressed or the accused individuals who get a “less fair” trial.

### **Designing a Suitable, Sustainable Program**

Once a judicial assessment report is complete, appropriate officials need to work with the host nation to discuss possible follow-on actions, whether it be to draft new laws, renovate or break new ground on court and prison facilities, or begin training. These recommendations should be made with key considerations regarding their longevity in mind. They must be suitable to the level of development within the country and sustainable by the host nation in order to make the investment worthwhile. There are many examples of donor-provided war-crimes or justice-sector development programs that are beyond what the local community could ultimately operate once the country providing the assistance is no longer there. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) is a hybrid UN and domestic court in Sierra Leone established in 2003 to try Liberian and Sierra Leonean officials for war crimes,<sup>111</sup> and has been fairly effective at prosecuting war criminals. However, nine years into its operation, the SCSL has well exceeded its three-year mandate and is likely too “high-end” to have any real spillover effect on the regular Sierra Leonean judiciary as it operates behind the walls of a fairly isolated compound. In fact, sadly, despite the great work done by the SCSL, it is likely that even the Sierra Leonean judges on this court will leave Sierra Leone for higher-paid “international” jobs at the completion of its work. This is one reason why it is important, wherever possible, to incentivize the “mainstreaming” of specialized courts, such as war-crimes courts or other specialized courts, as much as possible into the regular court system with the goal of keeping experienced judges in country following the work and ensuring the greatest amount of spillover possible into the local justice system. A court that it is not seen or felt by locals cannot truly raise the level of local justice and will likely be abandoned after its specialized work is done, leaving behind very little. Placing these specialized courts within the mainstream justice system provides the greatest opportunity that their work will help to raise the standard of justice overall.

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<sup>111</sup> Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on Establishing a Special Court for Sierra Leone, *supra* note 98.

Along the same lines, it is not necessary to build the “Taj Mahal.” A fancy, expensive, case docketing or filing system (that relies on a constant flow of electricity) may not be useful for a rural Iraqi domestic court. Similarly, as we have learned, a workforce labor-intensive, rehabilitation-style prison may not be “Afghan-sustainable” over time. Accordingly, high-end investments should be scrutinized in favor of more rudimentary solutions that are durable and more reflective of local needs and customs. This does not apply uniquely to government support. There have been many instances when vendors with an interest in selling a particular product, such as a sophisticated case docketing system, an expensive DNA identification program (for mass graves), or a ready-made training program the vendor has on the shelf (whether it is truly needed), automatically recommends their product in every “assessment” they help perform or recommendation they make to assessment teams.

The goal of the overall justice-sector development program design should be to make it affordable and capable of being maintained by the host nation after the initial assistance has ended. “Sustainable” programs should not require donor assistance in perpetuity. The unique case of war-crimes prosecutions has a little more latitude in cost, due to the high profile of these trials and the fact that they are generally designed to phase out within a period of years. Accordingly, there may be donors willing to see the entire process through to completion. Even so, it is important to try to mainstream as much of the system as possible so that it can have a collateral benefit of raising the standard for justice throughout the country.

## **Implementation**

There is no “one size fits all” way to implement a justice program. In some instances, following legislation reform and training programs, the domestic court requires little assistance day-to-day. In other cases, a large oversight mechanism is needed until further capacity-building efforts are successful. However, it is critical to coordinate with other donors to ensure that programs are not duplicative. Multiple, overlapping, judicial judge training programs, which every donor country loves to provide, often duplicate efforts and rarely make the judge “twice as smart.” They also waste valuable court time when that judge could be hearing cases. For whatever reason, judicial training appears to be the most popular donor activity and, taken to the extreme, can keep the judges out of the courtroom.

## **Why Domestic Approaches to War-Crimes Accountability May be More Effective than International Ones**

The first part of this chapter focused on ways to strengthen domestic justice systems across the spectrum of justice activities. This section addresses historical and current trends to develop international justice mechanisms over domestic ones and argues that the trend is, or should be, towards focusing more on domestic institutions and less on international ones.

The initial post-WWII development of international criminal accountability mechanisms focused on creating international solutions where domestic options were not truly available because the host nation lacked either capacity or will to establish accountability mechanisms. Although the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials were both effective and efficient at successfully prosecuting

high-level, defeated military leadership by the war's victors, they were able to handle only the highest level of senior leadership. Additional mid and low-level prosecution efforts still needed to take place when Allied and domestic institutions in Germany were operational again and able to function fairly. The principal reason for making this point is to demonstrate that, even when international options are on the table, there is still always a role for domestic courts. In addition, unlike World War II, most of today's war-crimes tribunals are created to hold accountable members of a government who have committed a majority of their crimes *against their own people*, whether in time of war, internal conflict, or peace. This fact makes efforts to ensure accountability at home, where victims can feel and see the justice, much more crucial. Accordingly, the "international" justice model may not be as effective at handling these types of atrocities.

### **The Iraq Example**

Iraq is illustrative. Although Saddam Hussein was a menace to the world in many ways, his principal crimes were the atrocities he committed against his own people in his own country—namely, the massacre of more than 300,000 people, and the torture and abuse of countless others. As a result of the Iraq War, many of the country's courthouses had been damaged structurally, and parts of the justice sector had been misused by Saddam's regime. Although Iraq's justice system was in dire need of assistance, the U.S. Government resisted calls for a new international tribunal to be established and, instead, provided direct financial support for the Iraqi-led domestic effort to establish the IHT. Few other countries were willing to support the tribunal, arguing that they could not because it authorized the maximum penalty under Iraqi criminal law, the death penalty. Instead of coming in to assist this domestic tribunal to provide the fairest justice possible, most European nations chose to boycott it in the hopes that it would fail on its own. Notwithstanding the lack of concrete and moral support from the international community, Iraqi judges did in fact carry out a relatively sophisticated, televised trial against Saddam Hussein, at home in his native Arabic language. These domestic proceedings had a healing effect on many victimized Iraqis. Saddam's trial lasted about 15 months, and, at the end, he was convicted and executed in Iraq within three years of his capture. Although many critics point out the stream of imperfections in the trial, it went off fairly well considering the lack of international support from the "international justice crowd," including the UN. As an interesting point of comparison, Milosevic's "international" trial, in contrast, lasted more than 4 years, and has been considered the longest and most expensive criminal trial in history.<sup>112</sup> The trial record includes approximately 1.2 million pages of filings, and testimony from more than 300 witnesses.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> John Laughland, *Travesty: The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic and the Corruption of International Justice*. Some cost estimates place Milosevic's trial at \$20-30 million per year over the course of 6 years from the time of his indictment.

<sup>113</sup> *Id.*

## Current Choices

Libya is a more recent example of a government that has carried out significant crimes against its own people within the confines of its border. In Cote d'Ivoire, both the prior government and current government have been accused of carrying out crimes against the domestic population, beginning as early as 2002 and ending in the recent 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis. In these and similar cases, it is essential to determine whether the nations themselves may be willing and able to conduct fair trials at home to achieve accountability or whether, with a certain amount of international support, they could be elevated to the right level. Libya's National Transitional Council advised the International Criminal Court (ICC) that it wished for Libya to try Saifal-Islam, Qaddafi's son, at home.<sup>114</sup> The ICC indicated that it has not yet made a decision whether to issue an indictment. An ICC referral would be appropriate only if the Libyans are either unable or unwilling to effectively conduct a domestic trial. If they are willing, but need international support in order to be "able" to provide fair justice, the international community should put its time and effort into strengthening Libya's justice system, rather than pouring money into an international trial that would likely take place somewhere in Europe. An assessment of the capabilities of the Libyan justice system, and whether it can be brought up to speed to hold regime officials accountable, should be made before a final decision is made. Cote d'Ivoire is similarly assessing what role domestic justice efforts can play in accountability for at least the more-recent post-election crisis in 2010-2011, and has already launched a series of cases in the local courts. The ICC has also been investigating all parties in the crisis.

## The International Criminal Court's Position on International Tribunals

Contrary to popular belief, the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court also favors domestic tribunals over international ones. The court's statute says that it "shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction," permitting national jurisdictions the first opportunity to investigate and prosecute alleged offenders.<sup>115</sup> This is intended to designate the International Criminal Court as a court of second or last resort, not "first use." Accordingly, the International Criminal Court takes jurisdiction only over crimes which have not been effectively addressed under a country's domestic system. Notwithstanding, many human rights experts, nongovernmental organizations, and war crimes junkies are quick to recommend "international" tribunals over domestic ones, out of a patriarchal belief that "international" is always better. But, for many of the reasons stated above, in fact, that is not the case.

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<sup>114</sup> *Libya: War Crimes Court Denies Nation Deal for Gaddafi Son Trial*, Jan. 23, 2012, Radio Netherlands Worldwide, available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/20120124/366.html> (last visited Feb. 2, 2012); *Libya Says It, not ICC Will Try Gaddafi's Son Saifal-Islam*, Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/23/us-icc-libya-idUSTRE80MIV820120123> (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).

<sup>115</sup> Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, arts. 1 and 7, *adopted* July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

International tribunals have had significant successes in achieving accountability where domestic justice was not possible. These international tribunals, however, are generally very expensive,<sup>116</sup> operate at a relatively slow pace, and are ultimately designed to shut down, leaving only a warehouse of records and evidence behind in the event of new evidence or new appeals.<sup>117</sup> There is also a growing sense of “tribunal fatigue,” meaning that donor nations are wary of creating new international tribunals that will be costly and lengthy. Domestic tribunals, in contrast, tend to be cheaper and faster, and take place closer to the victims who most need to see justice occur. They also have the ancillary benefit of strengthening host-nation capacity across the spectrum of justice activities, which is a significant legacy when it is achievable.

Even with an increased focus on domestic capabilities, international tribunals will continue to have a role in places where the host nation is unwilling or unable to take the steps necessary to ensure that fair, appropriate justice occurs. For example, it is hard to imagine any context in which the overcrowded, limited justice system of Rwanda could have effectively handled the trials for the Rwandan genocide, given the ethnic makeup of the country following the genocide.<sup>118</sup> Even so, the Rwandan traditional “gachacha” system of justice did play a remarkable complementary role in the overall transitional justice effort, for effectively handling mid- to lower-level offenders. Accordingly, it is extremely important in every case to determine whether there are aspects of a local justice system that can be strengthened and to focus capacity-building efforts there. A fallback to an “international” solution should be reserved for cases when it is the only option and, even then, should be complemented with domestic programs.

### **Other International Tribunals**

Most of the political debate over international versus domestic justice occurs in the context of war-crimes trials, given the existence of the ad hoc Chapter VII created war-crimes tribunals, and the now standing ICC. There is no international court that hears routine domestic criminal-justice cases, even in a post-conflict environment, and, accordingly, countries are left in this context with only one option—to strengthen domestic capabilities. Currently, however, there is still some debate over whether to create specialized anti-piracy tribunals or some other form of international piracy tribunal to handle piracy cases, or whether to allow national jurisdictions, whether they are a victim state or not, to try pirates in their own national courts. Countries like Kenya, the Seychelles, and the Maldives, which have expressed a willingness to prosecute pirates captured off the coast of Somalia, are acquiring assistance from the UN Office of Drugs

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<sup>116</sup> 2010-2011 is a good sample two-year budget for the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at \$301,895,000. This is nearly 20 years following its creation, as it is preparing to implement its completion strategy.

<sup>117</sup> ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have both prepared, and are in varying stages of implementing, their “completion” strategies, which includes a phased-out existence of the court.

<sup>118</sup> The Rwandan government’s genocidal campaign so effectively wiped out the ethnic Tutsis (killing nearly 1 million Tutsis, which was 90% of their population in Rwanda) that there was little hope that justice carried out by the ethnic majority Hutus would or could have been fair.



and Crime (UNODC) and other countries to strengthen their domestic capabilities. These efforts leverage what is already available and may also raise the caliber of these national justice systems, making them more effective than a potential International Criminal Tribunal for Piracy that would cost more and risk saturation quickly due to the sheer volume of the piracy cases anticipated. The UNODC support includes new laws, renovation of courthouses, judicial and prosecutorial training programs, and prison reforms.<sup>119</sup> Occasionally, recommendations of specialized international drug courts or terrorism courts also surface, but, to date, none have been created. This chapter has advanced a preference for strengthening domestic capacity over creating new international institutions, with the ultimate goal of raising the level of justice everywhere. In so doing, courts around the world may in fact be better prepared to address war crimes, pirates, terrorists, drug traffickers, and ordinary criminals.

## **Conclusion**

The U.S. government's efforts to enhance domestic capabilities of the justice sector through capacity-building programs have become increasingly effective over time. When designing a particular domestic justice program, proper team composition and training and development of a long-term sustainable program should be key priorities. Although every country has unique aspects to its national justice system, well-tailored justice development programs can make justice both more accessible and more affordable. Favoring domestic war-crimes tribunals over international ones when possible best supports the ICC's principle of complementarity. Similarly, national jurisdictions that can effectively try piracy cases should do so, with the support of the broader international community. The development of national justice systems around the world is the most effective way to improve both the level and quality of justice provided for all—if it is done the right way.

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<sup>119</sup> UNODC Counter Piracy Programme, 2009, available at [http://www.unodc.org/document/easternafrika/piracy/UNODC\\_Counter\\_Piracy\\_Programme.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/document/easternafrika/piracy/UNODC_Counter_Piracy_Programme.pdf)

## Chapter 13

### Systematizing a Holistic Approach for Education and Training on Conflict Prevention, Stabilization, and Resolution

*John Agolia*

#### Introduction

Some 30 years after the Wright brothers built the first aircraft, the U.S. deployed the first B-17 bombers. Americans have routinely undertaken technological advances to prepare for war, stretched ourselves to outpace our enemies and protect ourselves in the face of national security threats. However, we rarely apply this level of focus on developing new methods to prevent conflict, as if peacekeeping and conflict termination are less essential tasks, or somehow intuitive, or impossible to be improved upon. Yet the past decades of conflicts and the ensuing peacekeeping and stabilization efforts have repeatedly shown that conflict prevention, stabilization, and resolution require a field of study to capture and preserve the hard earned experiences of these past decades

To this end, there is increasing momentum among subject matter experts and practitioners to develop effective and evolving interagency education and training programs for conflict prevention, stabilization, and resolution as evidenced by the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*. This is a positive shift because currently, each of the different interagency (USG agencies) and other (foreign partners, international organizations (IOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)) players in a conflict environment have separate education, training requirements, and practical exercises of their own. The disparity between players is significant, and their approaches to education and training are not rooted in a common set of guiding principles, definitions or beliefs. The result is, when these players are brought together in theater, the approach to their missions often contradict each other. Although each is in possession of information on best practices, key contacts, and lessons that could enhance the effect of their mission and the mission of others if properly shared across theater players, this information is not systemically captured, passed off in theater, or incorporated into ongoing education and training back in home countries.

As such, any whole-of-theater effort is cumbersome at best for senior officials to manage, whether an ambassador over a country team or a military commander over a combat mission. Successes that could be derived are often misunderstood due to a lack of a common framework and can be personality driven, while understanding of best practices, key contacts, and lessons are more by chance than as a result of any integrated strategy, and can be lost with each turnover of personnel. No agency is charged with capturing this in-theater information and ensuring the dissemination to all of the participants. In essence then, instead of learning from experience, personnel at all levels within key organizations are repeatedly experiencing the same learning curves. Speak to anyone having more than one deployment in Afghanistan and you will hear the refrain, “This is not an 11 year war. This is a 1-year war, repeated eleven times.” Failure to standardize the education and training of practitioners and create and institutionalize a feedback

loop is resulting in a dangerous and costly institutional memory loss and affecting our ability to stabilize fragile states and prevent or resolve conflict.

This chapter seeks to address these issues through the following recommendations:

- Identify an executive agent to systematize a holistic best practices approach to interagency education on conflict prevention, stabilization and resolution,
- Facilitate pre-crisis interagency education and training to ensure a broad base of practitioners exist at all levels throughout the interagency,
- Set groundwork to facilitate rapid expansion of pre-deployment training for a specific crisis, and
- Create a feedback loop for theater information to ensure that information gained in theater like best practices, key contacts, and lessons learned informs pre-crisis and pre-deployment education and training.

Only by systematizing a holistic approach to the pre-crisis education and training for interagency and other players for conflict prevention, resolution and stabilization can we be assured that all involved are aware of the best practices and multitude of available lessons learned from previous crises, and capable of examining the situation and applying or adapting the lessons to the current crisis

### **Setting a Framework in Place**

The first step to systematizing a holistic approach begins with designation and empowerment of a US government executive agent as the coordinator for all conflict prevention, resolution and stabilization education and training for the interagency. No one governmental agency or department, international organization (IO), NGO, or other player has the responsibility or capability to solve crises like Sudan, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Colombia or Somalia. There needs to be synergy developed among the various players; until that happens, the crisis is not being responded to with the best the US can offer. In the military there is a saying, *We fight the way we train so train the way you fight*. This saying, adapted to a whole of government framework would be, *We execute and implement the way we train so train the way we execute and implement*. The problem is the military believes in this approach when it comes to fighting, but neither the military nor the rest of the whole of theater players have demonstrated a willingness to execute this tried and true approach when it comes to conflict prevention, resolution and stabilization.

In theater this has meant the various participants' approaches to conflict prevention, stabilization, and resolution are often found competing with each other for scarce resources and the theater participants are often working with each other for the first time in the field. For example, in Afghanistan, the U.S. military, USAID, various NGOs, and other theater participants generally only learn or grasp the missions of the other agencies after they arrive in theater. It is not

unusual in a given province of a country to have the U.S. military, the U.S. Department of State, other U.S. agencies, and NGOs all interacting with one tribal leader. One agency's decision to withhold help on building a well, for example, until greater cooperation on stability is obtained, can be undermined by another agency passing the same tribal leader money for the same well as a means to generate support for another program. Thus, in front of the very country nationals they are trying to help, these groups are often sorting out, over and over again, as each new theater participant rotates in and out, overlapping, complementary, and conflicting roles, points of leverage, and strategies for effective development.

Designation of a single USG executive agent is required as the focal point for organizing a conflict prevention, stabilization, and resolution curriculum for pre-crisis and pre-deployment training that is available to all participants, and to design a feedback loop of best practices, key contacts, and lessons learned into an ongoing evolution of the curriculum. The current process of each agency having its own design without access to the information learned from other agencies, or often even its own, with prior time in the theater, is an endless waste of resources and duplication of effort. Too often, contractors or academic professionals are contracted to create a course on Afghanistan for various government agencies, with the parameter being something as broad as cultural familiarization, when what is really needed is for these practitioners with experiences to contribute to one process that can then be tailored for government agencies, and to ensure best practices for conflict prevention, stabilization, and resolution training are truly captured. Similarly, although the multiple assessments of individual period best practices and lessons learned written by myriad theater actors remain critical, one agent needs to be aggregating these lessons, disseminating to the collective, and incorporating them into both the pre-crisis and pre-deployment curriculum as appropriate.

One logical choice for this mission is the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), which is in the process of standing up a Peace Academy with an obvious interest in the same issues. USIP has a congressional mandate to focus on education and training of practitioners in conflict prevention, stabilization, and resolution. USIP has shown itself in the recent efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan to be an entity that can navigate between the civilian and military sides of theater missions, including with not only the military, members of a typical country team, NGOs, IOs, think tanks, and academia, but also foreign counterparts.

If we were to presume USIP as the executive agent, then a follow-on requirement would be the creation of an integrated curriculum that can be supported by all affected agencies. Previous studies related to interagency training and education have developed products that were useful, but, without a designated agency to continuously integrate these period-specific studies into an evolving curriculum, they eventually, as stand-alone pieces, become obsolete. USIP has performed this integrating function before with such products as the 2005 *Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments*, the 2009 *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, as well as their recent efforts in support of the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*.

In designing the core curriculum, the designated agent must review best practices for both pre-crisis and pre-deployment training in regards to:

- Mental models or frameworks required for in-theater cooperation
- What to teach and train about situational and regionally specific information, as well as when
- How to structure effective education and training, and
- Who to educate and train, where, and by what methods.

A break-out of each of these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter, but expansion of the first bullet includes identifying what can't be taught or trained in pre-crisis training so we have identified the knowledge and skills we need resident across the community of practitioners before they are asked to prepare for a specific crisis. Such knowledge and skills provide practitioners general mental frameworks that they can apply to specific situations in order to enable them to more rapidly understand the environment they will be working in and problem sets they will be dealing with. One example is cultural awareness. During pre-deployment training, you can lecture someone on what is culturally taboo or acceptable in a specific country and train him or her on acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. But you can't educate them to be culturally aware and attuned to the numerous indigenous ethnic and religious groups in country. That level of desired cultural awareness can only come over time and begins with an education on your own culture. That type of knowledge, skills, and ability provides an individual with a mental framework and capacity to grasp the nuances of cultural analysis and the roles of the various indigenous and external actors. When provided the specifics on the culture of an area to which they are deploying and the indigenous and external actors present, it can enable them to ensure cultural and situational considerations are accounted for in every aspect of the mission. It can be taught only prior to a crisis.

Cultural awareness is also critical in terms of practitioners understanding the culture of the other organizations they will be interacting with in the conflict zone. The time to learn about the other organization's capabilities and limitations and truly understand them is not at the last minute when preparing to enter a conflict zone or while in theater. It is pre-crisis.

Much of this kind of knowledge exists in reviews done in the past 10 years of conflict prevention, resolution and stabilization; what is key now is for one agent to identify best practices and key lessons learned to incorporate into the curriculum, and to keep the ongoing evolution of this knowledge current. To be effective in this role, the agent must also have directive authority over curriculum and faculty development. But for the curriculum to be representative of the whole of government and civil society approach that is a factor in any conflict theater, the agent must hear from the interagency about its needs in the creation of the curriculum. To this end, the formation of an interagency curriculum board would be most useful in ensuring needs across the interagency are met and the material developed is truly an integrated interagency product.

Thus, the interagency must be incentivized to participate in this process. Incentivizing the interagency, in addition to ensuring the curriculum development is representative of all agencies needs, has a secondary purpose of encouraging the voluntary offering of inputs from other players (NGOs, IOs, foreign governments). Once these other players recognize this curriculum process will provide a framework for common in-theater interaction, and capturing of best practices, they will seek out opportunities to participate in the curriculum development as well as the actual education and training. Focusing on critical shared yet complex topics such as building police, military or other indigenous governmental structures, reforming education, banking and electoral systems, or development of agriculture and infrastructure would further incentivize broad practitioner participation since these topics affect every aspect of the mission and impact all practitioners directly or indirectly.

### **Execution Across the Interagency**

Once the agent has established a core curriculum, the next requirement is to be able to disseminate this material without delay, particularly before new crises emerge. Key to this becomes the facilitation of interagency education and training to ensure there is a broad group of practitioners at all levels throughout interagency that have the ability to implement effective conflict prevention, stabilization, and resolution strategies in coordination with other agency efforts. To this end, the agent may wish to employ a train-the-trainer model, providing training first and foremost to educators and trainers for other agencies that can work as a force multiplier to move the material. The agent can guide this process further by providing instruction on the correct sequencing of educational and training modules, followed by practical exercises to move an individual up a graduated scale from a beginner/practitioner level to a skilled educator/trainer level for pre-crisis training.

As pre-crisis education and training on the newly developed integrated curriculum commences, it will be important to keep in mind the configuration of the class. One best practice in setting up effective education and training has been integrating as many different practitioners from across the spectrum of organizations into the same classroom or training environment. So, just as interagency participation was critical in designing the curriculum, it is also critical in executing the curriculum. At the same time, it is not possible for educators, trainers, or participants from all agencies to physically participate in every class or training exercise. This is another area where the role of the agent is critical. The agent can, through pre-prepared presentations, video conferences with other agency trainers or participants, or video-taped interactive role playing scenarios between other agencies and players provide a multitude of methods and techniques that provide the desired diverse interagency interactive pre-crisis education or training environment. The previously developed cadre of educators and trainers can then tailor the education or training event to the specifics of the diversity, capabilities, and experiences of the participants and the instructors, as well as the time available.

The audience to participate in the pre-crisis education, training, and practical exercises delivered through the agent needs to be the actors that will fill critical planning, policy development, and program implementation positions during a crisis both in theater and at home. Key U.S. military

and other USG agencies should attend on an institutional basis, i.e., as part of their routine education and training—hence, the train-the-trainer program— and then as part of pre-deployment training.

This effort of developing the educators and trainers through a train-the-trainer program can be further recouped by agencies. This cadre of instructors and trainers armed with this interagency and holistic curriculum would set the groundwork and facilitate the rapid expansion of pre-crisis education and training into the development and execution of a holistic pre-deployment training program for a specific crisis. The initial portion of the pre-deployment training program would consist of refresher courses on the mental models and tools previously learned, followed by instruction on how to adapt those mental models and tools to the specific environment; think back to the earlier example on cultural awareness.

In addition, by using the pre-crisis training and education as the foundation for the initial pre-deployment training, the agent will now be in a position to guide the development of a holistic in-theater feedback loop focused on such critical in-theater knowledge as best practices, key contacts, and lessons learned. The agent must encourage integrated interagency participation in this part of the process to ensure the core curriculum is continuously updated by all key in-theater players for the benefit of all practitioners. And those in-theater practitioners who attended the agent's pre-crisis and pre-deployment programs will have been sensitized to the need for establishing this feedback loop, thus predisposed to set up the feedback loop. Further incentivizing the feedback process can come in many forms for both the interagency and other players. Some methods to consider include: post-deployment sabbaticals of varying lengths in order for returning personnel to capture experiences in the field; agent-conducted debriefing interviews through prepared questionnaires of returning personnel; and fully supported integrated research trips by educators, trainers, and policy reviewers from think tanks, accredited universities and colleges and government organizations like the Congressional Research Service

## **Conclusions**

Although there is much work to be done, the beginnings of a more holistic approach to education and training on conflict prevention, stabilization and resolution can commence immediately through USIP. The USIP will need directive authorities and interagency participation to build a core curriculum for conflict prevention, stabilization and resolution. Once training is ready to commence, USG agencies can send personnel or trainers for this instruction, and other players, like NGOs, IOs, and foreign government partners can be invited to participate in the training. As the process develops, curriculum development and training into more specialized areas can commence.

The United States Institute for Peace cannot solve this problem alone but, in standing up the Peace Academy, USIP can start the process and the dialogue necessary to begin to address this issue. USIP can be the catalyst in helping the U.S. government address the role each of the various USG agencies and departments can play in shaping an effective, efficient, and innovative whole of government/society education, training, and exercise program so that all conflict theater players in a whole-of-government/society approach to crisis can in fact *train the way they would*

*execute and implement.* Only by institutionalizing the process of holistic education, training, and lessons learned can we educate an interagency on the best practices for conflict prevention, stabilization, and resolution and achieve results that meet the needs of the indigenous population and the expectations of ours.



## Chapter 14

### A “Comprehensive Approach” to Conflict Prevention and Stability Operations: Challenges for the Future

*Beth Cole*<sup>†</sup>

Can the comprehensive approach<sup>120</sup> be made effective, especially in an era of budget austerity? After a decade of daunting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, a review of these missions reveals some success. But persistent barriers to effectiveness and efficiency and major programmatic and operational gaps remain. This chapter, first, reviews some of the major highlights from 2010-2011 to offer a baseline from which to consider the future. It then considers how to take effective actions in four areas—education; assessment and planning; deployment and execution; and lessons and metrics.

#### **The Baseline**

Over the past few years, substantial actions have been designed to make the comprehensive approach more effective; nonetheless, significant issues remain:

- The first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)<sup>121</sup> finished its business, and, among other conclusions, the Department of State decided to stand up a Conflict and Stabilization Operations Bureau (CSO) that absorbed the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (SCRS).
- The Department of Defense, meanwhile, not content to wait for the wheels of the diplomacy and development machinery to deliver, established the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) and the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program (MoDA) to deploy the Department’s civilian personnel to support current operations.
- The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) created a Policy, Planning and Learning Bureau (PPL) to reconstitute its institutional “brain” for stability and other types of operations.
- The U.S., meanwhile, is paddling through difficult transitions in Iraq and Afghanistan that will test the mettle of participating agencies and the success of stabilization in these two countries albeit with fewer resources to mitigate against potential backsliding.

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<sup>†</sup> These are the views of the author and do not represent the views of the United States Agency for International Development.

<sup>120</sup> See, e.g., FM3-0-7 Stability Operations, Department of the Army, October 2008.

<sup>121</sup> Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (2010).

- Whole of Government Planning for post-Ghaddafi Libya did occur that brought agencies together but in an ad-hoc manner reminiscent of pre-S/CRS days.
- U.S. agencies, mostly civilian, including the U.S. Institute of Peace, and major humanitarian non-governmental organizations came together, spurred by the political will of a worried White House, to prevent major conflict in pre- and post-referendum Sudan and are working to stabilize and enable development for South Sudan.
- Challenges requiring a whole of government approach posed by Syria and other “Arab Spring” states in the Middle East and North Africa loom large and remind all that these missions will continue unabated even as Afghanistan and Iraq transition to host nation ownership.
- The role of other agencies that have been brought into the stabilization fold as a result of recurring deployments to the field—the departments of Justice, Transportation, Homeland Security, Agriculture, Energy, Commerce, Labor, and Treasury—is uncertain as the new CSO Bureau focuses more on supporting the Department of State.
- The U.S. Congress and government agencies are demanding a higher threshold for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) as funds become scarcer and intense scrutiny becomes the norm—M&E shops are proliferating.
- The “lash up” with private contractors, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and key allies remains more chaotic than organized, without adequate systems to coordinate, let alone evaluate.

Finally, the din of buzz saws provides incessant background noise as budgets are being cut across the major institutions that engage in these missions. Thus, some steps forward, but many not yet taken (or not taken fully enough). The key question: What would make a difference?

### **Challenges for the Future**

To focus on what ails the “interagency” community and what simultaneously gives this enterprise hope, it is useful to focus on the essential underpinnings for a “comprehensive approach.” In this regard, the U.S. military provides a useful model.

The U.S. military is equipped with a robust system that includes life-long education and training, continuous assessment and planning, full-spectrum operations, and ceaseless lessons collection, ongoing doctrine development, and revision. A continuous loop of these fundamental blocks produces an engine composed of many parts that operates effectively. It, too, suffers from over-wear and over-reach, but it has proven to be fairly effective and agile. This complex system is what gives the President the confidence to look to the military for guidance and heavy lifting in

operations. It offers a model that non-military institutions have trying to emulate in the quest for a “comprehensive approach” because it has been tested over the span of a century. Moreover, it has proven “good enough” to bring some semblance of order to a chaotic playing field where, by definition, hundreds of disparate agencies play. Every major actor—from the UN to the U.S. to the U.K. and the European Union are building off these blocks. There are four critical challenges:

### **1. Preparation of the Workforce: Education and Training**

A foray as a senior mentor to Camp Atteberry’s Muscatatuck Training Center in Indiana where the most recent recruits for the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Advisors Program received the field component of their pre-deployment training offers a good news story. A combination of actors—the Department of Defense, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), the Indiana National Guard, and private companies, namely the McKellar Corporation, Caerus and a few others, are finally figuring out how to prepare people—within a limited time—to operate in these environments.

These actors have all teamed to give civilian recruits from the ranks of the Defense Department’s workforce an intensive course in how to be a security ministry mentor in the Afghan context. It is a terrific effort and represents a leap forward for these operations. It is collaborative. Each contributor brought his/her strengths to this training and made it a success. There are no real “turf wars.” Ministry mentoring and mentoring in general are basic fundamental requirements in these environments. It took more than a decade to figure out how to begin to tackle this gap and prepare people to fill it. Capturing the lessons from this “gold standard” enterprise and continuing such preparation in the face of budget woes constitutes a major challenge as agencies look beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.

There remains a lot more to do on this training front. i.e., the “preparation of the workforce” challenge. USIP’s Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding has staffed a working group, at the suggestion of the Department of Defense, to provide recommendations for senior leaders on how to capture best practices, fill gaps, and maintain an effective and resource-efficient effort to educate and train those who prevent conflict and build peace. Nine agencies of the U.S. government, UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Interaction, and the Alliance for Peacebuilding are working together to figure out how to deal with future education and training requirements for humanitarian assistance and disaster response, stabilization operations, and the new, murky, uncharted field of conflict prevention operations.

### **2. Assessment and Planning**

Agencies have gotten better at assessment and planning; sometimes, it is even done in an interagency fashion. The U.S. civil-military plan for Afghanistan, first executed under the leadership of Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal, is evidence that agencies can

plan together.<sup>122</sup> The lesson of whole of government attempts to do assessment and planning is this: no single agency has a lock on this process. It has to be collaborative. The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), the military planning processes such as theater engagements plans, and the UN's integrated mission planning process (IMPP) provide illustrations that assessment and planning principles are being applied. There are general principles for assessment and general principles for planning. The 3D planning document<sup>123</sup> produced under the leadership of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, Dr. Janine Davidson, embraces those principles. SCRS, now CSO, has contributed immensely on the ground to bring civilians into a civil-military planning process and produce some impressive plans in several theaters.

But what happened in Afghanistan is an illustration that new, interagency approaches can be resisted in an effort to follow standard, more "normal" procedures. The little known Interagency Civil-Military Action Group (ICMAG) that stood up in the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to do integrated planning was rejected like a body rejects a transplanted organ by those who believed this innovation was slightly renegade and outside the realm of normal embassy operations. When there are five senior ambassadors in one embassy, it is already outside the realm of normal. And what else happened here? In the much maligned Interagency Management System (IMS) that was designed at SCRS but never used, an Interagency Planning Cell would deploy to the relevant Combatant Command and an Advance Civilian Team (ACT) would deploy to the embassy of the country in question to do planning. So this was called something different—the Interagency Civil-Military Action Group (ICMAG)—instead of following a process many had been trying to establish. By contrast, the military uses systems and constructs that generally remain intact even if they are in different parts of the world. Standard operating procedures and constructs matter in a world of chaos. A genuinely precedent-setting effort in Afghanistan could have set a standard by using terms and constructs that agencies had deliberately tried to create. A lesson for the future?

What happened with planning for Libya? Did SCRS, ostensibly the lead for State Department and interagency planning, pursuant to National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 44)<sup>124</sup>, get the pin? Did the U.S. government coordinate effectively? Partly. In the beginning, the National Security Staff (NSS) and State ambled in different directions and started giving orders without a concrete understanding of who was in the lead. Pursuant to the QDDR, the Ambassador is supposed to be the Chief Executive Officer. The Department of State tried that approach. But did the NSS acknowledge that? So a little chaos ensued and a little conflict "at home" occurred; then the planning effort settled down. The plan itself, in the end, demonstrates that a tremendous amount has been learned. The Libyan Transitional National Council plan, to which State and the agencies contributed, is also something from which to derive hope. But valuable time is lost, wasted energy is expended, people's patience is tested, and the "interagency team" is denigrated every time "ad-hocery" reigns.

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<sup>122</sup> See United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan (August 10, 2009).

<sup>123</sup> 3D Planning Guide, Pre-Decisional Working Draft, (September 15, 2011).

<sup>124</sup> National Security Presidential Doctrine 44 (December 7, 2005).

Haiti is another example of sub-optimal procedures in the planning process. Will the QDDR-directed International Operational Response Framework (IORF) resolve this? Will it really take the place of the Interagency Management System (IMS) that was never really used? Will the U.S. learn from the domestic National Response Plan framework that it is possible to have a planning and operational framework that people can rely on from contingency to contingency? Where is the IORF?

### **3. Deployment and Execution**

A Washington Post article on training of police in Iraq paints a picture of the problem with execution of a critical program.<sup>125</sup> The following excerpts from the article reveal recurring problems for effective execution in these environments in one of the most important areas for stability:

Since 2003, the United States has spent about \$8 billion to train, staff and equip Iraqi police forces. With the U.S. military exiting Iraq at the end of December [2011], responsibility for the police training program transferred to the State Department. The department has requested \$887 million to continue operating the program this fiscal year.

But a government report set for release...found that the department is spending just 12 percent of money allocated for the program on advising Iraqi police officials, with the 'vast preponderance' of funds going toward the security, transportation and medical support of the 115 police advisers hired for the program. When U.S. troops leave, thousands of private security guards are expected to provide protection for the thousands of diplomats and contractors set to stay behind.

What is wrong with this picture? U.S. civilians are confronting great challenges to operating on the ground effectively. The "tail" needs are huge for security and support. What other models are there? OTI, which uses mainly personnel service contractors? Private contractors? NGOs? USIP? Or can the U.S. let its civilian personnel take more risks?

More importantly, during the QDDR, experts identified a whole slate of core activities the U.S. needs to be able to execute with some precision and skill in most of these operations. The activity above is one of the core elements for success. And yet, the U.S. is far from being able to

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<sup>125</sup> "State Department's police training program in Iraq lacks planning, report says," Washington Post, October 24, 2011

implement this constellation of security sector reform<sup>126</sup> operations. In Afghanistan, part of this critical mission set passed from the Germans and the Italians and the U.S. to a NATO command—NATO Training Mission Afghanistan. It is time to reflect, hard and fast, on why this was bungled so badly. The hope the interagency community must take from this is that the bungling and inattention in the early years has been the subject of laser-like attention now. Is it too late? And how can the monstrous gap in police, justice, and corrections be plugged effectively? This problem can be attacked only through a “comprehensive approach.”

This is one example that reflects the anemic or even willful inattention to recurring SSR requirements and rule of law (ROL) requirements on the ground. It is illustrative of what happens when there is not an adequate focus on building the expertise and operational capacity here at home to build capacity in host nations for critical core functions. Where is SSR accomplished in the U.S. government? How about rule of law? The Department of Justice? State? The Department of Homeland Security? USAID? USIP? The answer is all over the place and sometimes not at all. Why has this failure to have robust, coherent, strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities to work on SSR and ROL been tolerated? USIP conducted a scoping study with the encouragement of the National Security Council in 2003 to identify ROL capabilities within the U.S. government.<sup>127</sup> That study identified serious skills and capabilities across multiple agencies. A plan for an office dedicated to this mission set was created—the Office of Rule of Law Operations (ORLO). It became SCRS. Has history demonstrated the crying need for ORLO? The European Union has dedicated ROL capabilities as does the UN under the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Why doesn't the U.S.? Where is the SSR integrated team? A few brave souls from the “interagency” produced a formal white paper on SSR. That paper exists, but there is no real capability to implement its guidance.

One can drill down into the other neglected areas, but this can stand as an egregious example of the problem for the purposes of this short chapter.

#### **4. Lessons and Metrics and Doctrine**

Regarding lessons, the U.S. government as a whole doesn't handle them systematically or robustly or coherently. There is no central repository for lessons. They are not mined for the next round in any systematic way. There is no agreement that these should be called lessons or lessons learned or observations or best practices or good practices or just practices. Do the famed Treasury Advisors have a lessons system? Does the U.S. Department of Agriculture? Does the Department of Justice? At the time of this writing, it is expected that CSO will have one. Even if there were individual systems in agencies, there would be a possibility of lashing them up to learn something before the next mission.

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<sup>126</sup> SSR refers to reform efforts directed at the institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and promote the rule of law.” USAID, USDOD, USDOS, Security Sector Reform (February 2009), at p.1.

<sup>127</sup> Perito, Dziedzic, Degrasse, Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations: The Rule of Law Component. USIP Special Report, 2004.

Does the NGO community have lessons? Where are they? Does the contracting community? How about the European Union? How about the UN? The UN actually has one of the most encouraging systems on the non-military side in the world. It deploys “best practice” officers. It has a repository, best-practice conferences, and an online community of practice that shares lessons within the UN system.

Why are these needed? Because, if there are no lessons, it is impossible to write doctrine or manuals or handbooks or any of the basic guides that are needed to prepare people instead of constantly throwing them into these environments without giving them the tools they need to succeed. There are some excellent guides from USAID on post-conflict sectors and they should be used<sup>128</sup>. USIP, with support from the U.S. Army, spent two years of the past decade reading the literature of the agencies worldwide that operate in these missions. The effort was born out of frustration because lessons did not exist in any one place that was user friendly, accessible, and field relevant.

It was a doctrine project. USIP learned about doctrine from the U.S. military and other militaries. Then USIP discovered rich lessons buried in hundreds and hundreds of disparate documents. *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, published jointly with the U.S. Army, was the result. It was not a panacea, but it was executed for SCRS because the U.S. needed something. And this is a lesson, which takes the reader back to the beginning of this chapter. This doctrine was not adopted by State though it was by the U.S. Army and others. Why? It was vetted by SCRS and other actors at State, as well as USAID and other domestic agencies. It was intended to be used by this office. The “doctrine” office at SCRS still has nothing to give to civilians deploying. Why? The U.S. had or has ICAF, IMS, whole of government doctrine. Is there time to worry about branding when so many challenges exist on the ground? Is that the problem here?

It is time to remove the stovepipes and the barriers to true interagency cooperation on lessons, doctrine, assessment, planning, education, training, deployment, and monitoring and evaluation. There is much work to do and less money to do it with. The term “burden sharing” characterized the need for a similar effort during the Cold War. It led to interoperability and cohesion across the NATO member states. It is time to get serious about “burden sharing” for conflict prevention and response operations because no agency—neither defense nor state—can do it alone.

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<sup>128</sup> E.g., USAID, *A Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries* (January 2009).

## CHAPTER 15

### IS DIPLOMACY A PROFESSION?

*Robert W. Beecroft*

Daniel E. Sickles was a flamboyant New York lawyer and politician. In the decade before the Civil War, he served in the New York State Assembly and the United States Senate. In 1859, he shot and killed Phillip Barton Key II, the son of Francis Scott Key, in Lafayette Park, across the street from the White House. Key had been having an affair with Sickles' wife, who was half her husband's age. Sickles was ultimately acquitted on grounds of temporary insanity—the first successful use of that defense in the United States.

At Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on July 2, 1863, now Major General Sickles disobeyed the direct orders of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, Major General George G. Meade, and marched his III Corps a mile west, straight toward the Confederate forces in front of Cemetery Ridge. In doing so, he diluted III Corps' strength while simultaneously threatening the coherence of the entire Union position. Confronted by Meade while the battle was still raging, Sickles flatly refused to return to his previous position. The incident sparked a running public quarrel between the two that lasted until Meade's death in 1872.

Unlike many senior commanders on both sides of the Civil War, Dan Sickles did not attend West Point. In fact, he had no prior military experience at all. In part due to lessons learned in that conflict, the U.S. military (with the conspicuous exception of Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders) subsequently moved deliberately and systematically to establish an officer corps made up of full-time professionals. It may be that war is too important, as Clemenceau put it, to be left to the generals, but there appears to be a general consensus that warfighting as such requires the expertise of full-time practitioners of the art.

That consensus breaks down, however, where the diplomatic art is concerned. This raises a question: *If war is too important to be left to the generals, is diplomacy too unimportant—or too easy to pick up—to be left to the diplomats?*

During my two years as a Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College (2004-06), I was repeatedly impressed by the respect and collegiality that were shown to me and my Foreign Service student and faculty colleagues by our military counterparts. The curriculum focused on the four levers of state power, known collectively as the DIME—diplomacy, information/intelligence, military force, and economic strength. Diplomacy leads the list, not only alphabetically but also because, as a rule, the military lever of power should be considered an option only when and if diplomacy fails. In recent decades, however, the U.S. preference has repeatedly gone in the opposite direction.



The responsibility for deciding which lever (or levers) to pull in any given situation rests ultimately with the President and his or her closest advisors, including the Secretaries of State and Defense. Inside the Department of State, I saw a procession of Secretaries of State pass through between 1971 and 2006. Some are generally well remembered, others less so. Some valued the regular advice and substantive command of Foreign Service Officers, while others kept the career service at arm's length. To a greater or lesser degree, all came to understand that just as our military officers are dedicated professionals who devote their lives to mastering the tools of their craft, the same holds true for their diplomat colleagues. It is not a coincidence that we and they take the same oath. The difference is that there are more than 200,000 commissioned officers in the U.S. Armed Forces, as against fewer than 8,000 commissioned Foreign Service Officers, spread among more than 200 embassies, consulates, international organizations, and the Department of State itself.

In February 2011, the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD), in collaboration with the Stimson Center, published a report entitled *Forging a 21<sup>st</sup>-Century Diplomatic Service for the United States through Professional Education and Training*. The report was the result of a year-long effort, which I headed. The working group, chaired by one of our most distinguished diplomats, Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, included participants from the military, the private sector, congressional staffs, academia, the State Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) working group, and the Foreign Service, both active and retired. On several occasions, the Director General of the Foreign Service and the Director of the Foreign Service Institute participated personally in our debates. To gain perspective and understanding for other approaches to preparing diplomats for their duties, participants in the working group interviewed staff members from a dozen foreign embassies in Washington. (The report can be accessed online at [www.academyofdiplomacy.org](http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org), in both full and abridged versions.)

Underlying our work was a driving curiosity about the functions and relevance of diplomacy in a complex, threatening, and rapidly evolving international environment. Is diplomacy a profession? If so, what defines it? What are its goals and objectives? Because there is no possibility that the Foreign Service will follow the model of the U.S. military and limit its membership solely to career officers, the question is how best to take advantage of the varied skills and abilities that non-career officials bring to the table.

Merriam-Webster defines “profession” as *a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive academic preparation*. The overwhelming consensus in our working group was 1) that the practice of statecraft is a blend of art and science, comparable in terms of its fundamental strategic objective (supporting and protecting our national interests) to that of the military profession; 2) that diplomacy is primarily, though not exclusively, a profession practiced by Foreign Service Officers; and 3) that the professional skills and qualifications of those officers should be systematically sharpened and refined over the course of a career.

The eight recommendations in the report are generally consistent with the QDDR's central emphasis on the importance of systematic training—and the resources to support it—for our diplomatic professionals, to enable them to take the lead in an increasingly complex multi-agency foreign policy apparatus overseas, and to participate effectively in interagency policy

formulation at home. But the report also stresses that training alone is not enough. Today and tomorrow, America's Foreign Service Officers require professional education, not just training, to deal with the tasks they face—a period of reflection and thought, to prepare them for foreign policy leadership at home and in the field. As our military colleagues already know, this translates into a period of study and reflection, away from the demands of hectic operational assignments—an opportunity for strategic thinking as a prerequisite for senior leadership.

To quote the report: “Professional education and training are essential to raise the overall level of performance of our Foreign Service. This need is made even more acute by the shifting dynamics of international relations, characterized by geostrategic change, rapidly evolving technology, and the urgency of leadership within a foreign affairs community vastly more varied than was the case even ten years ago. For America’s diplomats, the principal responsibility must be to manage change and minimize instability and conflict and, when conflict has occurred, to take a leading role in post-conflict stabilization.”

Our military colleagues express the same thought in fewer words: “Train for certainty, but educate for uncertainty.” It is with that goal in mind that the AAD/Stimson report recommends that every Foreign Service Officer, at the FS-01 or 0-2 level, “complete a year of advanced study related to his or her career track as a requirement for promotion to the Senior Foreign Service.” Appendix E of the full report, which addresses diplomatic professional formation in other countries, portrays the situation in stark terms: “[The United States is] one of the few [countries] to provide little or no definition, history and theory of international diplomacy and its national manifestations to its FSOs....There is no discernible, shared professional core knowledge of values to create and sustain a common professional service of individuals committed to a career in diplomacy. The institution that hires them provides no clear, common definition of diplomacy, its functions, core values, ethics, and professional standards, and only minimally conveys expectations about required attributes and skills, or inspirational history and examples of master practitioners whose accomplishments and standards entering officers should seek to emulate.”

The report recognizes that heavy budgetary pressures seriously limit the Department of State’s ability to build new programs, or even maintain current levels. Those pressures have grown even more serious as a result of Congressional efforts to reduce the budget deficit, at the precise moment when State Department civilians are assuming greater responsibility in countries such as Iraq, where the previous U.S. role was overwhelmingly military in nature.

The President’s 2012 Budget proposes \$47 billion for the Department of State and USAID, excluding costs for Overseas Contingency Operations, a one-percent increase from 2010 enacted funding levels; but pressures from the Hill could result in serious reductions in the final appropriation level. Against that gloomy background, the report’s lead recommendation is to “redress the underinvestment in diplomacy and the consequent imbalance between defense, on one side, and diplomacy and development, on the other, by fully funding Diplomacy 3.0” (the hiring surge begun in 2009 under which the State Department planned to increase the size of the Foreign Service by 24 percent by Fiscal Year 2013). If completed, the hiring surge would allow the Department to maintain a personnel training float of 15% above requirements for regular

assignments—essential for professional education purposes. That objective is under serious threat today.

Even in the face of budgetary constraints, mission-focused professional education and training can accomplish a great deal to prepare our diplomats to lead at all levels. The report recommends that the Department of State make a long-term commitment to investing in professional education and training. Such a recommendation may seem self-evident, but training, except for language training, has often seemed like an afterthought in the Foreign Service, to be squeezed in if and when operational needs allow. One reason for this was simply the lack of resources to free people to train, but Foreign Service cultural attitudes towards training, which has never been regarded as “career-enhancing,” were also a factor.

The AAD/Stimson report stresses the critical role of the Ambassador, both as leader of the Country Team and as the President’s personal representative—his or her statutory role—in a given country. (In addition, preparing ambassadors to lead multi-agency missions is a central theme of the QDDR.) Currently, the responsibility for preparing an ambassador lies primarily with the relevant bureau and country desk officers. The report recommends short courses for the latter, possibly through distance learning, to enable them better to assist ambassadors in identifying major policy issues and meeting with appropriate experts before departing for post.

Frequently, non-career officials come into office well versed in policy, but less well informed about how to work effectively in the bureaucratic context of Washington and the State Department. As noted in Appendix E of the full report, “The United States is one of only a very few countries (the Philippines and Poland are others) that routinely place large numbers of untested newcomers into the international diplomatic game in senior diplomatic positions.” The report recommends that before they take up their duties, both ambassadorial and Washington-based officials be given a focused, succinct tutorial on “the structure and procedures of the Department of State, the interagency process, and Washington power relationships.” For those going to U.S. missions overseas, personnel-related responsibilities and the role of the country team should be included.

The issues addressed in the AAD/Stimson report reflect an out-of-kilter reality in the way the United States has managed its international relations. The report puts it this way: “Since at least 2001, America’s ‘smart power’ equation has been out of balance. Increasingly, underinvestment in diplomacy and development has led to our military taking on responsibilities traditionally met by diplomats and development experts. Driven by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the need to respond to the global threat of terrorism, resources and influence have flowed, abundantly and too often uncritically, to the Defense Department, which more than anyone has pointed to the limitation of bullets in addressing the challenges in this region.”

Training and education alone will not right the balance. Some have suggested a comprehensive review and reform of America’s national security structure, akin to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, if not the National Security Act of 1947. In the absence of such a thoroughgoing review and reform, the Department of State must take all possible steps to strengthen civilian power—through professional education to strengthen the intellectual base of our diplomatic service;

through training to improve execution; through sufficient funding to ensure necessary capacity; and by improving understanding and cultural awareness among our foreign affairs agencies, including interagency experience in selection criteria for senior positions. Otherwise, the imbalance evident for too long among the levers of America's power will continue to impede and distort our efforts in the international affairs arena, as well as U.S. interests overall.

(Postscript: George G. Meade died in 1872, embittered by the lack of recognition he felt he deserved as the victor at Gettysburg, and by the personal vendetta that Dan Sickles continued to wage against him. Sickles died in 1914, having served as Minister to Spain, where he had a rumored affair with the deposed Queen Isabella II before marrying the daughter of a Spanish Councillor of State. After campaigning for the award for 34 years, he was awarded the Medal of Honor in 1897 for his actions at Gettysburg.)

## CHAPTER 16

### IRREGULAR CONFLICT: CRITICAL REFORMS IN INTEGRATION, CAPABILITIES, AND EDUCATION

*Franklin D. Kramer*

#### **Introduction**

War, as Clausewitz has described, is an important way to achieve political aims.<sup>129</sup> Yet it requires violent means, significant societal disruptions, and large costs. It is no wonder that Sun Tzu cautioned that “there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.”<sup>130</sup> The United States has, however, been engaged in a period of long wars—most notably, Afghanistan for 10 years and Iraq for 8. In fact, William Lynn, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, has argued that one of the three salient characteristics of current wars is their increasing duration, along with their often asymmetric nature and an expanded access to lethality both in high-end and low-end conflicts.<sup>131</sup>

This chapter offers a series of recommendations on how to undertake irregular conflicts—the “long wars” in which the United States has engaged—in a more effective and less costly manner. The chapter, derived from the efforts of a workshop held jointly by CNA, the National Defense University, and the United States Institute of Peace, proposes a triad of actions that, if implemented, could affect the duration, asymmetry, and lethality of irregular conflict engagements and operations. The workshop utilized as a starting point recommendations by Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Review Panel and, therefore, had a somewhat greater orientation toward the military side of such efforts (with later workshops having a greater focus on the civilian side—as are developed in other chapters of this book) but, as will be clear from the this report and the analysis below, an overriding conclusion is the absolutely critical need for effective integration among military and civilian efforts.

The chapter has three sections: the first on integrated operations, the second on enhanced capabilities, and the third on expanded education. None of the recommendations are intended as panaceas—irregular conflicts present very difficult problems.<sup>132</sup> Moreover, it is important to avoid overgeneralization. Context matters a great deal in warfare generally and even more so in irregular conflicts where social, cultural, and psychological elements play key roles. Afghanistan

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<sup>129</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, Book One, Chapter One, para. 24, at p. 99 (Howard and Paret ed. and trans).

<sup>130</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, chapter 2, para. 7 at p. 73 (Griffith trans.)

<sup>131</sup> William Lynn, speech on “The Future of War,” June 8, 2011.

<sup>132</sup> See Kramer, *Irregular Conflict and the Wicked Problem Dilemma*, in *PRISM* (July 2011) at p. 75 et seq.

is not the same as Iraq,<sup>133</sup> and neither presents the issues in the precisely the same manner as faced in a Pakistan, Balkan, or Haiti situation.

The recommendations offered are substantial, but there are some reasons to believe that significant reform can be undertaken if wisely pursued. First, there are the obvious budget pressures on the United States. As many have pointed out, the United States alone has spent well over a trillion dollars in the past decade on irregular conflict, moneys that otherwise would have been available for different purposes.<sup>134</sup> Much of the expenditure has come about because the United States counterinsurgency strategy is heavily manpower dependent. Two Presidents from different parts of the political spectrum have seen fit to utilize “surge” efforts to meet irregular conflict requirements, and this dependence on very large numbers of non-host country manpower has high costs. The pressure to reduce costs can be used as a catalyst for reform. As a simple mathematical calculation, even a 10-percent saving would have garnered some \$100 billion, a highly valuable consideration in an era of fiscal constraint.

Second, although changing a highly effective strategic approach would make little sense, the fact is that the results of our counterinsurgency efforts have not been overwhelmingly positive. There is no doubt that significant gains have been made in both Iraq and Afghanistan when measured against the most difficult times in those countries, but neither of those countries presents a fully satisfactory security situation—as exemplified to the frequent reference to the “fragility”<sup>135</sup> of the security situation in Afghanistan. If “clear, hold, build” is a quick shorthand for the current counterinsurgency strategy, it would be highly desirable for the “build” portion to be much more effective—and there are reasons also to review the “clear” and “hold” portions to see whether they likewise could be done more efficiently and effectively. Accordingly, like costs, the desire for more positive consequences can be an important catalyst for change.

In short, changes that offer a more effective and lower-cost approach to irregular conflict fit both the needs of warfare and the budget requirements of a fiscally constrained circumstance. Such proposed changes are set forth below.

The reforms set forth below—integrated operations, enhanced capabilities, and expanded education—are discussed separately, but effective results will require actions in each of these arenas. Mutually supportive change integrated into policy, operations, capabilities, and education and training will be the requisite effort that accomplishes the desired end results.

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<sup>133</sup> See Malkasian and Myerle, *How Is Afghanistan Different From al Anbar* (February 2009).

<sup>134</sup> Congressional Research Service, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*, RL33110 at p. 2 et seq.

<sup>135</sup> “*While the momentum achieved by the Taliban in recent years has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in some key areas, these gains remain fragile and reversible.*” White House Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, April 2011, at p.8.

## 1. Integrated Actions

At least since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, DOD has focused on the value of integrated operations—“joint” when among services, “combined” when with other nations. Key elements include planning, training, and operating together. Yet, when the United States has undertaken consequential actions as in Iraq and Afghanistan, “jointness” among military and civilian organizations has been too limited and often only the result of good ad hoc arrangements among leaders in the field. All too frequently, there have been problems of the left hand not having sufficient knowledge of what the right hand is doing—or, when there is knowledge, a failure to resolve conflicting approaches.

The QDR Independent Review Panel pointed quite clearly to the problem, stating:

All of the civilian departments and agencies involved in the whole of government effort face the need to adapt their internal cultures, processes, and structures to work comprehensively together to meet 21st century challenges. . . . But each agency has its own perspective on national security challenges, its own methods of operation, its own personnel system, and its own culture. Enhancing a whole of government culture requires the development of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that both transcend and integrate the department and agency into this comprehensive perspective on national security.<sup>136</sup>

As the Panel stated, the problems are structural, procedural, and cultural, and include planning, training, and operations.

Effective interagency planning is a critical element of responding to irregular conflict, and it has two key elements. First, to be effective, planning must be adaptive—circumstances change and the plan must change over time or, if initial efforts are not working, change in substance. Planning requires efforts not only prior to a conflict, but also throughout its duration. Periodically, what was the best action for one time will require revision at a later time. The United States has been reasonably capable of being adaptive, as is exemplified by the decisions to surge forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan after earlier actions were less successful.

Second, however, adaptiveness alone is not enough. Effective planning also requires a comprehensive interagency approach to all key elements of resolving an irregular conflict—and comprehensive planning arguably is the least well undertaken aspect of United States efforts at the strategic level over the past ten years. The QDR Panel noted that this is not an easy task: “The number and diversity of potential participants and their likely relationships suggest the complexity and scale of the challenge.”<sup>137</sup> Although the operational and tactical elements of the military elements of strategy have received good planning efforts, other elements of strategy—

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<sup>136</sup> QDR Independent Review Panel, *The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, at pp.33-34.

<sup>137</sup> *Id.* at p. 34.

governance; non-military security such as police and courts; economics; and social/cultural factors—have not been planned for in a comprehensive and organized integrated fashion.

It should be clear that this analysis does not question either the good faith or the substantial efforts of numerous persons, both civilian and military. The argument is not that there is no planning, but that there is insufficient comprehensive integrated planning that would allow for a more effective overall strategy.

To accomplish the type of effective planning called for here, four sets of actions need to be taken.

- First, at the policy level, Congress should mandate the necessity of comprehensive interagency planning for irregular conflicts, similar to the requirements it mandated under Goldwater-Nichols. As the QDR Panel noted, “Although, to an extent, this will be event-dependent, time can be saved by studying likely future contingencies in advance and identifying now the critical organizational participants and the appropriate relationships among them.”<sup>138</sup>
- Second, the President should designate a senior policy planner in Washington who will report to the National Security Council. That does not mean reporting to the staff of the National Security Council but to the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense plus whomever else the President designates to be on the NSC. That senior planner will receive the agency plans and have the authority to cause them to be integrated. The interagency process will still work to develop goals and even proposed methods—but then those goals and methods will be encompassed in an integrated plan.
- Third, a critical element of this approach will be to have the State Department and the Agency for International Development speak with one voice, as is ostensibly the case but not so often true in fact. State created, but then not been able to use well, its Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability—and now a new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations. An office with the type of mandate intended for the new Bureau probably is the best positioned entity to coordinate planning for State/AID, but only if given the authority and backing of the Secretary of State. Depending on how organizational changes are undertaken, the head of S/CRS or of the new Bureau, if of sufficiently high rank and commensurate experience, could even be designated the overall planning head, as suggested above.
- Fourth, in the field, there will be a requirement to integrate the military and civilian planning. The relevant combatant commander for the military should integrate military plans with a designated senior civilian theatre planner who should have authority over all civilian agencies and their plans. It is possible that the civilian planner would be the

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<sup>138</sup> Id.



ambassador, but it may be sensible to have a designated person, along the lines of a special envoy who is less subject to the immediate politics of the host nation.

### **A. Integrated Operations**

Planning in an integrated fashion is only part of effective integrated actions. Most importantly, field operations also need to be integrated—and, to do that effectively, training and budgeting likewise need to be integrated.

From an operational perspective, there is no single best method for military and civilian entities to operate together. As noted above, context will differ in different irregular conflicts and, undoubtedly, will also change over time. Senior leaders should have the flexibility to use multiple approaches and to change them as called for by changed circumstances. The concept is not a straitjacket, one-size-fits-all approach, but rather flexibility within the inviolable principle of integration.

It is, however, critical to have an organized common effort. The QDR Panel called for a “unity of effort.”<sup>139</sup> A key point here is the necessity to understand the resources and capabilities of each deploying entity and the way they will each see and react to the environment in which they are deployed. Because specific tasks will, of course, differ, different requirements can often lead to different methods, different analysis of desired end results and various opportunities for conflict. It is critical to bring those differences into a common approach.

That, of course, raises the question of who is in charge. One oft-cited model is the relationship in Iraq between the military, headed by General Petraeus, and the civilian side, headed by Ambassador Crocker. During their common tenures, the dual-head approach worked well, but there may be circumstances where a single head would be more effective. It is notable that in the two examples cited by the QDR Panel—Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the Africa Partnership Station—there has been a single command structure. Particularly when the security situation is highly unsettled, there are potentially strong reasons for unity of command—and that approach should not be ignored out of hand, but neither should it be simply adopted as the default position.

The reality is that there can be risks in either direction. To be sure, there are understandable concerns that over-militarizing an effort might cause other key elements to be ignored or misunderstood. But it is an equally legitimate concern that an absence of structure and a lack of integrated direction can confound attempts to organize integrated operations, creating a real prospect for significantly negative results. In sum, organizing the proper command approach—whether unity of command or unity of effort—is one of the key aspects of responding to irregular conflict and should be given a high degree of analysis within each particular conflict.

The proper focus on training also will be a key factor. As the QDR Panel noted, “Success in military operations requires . . . a commitment to train in the way we expect to operate,” but that

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<sup>139</sup> Id. at p. 37.

there was not such a commitment across the whole-of-government approach.<sup>140</sup> Training utilizing an interagency approach will help uncover some of those differences among agencies noted above, and deploying with personnel who were trained together will mean not only that there is a common reference background but also the more evolved human relationships that make integrated efforts more likely.

There are two broad elements to training—pre-deployment training and baseline training designed to develop, teach, and sustain operational-level skills and processes necessary for building a set of “whole of government” capabilities and capacities. Pre-deployment training does take place to some extent now on an integrated basis, but it could be significantly enhanced. Longer-term training does not. The QDR Panel found that “The Department of Defense needs to contribute to training and exercising these civilian forces with U.S. military forces so that they will be able to operate effectively together,” and even recommended a “biennial (every other year) exercise involving both the international community and the national agencies.”<sup>141</sup>

Integrated training will generate much more effective integrated operations and, for that reason, should be a key element of responding to irregular conflict. One of the key real- life obstacles to integrated training is costs, and that raises the broader issue of budgeting for irregular conflict.

## **B. Resources**

No strategy can be effectively implemented without adequate resources. And although the expenditures on the United States’ long wars have been very high, they have not always had the flexibility that would allow them to be most effectively utilized. The general constraint has been the Congressional requirement for the separation of agency funding streams and the limitations on transferring from one agency to another budgetary authority that circumstances have shown would be more desirable (and there are also limits on whether an agency can transfer its own funds from one type of expenditure to another).

Congress has provided some assistance, initially in so-called 1206 and 1207 situations where DOD money has been available for transfer to State for the purposes of security assistance, including counter-terrorism and stability and reconstruction. Moreover, starting with FY 2012, DOD and State have been authorized to utilize pooled funding to a limited extent. Former Deputy Defense Secretary Lynn explained this approach as follows:

For FY 2012, the State and Defense Departments have proposed an important new tool, the Global Security Contingency Fund, also known as the “pooled fund.” This fund would allow us to provide assistance for security forces and institutions and rule of law and stabilization programs in key nations. One of the unique aspects of this proposal is that it would allow us to provide targeted assistance within the budget cycle whenever we have a strategic opportunity or

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<sup>140</sup> Id. at p. 32.

<sup>141</sup> Id. at p. 44.

see a threat emerge. This fund is based on a new model of interagency coordination, one that emphasizes the links between defense, diplomacy, and development, and enables our departments—in close consultation with Congress—to respond jointly and effectively to a broad range of transnational challenges.<sup>142</sup>

The broad approach of enhanced flexibility to support integrated operations needs to be expanded. One useful way to do this would be to broaden the availability and size of the Global Security Contingency Fund so that money could be allocated as the President determined. Reporting could be undertaken to Congress, and some limitations could be established along the lines of existing reprogramming requirements. The key point is that flexible integrated operations require flexible integrated funding, and the annual—and longer—ordinary budget cycle does not provide for that flexibility.

### **C. Non-Governmental Organizations and Integrated Operations**

Integrated operations will not be achieved only by integrating governmental entities, though that is obviously highly desirable. Contractors and other non-governmental organizations are extensively engaged in the conduct of an irregular conflict, and their actions need also to be integrated. The QDR Panel focused on the contractor portion of this issue and recommended:

...designating an Assistant Secretary of Defense-level official to oversee and standardize management of contractors in contingencies; increasing the number and improving the training of contracting officers; integrating contractors and contractor-provided tasks into contingency plans; and integrating contractor roles into pre-deployment training and exercises.<sup>143</sup>

But contractors are not the only non-governmental entities heavily engaged in irregular conflict. Particularly in governance and social efforts, including health and education, non-profit organizations play important roles. Not all such organizations are willing to engage with the U.S. government in the course of a conflict, but, increasingly, many are. To the extent possible, integrating their activities as part of an overall effort will have high value.

## **2. Enhanced Capabilities**

While the failure sufficiently to integrate planning and operations is a highly significant issue, it is only one of the critical problems faced in dealing with irregular conflict. A second equally, and often more, significant issue surrounds the question of capabilities. Capabilities issues arise in three different ways: i) first, there are some important things that we simply do not know how to do or, at least, not how to do well; ii) second, there are often situations in which we do not take advantage of what do know; and iii) third, as discussed in the section on integrated operations,

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<sup>142</sup> Statement of William J. Lynn, III Deputy Secretary of Defense before the Senate Budget Committee March 10, 2011, at p.3.

<sup>143</sup> QDR Panel, *supra* note 126 at 39.

we often do not integrate capabilities that we do have and, therefore, get a less than desirable result.

The QDR Panel discussed the problem of the lack of capabilities as follows:

The problem is that the civilian government departments and agencies do not have the needed capability or capacity to adequately support needed whole of government and Comprehensive Approach strategies. . . .<sup>144</sup>

As just one example, we need to strengthen our ability to improve governance of failing states so that we do not have to deploy our military because a failing state became a failed state that threatens our vital interests. But governance is a civilian function. We need to define the capabilities required for these kinds of missions and then draw together the civilian departments and agencies that have or need to develop these capabilities and ensure that they are organized for rapid deployment overseas. This is one example of how a whole of government approach could reduce our need to resort to our military.<sup>145</sup>

The Panel was very clear on the benefit of having such effective capabilities:

“In addition, coming in after a military operation with the whole range of civil skills required for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction will contribute to reducing the duration of a military deployment and accelerating the point where the military can shift to a supporting role and ultimately hand over security to either international peacekeeping or indigenous forces. Such an approach can ultimately shorten the duration of U.S. military deployments to these troubled regions.”<sup>146</sup>

Improving capabilities is not a simple task. All the entities and people who have been working these problems previously have sought to be effective. Being more effective so that better results will be generated will require three broad types of actions: better focused resources; greater understanding of host nation context and a lessons learned capacity that can align capabilities with context; and clearer objectives so that there are not conflicting requirements that offset one another.

#### **A. Focused Resources**

In terms of focused resources to enhance capabilities, there are three actions that could be promptly taken, two within the ambit of the DOD and one involving a broader effort:

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<sup>144</sup> Id. at p. 33.

<sup>145</sup> Id. at p. 34.

<sup>146</sup> Id. at pp. 34.-35.

The simplest action DOD could undertake would be to increase and more effectively integrate its civil affairs capabilities. There simply are not enough civil affairs personnel in the military. Moreover, for any officer or senior enlisted personnel who can be expected to be involved in irregular conflict—which is essentially everyone—civil affairs training is a necessity. The area is fundamentally under-resourced in terms of dollars, time spent, and personnel. Moreover, civil affairs efforts all too often are not sufficiently integrated with civilian efforts. The good news is that changing this situation would not require large expenditures of funds, but it would require a reallocation of personnel toward this set of activities.

The second action DOD could undertake is to increase its information-gathering capabilities and cultural and contextual understanding of the host nation. Lack of information and understanding makes more difficult knowing how to use non-kinetic actions to generate effects (and such knowledge would also enhance understanding of kinetic actions' consequences). DOD has recognized this problem to some important extent in the context of Afghanistan. In a well-known article, Major General Flynn wrote:

Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy. Having focused the overwhelming majority of its collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade. Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about whom the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers—whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers—U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency.<sup>147</sup>

There is no question that, since General Flynn's salvo, a greater effort has been undertaken in Afghanistan. But, entirely apart from how successful that has been, the need exists to institutionalize that approach. Doing so is partly a matter of reorienting intelligence efforts and partly a matter of providing the right education and training so that such efforts can be effective. Again, the good news is that this is not a requirement for large, new funding, but rather for focused reallocation within the context of existing budgets. The main issue, as with Civil Affairs discussed above, will be the recognition by senior officials in the DOD of the value of such reallocation in the context of constrained funding.

The third area in which existing capabilities could be better used is outside the DOD ambit, but should fall under the concept of a unity of effort approach. Most specifically, there are existing capabilities in the health, education, and agricultural areas whose use could be better integrated

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<sup>147</sup> Flynn and Pottinger, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan* (2010), 7.

with other efforts. Once again, this is not to say that there has been no effort in this area. Most obviously, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, significant efforts have been undertaken in precisely these areas. The issue is rather integration into an overall effort—and the value of those actions in creating a reasonably stable host country. Integrating non-government organizations, contractors, and universities into the planning process and coordinating field activities can have an increased multiplier effect.

## **B. Improving Capabilities**

In the United States approach to irregular conflict, it is well-established that much of the effort will go toward three important tasks: training the host nation military; enhancing non-military security, especially police and judiciary; and generating effective governance. It is also fairly clear from the results of U.S. efforts that these are not tasks that are easily accomplished. For example, in his 2010 report, Lieutenant General William Caldwell stated, “Before November 2009 there were insufficient resources to properly conduct the [police training] mission.”<sup>148</sup> Resources, however, were not the only deficiency; a second factor has been the design of training itself. In an earlier interview, General Caldwell stated, with respect to police training, “We weren’t doing it right. . . . It is still beyond my comprehension.”<sup>149</sup> And, of course, the host nation itself presents challenges beyond resources and training design. In Iraq, a review group led by General James Jones found the Iraqi Police Service and the national police to be incapable and ineffective; relevant factors included under-resourcing, sectarianism, and the dysfunctional nature of the Ministry of Interior under which they served.<sup>150</sup>

There are no easy solutions to these problems; otherwise, they would have been put in place already. There are, however, some important steps that could be taken to ameliorate the problems and give better results over the longer term. The initial focus needs to be on process and lessons learned.

Improving training for the host nation military can be utilized as a model. Without denigrating prior or existing efforts, it is worth remembering the very high costs in terms of casualties and resources of the extended efforts that have been required in Iraq and Afghanistan because host nation forces have not been able to fully meet requirements. It seems fair to say that, in general, the United States largely trains other militaries in the U.S. model. There are many reasons for this, not least of which is that this is what the military knows best and is a highly effective model if it can be made to work.

But it is this last point that needs to be considered. The U.S. model demands significant resources and highly educated and committed personnel. Often, neither of those will be available in a host nation. Accordingly, the question becomes whether a model more oriented to the

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<sup>148</sup> NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan, Year in Review (November 2010), 3.

<sup>149</sup> “Program Aims to Rebuild Afghan Police Force, Repair Its Image,” *The Washington Post*, March 10, 2010.

<sup>150</sup> The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (September 2007), 8–10.

capacities of the host nation can be utilized. To ask this question is not to answer it, but there certainly are some in the United States military—and particularly the Special Forces—who are capable of training to a different model. An important challenge for DOD should be to determine if training host nations can be significantly improved, particularly by consideration of non-U.S. modeled militaries. To be sure, training on the U.S. model can have accomplishments. There are, for example, ongoing improvements in the Afghan forces.<sup>151</sup> Yet, despite such improvements, United States and NATO forces are scheduled to remain in country until the end of 2014—which will be a 12-year effort—and it seems fair to ask whether focused analysis could offer ways to reduce such large and long-term programs.

This same set of questions arises in the context of the police and judiciary. Police and the judiciary raise complementary but different problems. Effective resolution of these issues requires, at a minimum, a good understanding of the culture and context. However, to the extent that they exist, U.S. capabilities are oriented to U.S. model, and, often, reliance for improving the police and judiciary is placed on the military, which does have some capability—particularly to be able to run a large program for police—but how effective such programs will be over time is not clear.

A key question is whether a rigorous analytic effort focused on lessons learned could lead to improved results. In the overall context of irregular conflict, funding for such an analytic effort would be small, but the implications could be large. A review, to be effective, would need to take account not only of lessons learned within the U.S. government, but also of learning and information from entities outside the USG, including non-governmental organizations (non-profits and contractors) as well as the host nation and other governments that have been engaged on these issues. Part of the effort might simply be a rigorous literature review as a good deal has been written on these topics. But the greater effort likely would be empirical analyses, focused on specific cases, which might illuminate best practices that have been effective.<sup>152</sup>

Governance is the third arena in which improvement is called for. It is fair to say that certain aspects of governance usually are done reasonably well—particularly establishing structured efforts such as elections or formal government structures. However, other matters such as ensuring participation in governance, accountability of officials, and limitation of corruption generally are much more challenging.

The 2011 White House report makes clear the problems in the context of Afghanistan:

While the Afghan government made advances in its capacity and effectiveness at the national level, it is still lacking at the sub-national level. Accountability at all levels remains weak. . . . Despite some small improvement in the training of judges . . . progress in the judicial sector was overshadowed by

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<sup>151</sup> White House Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, April 2011, at p.30.

<sup>152</sup> The QDR Panel made a recommendation along these lines: “Ensure the integration of lessons learned from the current wars within the programs of instruction of Department of Defense education and training institutions.” QDR Panel, *supra* note 126 at p. 46.

serious questions about the Afghan government's political commitment to fight corruption.<sup>153</sup>

For this difficult set of governance problems, it seems clear enough that we do not have a good set of answers, and yet they are critically important. Once again, the value of a serious, funded, analytic program based on lessons learned and seeking information from empirical analysis seems to be in order.

### **3. Expanded Education<sup>154</sup>**

Implicit in the discussions above regarding improved operations and enhanced capabilities is the assumption of appropriately educated personnel competent to take the actions necessary to achieve effective results in irregular conflict. The breadth of the background required was stated by the QDR Panel:

Officers today must be prepared to wage war among civilian populations, to partner with contractors and civilian experts from our own and other societies in rebuilding shattered neighborhoods, to segregate local populations with confusing ethnic or religious rivalries, and to advise senior political leaders about how to avoid—as well as win—wars in ambiguous settings against unconventional and uncertain enemies.<sup>155</sup>

Given the breadth of knowledge required, the assumption of competence is not necessarily warranted under today's circumstances. Yet even though education is more limited than it ought to be in terms of scope and reach, the problem of generating adequate education could be substantially resolved within the constraints of fiscal limitations. Four actions would make a significant difference.

First, the breadth of professional military education should be expanded. At different times in the career process, required courses need to include such diverse subjects as how to understand different cultures, how to build organizational structures, and how economics and security interact. There are no specific places within the military now to receive such education, but the DOD regional centers—there are five, one each for Europe, Asia-Pacific, Near-East/South Asia, Africa, and Latin America—might be the basis of curriculum development and potentially the provision of courses.<sup>156</sup> The State Department's Foreign Service Institute could also be engaged in the development and provision of appropriate curriculum.

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<sup>153</sup> White House Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, April 2011, at pp. 30-31, 32.

<sup>154</sup> A number of suggestions in this section are based on the presentation by Karen Guttieri of the Naval Postgraduate School as part of the workshop.

<sup>155</sup> QDR Panel, *supra* note 126 at p. 75.

<sup>156</sup> The QDR Panel recommended to "Establish authority for a consortium of existing U.S. government schools to develop and provide a common professional national security education curriculum. *Id.* at p. 41.



Second, such an educational approach should not be limited to the active duty military. Reservists and Guard personnel are frequently engaged in irregular conflict and should be given the same educational opportunities, which they do not now have. Distributed education capabilities could be enhanced and utilized to achieve such ends. Certainly also, State and AID personnel should be regularly involved—and other civilian agencies similarly should have some international expertise. Indeed, the QDR panel stated that a “cadre of national security professionals with perspective, experience, education, and training in the Comprehensive Approach must be developed.”<sup>157</sup> Moreover, if it were possible within fiscal constraints, contractors and other non-governmental personnel should be included in the education effort, just as they will be included in actual operations.<sup>158</sup>

Third, education and assignments should be linked. All too often regional educational opportunities are followed by assignments with no relationship to the region. Indeed, with some frequency, officers receive education and then leave the service shortly after. To offset this last problem, the QDR panel recommended that “Officers selected for senior service school should be obligated for at least 5 years of additional service after graduation.”<sup>159</sup>

Fourth, education for irregular conflicts should take advantage of expertise outside the military. One could hypothesize three or four levels of courses, with the military perhaps providing levels one and two, the State Department levels two or three, and perhaps outside organizations such as the United States Institute of Peace or a university providing levels three or above.

## **Conclusion**

Irregular conflicts present challenges that need more effective solutions than have been achievable to date. A combination of integrated operations, enhanced capabilities, and expanded education offers the prospect for significantly better results. Implementing the recommendations set forth above is achievable within the current fiscal constraints and would go far to improve international security in the highly globalized world of the 21st century.

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<sup>157</sup> Id. at p. 37.

<sup>158</sup> The QDR Panel stated:” Improving education and training requirements for contractors, particularly those supporting complex contingencies abroad, is also essential.” Id. at p. 29.

<sup>159</sup> Id. at p. 76.

## Chapter 17

### Two Sides of the Same Coin: Integrating Civilian and Military Surge Capacity for Stability Operations

*Melanne A. Civic, Esq.*<sup>†</sup>

Through the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), the U.S. Department of State (DOS) created a cadre of experts from among the civil service who were trained, equipped, and ready to deploy rapidly to fragile states.<sup>160</sup> The CRC, originally conceived as the Response Readiness Corps<sup>161</sup> in 2005, was a twist on the repeating dilemma of how the U.S. government civilian agencies would coordinate with the U.S. military, diffuse tensions and seek to avoid conflict overseas, build sustainable institutions for peacebuilding, and transition to longer-term economic development and state building. Such operations previously had defaulted to military elements—particularly leadership by the U.S. Marines,<sup>162</sup> Army Civil Affairs,<sup>163</sup> and Judge Advocate General (JAG) corps, active and reserves. While coordinated with the military, the CRC was to be a wholly civilian entity, yet excluded civilian employees of the Department of Defense (DOD), as well as civilians serving in the National Guard and as military reservists. At its height, the CRC was envisioned to number more than 2200 government employees from U.S. foreign affairs and domestic civilian agencies, with up to 264 active<sup>164</sup> members, devoted to full-time reconstruction and stabilization

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<sup>†</sup> The thoughts expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author and do not reflect the policies or positions of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

<sup>160</sup> The term “fragile states” refers to countries emerging from conflict or at high risk of state failure, and generally lacking in rule of law and justice, a sustainable economy, and good governance capacity. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines fragile states simply as: “those failing to provide basic services to poor people because they are unwilling or unable to do so.” OECD, 2006, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series Applying Strategic Environmental Assessment: Good Practice Guidance for Development Cooperation, OECD, Paris.

<sup>161</sup> The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2005, AKA the Lugar-Biden Act, was introduced on January 31, 2005. Ultimately, it was integrated into the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417, signed into law October 14, 2008).

<sup>162</sup> See *Small Wars Manual*, United States Marine Corps (1940).

<sup>163</sup> The Army Civil Affairs division was created under President Harry S. Truman to administer the Marshall Plan of economic recovery and reconstruction of Europe post World War II.

<sup>164</sup> At its height, 130 of the 264 active corps members were hired across the interagency partnership.

operations, training and planning, and some 1800-2000 standby members with applicable skills, ready to deploy as needed on stabilization and reconstruction teams.<sup>165</sup>

In parallel, in 2009 DOD established the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) to assist U.S. military forces in noncombat operations, including humanitarian missions, disaster relief, restoring law and order, drug interdiction, and stability operations.<sup>166</sup> Some have observed that DOD took on the task where the civilian agencies apparently were unable to do so expeditiously and comprehensively. The “military is doing the work, because USAID, and Department of State funding and staff don’t have the resources, but the military does.”<sup>167</sup> The CEW is designed to draw from current civilian and former civilian and military service DOD employees who voluntarily make themselves available to be called for operational duty, as needed.<sup>168</sup> CEW integrates civilian and retired military personnel, while it specifically excludes DOD employees who are dual-status National Guard or Reserve Technician employees.<sup>169</sup>

The CRC embodied the Whole-of-Government approach, drawing upon personnel and applicable skills across the U.S. government. The DOS perception of the Whole-of-Government approach is characterized by the coordination of civilian agencies, i.e., agencies other than DOD. The DOD perspective is coordination across the full spectrum of U.S. government agencies—civilian, military and all uniformed services. The Comprehensive approach, by contrast, is even more expansive than the Whole-of-Government approach, seeking cooperation and collaboration among and between all U.S. government departments and agencies, plus intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multinational partners, and private-sector entities. Yet a Whole-of-Government or Comprehensive approach presumes shared or at least overlapping objectives and interests, which often is not the case in reality. This chapter proposes an integration of civilian and military noncombat surge response mechanisms to operate in secure, permissive environments, and capitalizing on civilian assets, not only among the civilian agencies, but within military institutions, toward a comprehensive approach.

### **Origins of U.S. Expeditionary Noncombat Response**

For nearly a century, the operational response to post-conflict states was considered to be a military responsibility, at the service of civilian leadership, and supported by diplomatic tools and personnel. Over time, the priority attached to these operations by civilian and military

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<sup>165</sup> Full capacity was not realized for the active corps, and the momentum and policy support for maintaining a robust standing civilian surge capacity was short-lived. The CRC was operational in its original interagency form for three years, once the legal authorities, funding appropriations, and hiring processes aligned. By 2012, in the shadow of budgetary constraints and with the CRC under new leadership, the decision was made to downsize the active component to less than one-third of its original design, and the civilian response concept was comprehensively reevaluated.

<sup>166</sup> Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (2009).

<sup>167</sup> Congressman Christopher Shays, Commission on Wartime Contracting, Congressional Hearing, March 1, 2010.

<sup>168</sup> In practice, the CEW supplements its personnel pool by hiring outside contractors to serve in civilian roles.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*

decision-makers, and the character of the responses has vacillated so that they have generally taken the forms of military and/or mixed civilian-military efforts.<sup>170</sup> As early as the Spanish American War in 1898, the Marines were engaged in interventions with political, policing, judicial, administrative and economic dimensions, and a range of military governance activities. Following the “Banana Wars”<sup>171</sup> of the first three decades of the twentieth century, the Marines issued the *Small Wars Manual*<sup>172</sup> in 1940. The Manual described such engagements as exercised under executive authority and involving military and civilian tools:

. . . wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.<sup>173</sup>

The post-World War II European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) is the most commonly cited success story of stabilization and reconstruction, and it marked the genesis of the Army’s Civil Affairs division. Administered under the Economic Recovery Act,<sup>174</sup> the Marshall Plan centered on poverty reduction through domestic economic reconstruction and international trade. It was an interagency operation and an early form of the comprehensive approach although not termed as such. The nascent mechanism for interagency services and goods exchange through the Economy Act<sup>175</sup> has withstood the test of time, and was employed by successor reconstruction and stabilization interagency endeavors, including the initial CRC construct.

Achieving agreement on the form of interagency coordination and collaboration has taken many decades, despite having been conscientiously addressed during the Vietnam War, and later by three consecutive U.S. administrations, by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), by numerous donor countries, and by regional and multinational organizations.

A cohesive program of U.S. interagency partnership was established in 1967 in attempts to counter the de-stabilizing effects of guerilla insurgents in Vietnam. The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program sought to enhance security through the infusion of international aid and expert civilian and military advisors to implement governance, police and local security forces, and economic programs. Through CORDS, military and civilian security goals were synchronized, as were personnel activities under a single hierarchical structure with a single leadership chain and a unified mission. Civilian personnel from USAID (formed just six years earlier), the Department of State, Agriculture, Commerce, and Treasury

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<sup>170</sup> See Unity of Mission: Civilian-Military Teaming, Past, Present and Future, Jon Gundersen and Melanne A. Civic, Esq. Co-Editors, Air University Press (2012).

<sup>171</sup> A series of conflicts in the Caribbean and Central American regions between 1901 to 1934.

<sup>172</sup> *Small Wars Manual*, United States Marines, Government Printing Office (1940).

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.* at 1.

<sup>174</sup> Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (Public Law 472, 80th Cong., 2d sess., April 3, 1948).

<sup>175</sup> The Economy Act of 1932, as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 1535, permits Federal Government agencies to purchase goods or services from other Federal Government agencies or other major organizational units within the same agency.

provided expert advisors. Funds for CORDS were pooled into a single budget, requiring civilian and military agreement on program, resource, and expenditure decisions. CORDS was an extraordinary effort for the civilian USG agencies, yet relatively humble from the military perspective, proportionate to their respective budgets. At its height, fewer than one-thousand civilian experts deployed, compared to four to six thousand military personnel. Within two years of America's disengagement from Vietnam, CORDS was phased out. In the absence of the unifying imperative of the war, the differences among the various agencies of strategy and goals resurfaced and dominated the interactions, defeating unity of purpose. The various functions of CORDS were downsized and delegated back to the respective agencies.

Despite the American public's distaste for the Vietnam War, over the next 25 years the U.S. was engaged in a succession of stability and peacebuilding operations. Starting in the late 1990s and extending for more than a decade, U.S. security interests with respect to fragile states escalated from a "concern" to a threat. In the shadow of state failures in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia and elsewhere, various presidential and cabinet-level directives, planning templates, and policy initiatives mapped out activities and goals to promote collaboration and coordination between and among U.S. government civilian agencies and with the DOD for noncombat operations. The administrations of Presidents William J. Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama each issued specific directives and policy guidance on point, while senior policy-makers and nongovernmental experts continued to search for innovative stability response paradigms.

In 1997, President Clinton, in recognition of the complexity, multi-dimensional character and importance of such operations, issued Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56). Although it remains a classified document, an accompanying White Paper<sup>176</sup> outlined the general principles of the directive which included: (1) establishing a unified strategy and training for the whole of government; (2) collecting lessons learned from peacebuilding operations; (3) and integrating those lessons into improved training and planning for successive engagements.<sup>177</sup> The Directive made explicit the policy goal of minimizing the U.S. military engagement in in "complex contingency operations,"<sup>178</sup> beyond its traditional combat roles, and avoiding open-ended engagements. Reducing military direct action in these operations would require the concomitant increased use of civilian experts, where security conditions permitted deployment of civilians to the host countries. By 2004, however, little progress had been made in the U.S. to transform this policy into practice. The civilian experts were not prepared or equipped to take on the mentorship roles or substitution functions overseas or to temporarily take over governance, justice, and other functions.

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<sup>176</sup> White Paper on the Clinton Administration's Policy on Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive 56, May 1997.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>178</sup> The White Paper describes that PDD 56 defines "complex contingency operations" as peacebuilding and peacekeeping. It also encompasses those activities now known as stability and reconstruction operations. <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>. By contrast, humanitarian relief operations are considered separately, except where a humanitarian disaster results in political instability.

In 2005, President George W. Bush issued the National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44),<sup>179</sup> shortly after DOD issued the Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05.<sup>180</sup> Also in 2005, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) advocated for and executed policy decisions and a comprehensive approach involving “well sequenced and coherent progress across the political, security, economic and administrative domains.”<sup>181</sup> Across the U.S. government and among multilateral allies, policy favored a coordinated, comprehensive and civilian-led approach to peacebuilding.

Although NSPD-44 did not explicitly build on President Clinton’s PDD-56, it was developed in response to the same types of challenges. NSPD-44 calls for a permanent structure for stability and reconstruction efforts, and places it squarely under civilian leadership. Specifically, the Secretary of State is directed to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts” among the civilian agencies and to coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense.<sup>182</sup> The Directive also outlined the policy of “improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”<sup>183</sup> Elements of NSPD-44 were legislatively authorized through Title XVI of the National Defense Authorization (NDAA) for 2009.<sup>184</sup> Under the NDAA for 2009, authority for reconstruction and stabilization was authorized within the Department of State, to include the development of a standing civilian surge mechanism to respond to reconstruction and stabilization needs, and to coordinate and cooperate with the military. The Secretary of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) worked within the framework of stability and reconstruction operations to thwart conflict or stabilize nations after conflict.<sup>185</sup>

Concurrent with NSPD-44, DODD 3000.05 of 2005 raised stability operations to the level of a “core military capability that . . . shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.”<sup>186</sup> The two Directives were developed in consultation with each other, complementary and intended to be mutually supporting. Civilian-military coordinating provisions are mirrored in each. Specifically, DODD 3000.05 requires DOD and the military services to coordinate with DOS, the other civilian agencies, international institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. Over several years, DOD developed guidance and doctrine for coordinated military-civilian engagements, including for those experts frequently called upon in transitional

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<sup>179</sup> *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, National Presidential Security Directive (NSPD)-44, signed December 7, 2005.

<sup>180</sup> Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (2005, updated and reissued 2009).

<sup>181</sup> Security System Reform and Governance, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2005.

<sup>182</sup> NSPD-44 at 1.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>184</sup> Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2009, Public Law. 110-417 110th Cong, Title XVI (October 14, 2008).

<sup>185</sup> Neither S/CRS nor the Civilian Response Corps is designed for humanitarian response, although either may respond where a humanitarian crisis becomes a driver of conflict.

<sup>186</sup> DODD 3000.05 (2005) at §4.1.

security contexts. In 2008, the Civil Affairs Army Field Manual outlined the challenges, tasks, and method of coordination for stability operations through the comprehensive approach:

It postures the military to perform a role common throughout history—ensuring the safety and security of the local populace, assisting with reconstruction, and providing basic sustenance and public services. Equally important, it defines the role of military forces in support of the civilian agencies charged with leading these complex endeavors.<sup>187</sup>

By 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates identified “fractured or failing states” as one of the “main security challenges” of modern times.<sup>188</sup> Yet, despite policy directives and operational demands for interagency coordination and a Whole-of-Government approach, the reality of coordination across civilian agencies and between DOS and DOD remained sufficiently deficient for a Congressional hearing in the spring of 2010 to raise and critique the issue:

But for all the improvements of recent years, America's inter agency tool kit is a hodge podge of jerry-rigged arrangements constrained by dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources.<sup>189</sup>

In parallel, early in the Obama administration, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton established a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) with the purpose of synchronizing foreign policy and development goals and provide unified policy guidance. At the end of 2010, The QDDR was rolled-out and defined “civilian power” as “the government working as one, just as our military services work together as a unified force.” The QDDR also stressed the importance of diplomats and development experts working together and called for coordination between USAID subject matter experts in energy, agriculture, justice, and health, for example, to coordinate with their counterparts in U.S. government departments of Energy, Agriculture, Justice, and Health and Human Services. The QDDR emphasized the importance of collaboration, not only across the U.S. Government agencies, but also with the civilians working in DOD. It defined “civilian power” as “the government working as one, just as our military services work together as a unified force.” Furthermore, it touched on civilian-military collaboration, noting the policy drawbacks of relying on “civilian and military teams in the field to figure out how best to work together” and calling for “new ways and frameworks for working with the military” in conflict prevention and stabilization.<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> *U.S. Army Field Manual, Civil Affairs 3.07 (2008)*.

<sup>188</sup> “In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety and security—a city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack—are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. Dealing with such fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time.” Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others to Defend Themselves: The Future of Security Assistance.” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2010).

<sup>189</sup> Christopher Shays, *Op.Cit.*

<sup>190</sup> Some critics observed that some practical issues of implementation of coordination had been punted in the QDDR. See, e.g., *Concepts Are Not Enough*, [Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS, 2010, http://csis.org/publication/quadrennial-diplomacy-and-development-review-qddr](http://csis.org/publication/quadrennial-diplomacy-and-development-review-qddr); *Good Intent*

## The Civilian Response Corps

The Civilian Response Corps (CRC) was designed to be a team of reconstruction and stabilization experts cutting across multiple agencies and multiple disciplines, trained in stability operations and planning, and with a unifying esprit de corps

The CRC was to have three distinct, mutually supporting components: active, standby, and reserves. S/CRS piloted an exclusively Department of State active and standby corps in 2006, with a group of nearly a dozen active personnel working in S/CRS with specialized skills, and approximately two hundred standby pre-approved to deploy as needed from throughout the Department of State.

In September 2008, the S/CRS expanded the active and standby components to interagency partners—to institutionalize interagency coordination under a single insignia. NSPD-44 provided the policy basis for the interagency CRC, although legislative authorization restrictions remained a sticking point for engagement by those agencies with exclusively domestic mandates. Congressional oversight of departments such as Justice and Health and Human Services permitted agency appropriations to be expended only on domestic activities, which could not be overcome through a policy directive as NSPD-44. Even under the NDAA for 2009, only DOS and USAID were specifically named in the authorizing legislation, and by its terms, it did not create new authorizations for agency personnel with otherwise domestic mandates to use agency appropriations for international stability and reconstruction activities.<sup>191</sup>

Negotiations between DOS and interagency partners as to the terms of reference outlining the form, functions, respective duties, and prerogatives of the CRC partnership were delicate and not always entirely amicable. Over a period of nine months, the agency partners reached agreement. The original core group that signed an interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) included the Department of State, USAID, the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, Transportation, and Treasury. Later, Treasury decided to withdraw from the CRC and the Department of Energy offered to join in a standby capacity.<sup>192</sup>

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*but the Devil's in the Details*, Center for Global Development, 2010, <http://blogs.cgdev.org/mca-monitor/2010/11/the-qddr-pre-release-good-intent-but-the-devil%E2%80%99s-in-the-details.php>.

<sup>191</sup> NDAA for 2009, Title 16, Op. Cit., Sec 1605(b)(1): The Corps shall be composed of active and standby components consisting of United States Government personnel, including employees of the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and other agencies who are recruited and trained (and employed in the case of the active component) to provide such assistance when deployed to do so by the Secretary to support the purposes of this Act.

<sup>192</sup> According to the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), additional agencies may choose to participate in the CRC, by consensus at Assistant Secretary level in the Reconstruction and Stabilization Interagency Policy Committee (or successor body).



The CRC active component was established as a group of full-time U.S. government personnel whose primary duties would be to plan and conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations. Active members were committed to be available to deploy worldwide within 48 hours of call-up. When not deployed, the active members' duties were described as training for and engaging in coordinated planning of overseas stability operations. One distinguishing feature of the CRC, as originally conceived, was that the active members would remain in service to and in residence with their home agencies, while being part of the interagency Corps, rather than the traditional government "detail" arrangement which temporarily transfers personnel from one agency to another in a reimbursable or non-reimbursable fee for service arrangement.<sup>193</sup> This distinctive feature of the CRC active component was reevaluated in 2012, and the revised construct returned to a model more closely resembling interagency Detail or Secondment, whereby partner agency CRC members would serve in residence or "imbed" in DOS when not deployed overseas, and expert services paid for as-needed.

Members of the standby component of the CRC also were full-time government personnel, but employed in various capacities, and committed to providing expertise supplemental to the active CRC. Unlike the active members, the standby work in positions where their day-to-day duties likely are not international in character, but, by virtue of their individual and professional experience, their skill sets may be applicable to the work of stabilization.<sup>194</sup> As standby members, during the first three years of the CRC, the standby members received some pertinent training and other preparation to ready them for the possibility of rapid deployment. By advanced agreement with the individual and the agency, the CRC standby member was considered to be ready and willing to deploy within 30 days when called upon by an interagency policy decision mechanism.<sup>195</sup>

The original plan of the CRC envisioned a reserves component to be drawn from state and local government and the private nonprofit sector, to complement the active, and the stand by components, and to bring additional skills and capabilities that did not exist or were unavailable in sufficient quantities in the federal government. At the time that funding was appropriated for the reserves,<sup>196</sup> however, the CRC was not yet Congressionally authorized, and, therefore, appropriations could not be utilized. By the time the CRC was authorized, the appropriations covered only the active and standby components, with Congress calling for proof of concept.

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<sup>193</sup> In 2008, the CRC was funded through Economy Act mechanisms allowing for interagency payments for services. Through authorization under the NDAA for 2009, from 2009-2012, CRC personnel were funded through the budgets of the Department of State and USAID and coordinated by the Department of State.

<sup>194</sup> Examples include prosecutors, judges, economists, anti-corruption, forestry, irrigation and public health experts.

<sup>195</sup> The decision to deploy members of the standby component was delegated to the Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee or a comparable successor entity.

<sup>196</sup> Iraq Supplemental, May 2007.

## Proposal for an Integrated DOS-DOD Civilian Stability Operations Surge Capacity

The decision to exclude civilian DOD staff from the CRC was a missed opportunity for realizing the Whole-of-Government approach in surge capacity for stability operations. By contrast, the QDDR prioritizes closer linkages in stability operations across the agencies—civilian and military—as does the QDR and DODD 3000.05. With appropriate implementation policy and funding support, a CRC active, standby, and a resurrected CRC reserves could operationalize these QDDR concepts.

U.S. Defense institutions include both military and civilian elements, and civil and military skill sets. The DOD employs on the average more than 700,000 civilians, representing 28 percent of its total workforce.<sup>197</sup> Meanwhile, military reservists and National Guard personnel are civilian when not activated, with a full range of civil society skills, many of which are pertinent to stabilization and reconstruction activities. Furthermore, various elements of the military institution execute civil society functions, including Civil Affairs and Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers.

A genuinely comprehensive civilian-military approach would integrate the full range of skills and assets—the strategic vision with the tactical; the policy-maker with the technical subject matter expert; civil affairs complementing the civilian approach. It would organize stability operations under civilian leadership in permissive, non-combat environments, while the military command structure would take precedence in unstable environments where there is high risk of slipping or returning to combat. When a ceasefire is teetering or a society is fragile to the point that combat is a distinct possibility, the military intervention is dominant. Only once conflict is in check can transitional security and civilian-led stability operations come to the fore to address the underlying sources of conflict and seek to make security sustainable.

Through various studies of lessons and practices in stability operations,<sup>198</sup> the three most commonly cited challenges for success are unity of effort, unity of command, and clarity of mission.

Unity of effort and command are reported as difficult to achieve in civilian interagency and civilian-military teams. As described in the Civil Affairs Army Field Manual:

... the roles and responsibilities of the various actors—civilian and military—vary according to the threat, stability of the environment, viability of the host-nation government, and several other factors.<sup>199</sup>

Too often, internal disputes among interagency participants ensue over “who is in charge”-in Washington among policy-makers and in overseas operations. Disagreements arise over the appropriate mix of policy preeminence versus operational leadership and who reports to whom

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<sup>197</sup> *Department of Defense Civilian Human Capital Management Report*, 2009.

<sup>198</sup> See, e.g., studies conducted by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL); U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI); the National Defense University Center for Complex Operations (NDU/ CCO), and the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP).

<sup>199</sup> Civil Affairs Army Field Manual, *Op Cit*.

on interagency and civilian-military teams. Meanwhile, agency organizational cultural differences obstruct effective coordination.

Clarity of mission in stability operations often is cited as inadequate, causing frustration by military, DOS, and USAID personnel. Efforts have been made by senior decision-makers to better define the priorities and end-goals for stability operations, distinguish among the participants and between goals of stabilization versus international development. For example, transitional security sector and justice reform may focus on nonviolent dispute resolution and mediation to achieve a stable environment for development programs to germinate, while training local prosecutors and judges in fragile states may take root in the longer-term international development phase. Similarly, the skills of anthropologists, social scientists, and social workers would be in greater need during stability operations, with tools applied to encourage people and groups to get along and reconcile underlying sources of conflict.

What of the private sector attorney who is an Army JAG reservist or the police officer, police chief, engineer, economist, health, or agricultural professional who is a reservist for the Army, Air Force, or Navy? What of the National Guard personnel who maintain skills and have a wealth of experience applicable to strengthening or building the sectors of a failing state or a state in transition from conflict? What would it take to integrate these civilians with Federal agency civilians in stability operations, and thereby make the best use of the human resources of military reserves and National Guard in interagency stability operations?

The integration of civilian and military expertise through a Comprehensive approach in stability operations is feasible by taking the following steps:

- Creating detailed databases that capture pertinent information on skills, sub-skills, and training, standardized across the agencies and interoperable for shared accessibility and usefulness;
- Assessing training needs and instituting a system of precertification and credential evaluations; and
- Overcoming the proprietary and parochial perspectives of the Departments, Agencies and Bureaus.

Whether for the active, standby, or a reserves capacity, a sophisticated database of skills would need to be created through DOS, in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that could be interoperable for U.S. Central Command (CentCom), the Unified Combatant Commands (CoComs), and others. Presently, military reservists list their profession and place of employment as a record of where they work, rather than as a data point that may be useful for placing them according to their civilian skills in noncombat roles. For such a database, it would not be enough to list one's profession, but rather to provide detailed information on one's specialty, skills, sub-skills, the training, and the continuing education and training one has received. Civilian and reservist resumes would need to be standardized across the services and agencies in a manner closer in form to the Army's Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) or the

Air Force Specialty Code Explanation (AFSE) models in order to capture, process, and make the detailed information readily searchable.<sup>200</sup>

Joint assessments of training needs would need to be conducted and courses pre-certified jointly by civilian agencies and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manpower and Personnel J1 division. Training would focus on transforming subject matter experts into stability operations practitioners—for example, the private sector attorney JAG reservist trained to serve as a transitional justice practitioner. Personnel would be offered a menu of training choices within jointly decided-upon parameters.

Innovative incentive structures could be created through policy directives. The current promotion systems generally reward personnel for serving their institution’s objectives, in residence, but do not extend to the wider interagency objectives, and rarely while personnel are on detail or secondary assignment. Even where the home agency and interagency objectives and priorities align or overlap, individuals may lose out on promotions when serving in a position that takes them away from their home institution—a manifestation of the “out of sight, out of mind” phenomenon. Building an incentive structure that would create a clear path for promotion for personnel who voluntarily serve on interagency planning and stability operations in priority fragile states would strengthen the opportunities for participation by personnel in an integrated civilian surge entity.

The proprietary outlooks and corporate cultural differences of the agencies could largely be overcome by a top-down approach that prioritizes existing directives, doctrine, and policy. With political will secured across the agencies, the DOS CRC standby and DOD CEW databases could be made interoperable, cross-referencing skill sets into a truly integrated whole-of-government civilian response capability for stability operations. Ultimately, legislation that mandates “jointness” across civilian and military agencies would institutionalize civilian-military integration in stability operations, as the Goldwater Nichols Act<sup>201</sup> did to integrate the military services. The synergies between civilian agency personnel and DOD civilian personnel would augment the number of personnel available for a civilian surge, quality, and range of skills. Noncombat stability, conflict prevention, and reconstruction operations in secured and permissive environments would be conducted under Chief of Mission authority, with a civilian agency leader and a military commander as deputy. On matters of security, authority would be delegated to the military deputy, coordinating with Diplomatic Security (DS). Military reserves and National Guard could be integrated with civilian surge capacity in three possible ways. First, reservists and National Guard could be considered for active military duty either for combat or noncombat stability operations, attached as Civil Affairs, JAGs, or other to a civilian surge team. DOS and CentCom would coordinate on the requirements for stability operations, and CentCom would reach-back to the services and request personnel who meet specific criteria, as described in the interoperable database envisioned above. Furthermore, in order to preserve equity in the protection of livelihood, amending the Uniformed Services

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<sup>200</sup> Interview with Air Force Brigadier General (Ret.) *Charles E. Tucker, Jr.*, February 21, 2012.

<sup>201</sup> United States. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Washington, DC: GPO, Public Law 99-433 (1986).

Employment and Reemployment Rights Act<sup>202</sup> to include service by nonmilitary personnel in stability operations would be highly beneficial.

Second, given that military reservists are civilians until activated for service, they could volunteer for a Civilian Expeditionary Reserve Corps (CERC) as a possible successor to the Civilian Reserve Corps or CRC Reserves concept. To achieve a comprehensive approach, the CERC also would develop broader partnerships, including the following:

- Public-private
- Non-profit
- NGOs: U.S., foreign and international
- Academic institutions, civilian and military, U.S. and international, in particular linking up academic sabbaticals to active service in the reserves
- Bilateral partners (e.g., the UK, Canada, Australia, and Germany)
- Multilateral partners (UNDP, UNDPKO) and other international and intergovernmental organizations.

Third, a term appointment for one to two years, comparable to Fellowships already existing at the DOS and DOD, would mesh the CRC active and the military reserves. Based loosely on the Presidential Management Fellowship (PMF) model, for example, a Civilian Expeditionary Response Fellowship would provide for DOS, USAID, or DOD to hire military reservists into their civilian workforce for a one- to two-year period, in the individual's area of subject matter expertise, and rotate between civilian stability operation deployments and active military duty. At the end of the two years, the Fellows could be hired as permanent staff to continue to serve as CRC active and military reservists, with continuing rotations. Alternatively, the Fellow could return to the private sector, while continuing for one to five years as a font of expertise available to the Federal government, as needed, establishing an alumni network of experts with pertinent skills and experience working under Chief of Mission Authority.

## **Conclusion**

Military and civilian approaches to stability operations need not be segregated from each other. Furthermore, utilizing the human resources of DOD to accomplish tasks of a civil character need not, in and of itself, constitute the "militarization" of diplomacy or development. The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center, in a 2008 report, described such "militarization" as "DOD personnel assum[ing] public diplomacy and assistance responsibilities

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<sup>202</sup> The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ([USERRA](#)), [38 U.S.C. § 4301 – 4335](#) (1994).

that the civilian agencies do not have the trained staff to fill.”<sup>203</sup> Yet, this perspective is overwhelmingly offered by career diplomats— active service or retired—with a built-in bias in favor of preserving the diplomats’ domain and increasing staffing for the Department of State and USAID. DOD tends to be viewed as a monolith, and all of its employees – military and civilian – tend to be perceived of as military in character.

Indeed, the skills necessary for the missions are fundamentally the same whether the personnel come from a civilian agency such as DOS, USAID or from DOD, such as DOD civilian, Civil Affairs, or JAG. The officers of the military reserves and the state National Guards when federalized for military operations themselves represent two sides of the coin—they are civilians until activated for military service. Reservists possess a full range of civilian skills in their professional lives, many of which should be captured in a sophisticated database to be searchable and utilized for stability and reconstruction operations. Incentives could be built-in to encourage the voluntary participation in a civilian interagency surge capacity. Government fellowships or term positions could be created with rotation cycles to accommodate the active military duty service obligations of reservists. The primary obstacles to implementation may be basically breaking down agency cultural differences and proprietary mindsets.

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<sup>203</sup> A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness, the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimpson Center, 2008.

## Chapter 18

### **Facilitating Leadership: The Comprehensive Approach in an Age of Uncertainty**

*Nancy F. Nugent and Sherri W. Goodman*

The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) noted the need for a more comprehensive approach to national security issues, recognizing that U.S. civilian and military partners at the national and international levels have been constrained by resources, capabilities, and internal politics that may hinder the long-term effectiveness of national security policy. In today's increasingly globalized and interconnected world, the U.S. national security apparatus faces three main concerns: (1) the complex operating conditions of U.S. military and civil partners; (2) the increased civil interaction with the international community, domestic agencies, and the private sector; and (3) the frequent need to work closely with the agencies of foreign governments. Added to this, a new United States defense strategy makes clear that military forces will no longer be sized to meet large-scale counterinsurgency requirements. In this age of uncertainty, where a realignment of priorities, standards, and conditions may begin, the challenge is aligning U.S. government strategic goals in complex operations with those of its international partners. Under these circumstances, the question is how to engage others in developing an effective strategic vision that the world can embrace.

Most specifically, despite the challenges of the global environment, including constraints on resources, U.S. military and civilian services still are likely to be called to lead or conduct a response effort for host nations in crises, while incorporating or relying upon the contribution of partners and allies. The NSS tasks military and civil leaders to prepare for and respond to future challenges through greater integration of resources and capabilities. In the analysis below, we adhere to the comprehensive approach, which relies on all the tools of national influence (defense, diplomacy, economics, development, homeland security, intelligence, strategic communications, and the informed citizen) so that we might recommend a framework and an organizational structure that would (1) add a new role for American leadership in military and civil sectors as facilitator or broker, and (2) prepare for a more integrated and shared role of host nation cooperation and support. Our proposed approach also recognizes (3) that U.S. military and civilian leaders recently have had to find new ways to assess the influx of information and data required to support an integrated approach, and we recommend actions to take advantage of technological capabilities that may offer greater opportunities for coordination and collaboration at all levels of governance and polity.

Although the U.S. government once separated military from civil operations, the ability to integrate the efforts of both types of agencies through an updated comprehensive approach will help to build up the national security apparatus to meet future challenges. In proposing these recommendations, we hope to provide both military commanders and civil agency leaders an opportunity to address the need for a renewed vision of U.S. national security and its related missions in future legislation or executive order.

## **Emergence of a Paradigm**

Over the past 15 years, military and civilian agencies have increasingly worked together in close association in counterinsurgency, humanitarian disasters, and other irregular operations. As part of this effort, military commands have incorporated personnel from other agencies into their command-and-control structure and have begun to operate as partners with these agencies to respond more rapidly to crises, disasters, and war. For example, after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) deployed to Haiti to assess humanitarian conditions and coordinate activities with the private sector and the NGO community. USAID and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) activated a Washington, DC-based Response Management Team to support the effort. The Department of Defense (DOD), together with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency provided support to that team. The U.S. Coast Guard provided crucial, initial over-flight data of the devastation in Haiti, while the 82nd Airborne augmented the efforts of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Throughout the crisis, the government of Haiti established and maintained its priorities in coordination with these and other members of the international community. Open-source technology communities, such as CrisisMapping and Google, as well as large and small businesses, provided up-to-date information for rescue and relief efforts, including translation services and imagery, while SOUTHCOM facilitated this collaboration through a common platform, called the All Partners Access Network (APAN). Bringing these multiple modern capabilities to bear to help the people of Haiti enabled the United States to respond to the urgent needs of the Haitian people on a timely basis and with relatively great success.

Translating the practices of a particular operation into an enduring strategic framework has proved challenging, not least because civilian agencies continue to be chronically underfunded to stand shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. military in an operational context. In addition, different agency missions and cultures complicate efforts to create a unified framework from which to find and implement solutions. Although civilian agencies historically have held the lead role in maintaining and developing relationships within the international community, the emergence of transnational issues and newly regarded mission sets will require a more integrated approach in terms of persistent engagement up to and through the end state of a contingency or crisis.

The U.S. government's ability to work effectively with other stakeholders will depend on the quality and degree of prior integrated planning and coordination. Given the complexity of relationships among stakeholders in each of these domains, the United States may be asked to help provide needed detail on pre-crisis preparation, flexible planning, and agility in execution. That environment includes the host nation; Joint (embracing four military services); U.S. interagency (U.S. departments and agencies, as well as international organizations); and combined (U.S. allies and partners) domains.

To add to all these changes, the "social networking effect" brought about by the digital information age has been put to deliberate use in directing and advancing causes in the



international and domestic arenas with little comprehension of the implications for long-term foreign and domestic policies.<sup>204</sup> Humanitarian efforts, public relations (i.e., Facebook's hosting of EUCOM), and economic crises have highlighted the importance of technological developments that can provide additional impact on the ground, as networks have enhanced the ability to connect with one another globally and regionally (i.e., the Arab Spring). In the U.S. government, decision-makers are now able to reach beyond the traditional limits of their institutions and have recognized that increased communication and data-sharing will also entail higher risks and evolving security standards. Although more information does tend to allow increased accuracy or understanding of context about a situation (called situational awareness), the increased demand for assessment, feedback, and ongoing analysis with which to set new mission priorities and information sorting can easily render the national security apparatus incapable of providing nuanced recommendations to decision-makers if overwhelmed by additional processes. Those problems become more complicated when approaching those who tend to operate in isolation from the global community, such as Iran, North Korea, and unaffiliated international terrorist groups and organizations. The decision-maker, whether an admiral or a diplomat, may suddenly be required to make multiple decisions on several fronts in cooperation and collaboration with key partners.

### **Three Stages of the Comprehensive Approach**

#### *Provide a new framework*

To implement the comprehensive approach in an age of uncertainty, three steps or stages are required. The first is to provide an overarching framework that the military and civil services can both use to address their new responsibilities in the foreign policy arena.

The steps to achieving an effective framework in the context of a particular conflict or other challenge include:

- Identifying stakeholders and their roles, responsibilities, and particular core competencies
- Establishing leadership structures that have broad decision-making capability
- Determining overall mission sets or goals—and then ensuring that each department's goals fit within the larger set and are not contradictory in practice
- Assigning the persons responsible for mission accomplishment and having a mechanism for resolving differences
- Ensuring that priorities are adequately resourced

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<sup>204</sup> Clay Shirky. *Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations*, (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2008).

- Encouraging learning and understanding that strategies will need to be adaptive over time (e.g., promotion of assessments, analysis, and lessons learned)

In some cases, the military services have already adjusted their approach to work with civil agencies that do not rely on a chain of command or directive action for execution of their objectives. By finding opportunities to incorporate a broad range of stakeholders in initiatives focused on national security, such as the Africa Partnership Station or the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, military and civil agencies can begin to incorporate their viewpoints into their respective decision-making processes. To better prioritize among the many programs related to these new mission sets, military and civil service leaders can promote a unified command and decision-making framework that would strengthen transparency and trust among stakeholders. This framework would allow for the best application of resources and provide alternative ways to report achievements. In addition, the framework would address stakeholders' need to address the many levels of reform and the addition of new structures, laws, processes, norms, rules, systems, and organizations that typify this new environment.

Moreover, globally applied funding mechanisms and the operational capacity of stakeholders at all levels may be better understood through the use of a long-term perspective in the comprehensive approach, as it provides the U.S. government with a way to measure progress or relate successes via collaborative and cooperative enterprises. For instance, frequent contact and in-depth involvement on shared issues will help place the U.S. - host nation relationship in a more positive framework. Further, just as the integration of host nations, partners, and allies would help to reassure the world community that the U.S. government has a substantial interest in developing long-term relations with host nations, the world community may then equally be more willing to consider the ways in which to enhance support to host nations.

#### *Provide an optimal organizational structure*

The second step is to provide an optimal organizational structure, ensuring that the management of processes, people, and resources is made to the best effect. This structure could incorporate the use of new technologies (e.g., social networking) as an alternative way to organize and manage its people, its priorities, and its missions. Although only the highest levels of government currently conduct integration, coordination, and synchronization, the lower levels have relied on ad-hoc arrangements through individual initiative.<sup>205</sup> The need for meetings and other opportunities for frequent interactions may have once helped to build a sense of community identification, but consistency of approach is now necessary. Approaching these issues from the "social network" perspective may help to adapt the joint and interagency world to a restructured national security apparatus. Understanding that these changes would reflect or mirror other organizational processes may help it to maintain its unique organizational history while adapting its structures to the challenges of the future.

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<sup>205</sup> Robert Egnell. "Explaining U.S. and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: the Civil-Military Dimensions," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29, no. 6, December 2006, 1041-1075.

Functioning better in military operations, planning, and policy, the military commander may want to act as a facilitator organization to help civil agencies work within the military structure.<sup>206</sup> The purpose of facilitator organizations is to coordinate activities, providing real-time communications for command and control, including decision-making. Facilitator organizations are typically the first to encounter change when interacting with other organizations from the outside world. They tend to encourage innovation and change within an existing organization and can act as mediators or through informal networks. They also tend to be better at conducting political/regulatory meetings and provide the necessary building of alliances for adaptive efforts within and beyond their organizations.

From the perspective of a facilitator or broker, the military commander or civil service lead can often translate what may seem to others as problems or inconsistencies among partners and allies as directly related to their attempts to achieve ineffective metrics or to demand compliance with rules and restrictions put in place for outdated foreign policy objectives. In effect, a broker serves as a link among external players. Brokers, such as NGOs, typically have the most interactions with outside organizations until they understand what qualities are needed to ensure the development of trust and what it takes to get stakeholders and communities of interest to contribute resources, particularly to host nations in crises. Sorting out these new roles and responsibilities will be needed to establish or determine the right objectives for everyone involved in policy-making. In the longer term, various programs in support of alternative strategies can be eliminated or developed, depending upon the contributions of those stakeholders who share both the enterprise's mission and global priorities.

#### *Focus on social networking approaches and capabilities*

The third step is to focus on social networking approaches and capabilities already in place that offer easier access to coordination and collaboration. Given current technology, stakeholders now have available various social networking capabilities that may help them build a facilitator structure. A social networking site capable of providing information on daily happenings, advice on various topics, email services that allow interactions between subject matter experts and individual participants, and access to records and other pertinent information will provide a more connected way of understanding and knowing others' needs through collaborative and cooperative enterprises. In addition, new opportunities for multiparty interactions or engagements will provide new experiences for stakeholders to gain a broader perspective. The broker typically provides three types of resources: information, services, and materiel.<sup>207</sup> As the broker who facilitates the interaction between global stakeholders, the United States national security apparatus can become an essential part of informal or formal organizations.

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<sup>206</sup> E.D. McGrady. *Military Organizations and the Navy: Facilitating a Joint Communication Center*, January 2001 (CNA Research Memorandum D0001732.A1)

<sup>207</sup> Mario Luis Small. *Unanticipated Gains: origins of network inequality in everyday life* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009).

One way to take advantage of new technologies is to develop collaborative groups via social networking sites, as they encourage the formation of ties through informal processes.<sup>208</sup> Some aspects of those sites could include<sup>209</sup>:

- Establishing common objectives
- Endorsing other groups' efforts that can support the organization's activities
- Incorporating and integrating lessons learned from other organizations
- Identifying potential interagency misunderstandings or anticipating conflicts
- Developing collaborative groups to focus on a particular mission.

Government agencies and military institutions have come to recognize the limits of their ability to “know” what is out there and have come to rely on the knowledge and expertise they have received from those stakeholders who are more open to learning about others' historical experiences and cultural truisms. Each of the stakeholders involved will be operating under particular circumstances that have long determined their way of behaving and interacting. Understanding how others may interpret information and make decisions may lead to common sources of assessment and courses of action. The effectiveness of such an approach will often be related to institutional biases or to different conceptions of effectiveness, as an agency's particular principles and ideals tend to affect its world view.

An important element in communications with host nations will be the quality and type of communication strategy acquired. In the comprehensive approach, keeping communication lines open, sharing information, and ensuring timely and constant updates to one another will be essential to maintaining and building upon those relationships already established with host nations. Although funding opportunities may limit this option for some participants, the development of approaches that seek to integrate the unique attributes and commonalities among host nations would help to ensure that host nation resources brought to the table foster improved participation and communication for the long term. Understanding the requirements of those host nations that have already established long term relationships with U.S. civilian and military services will help to develop a sense of legitimacy for any new efforts and realignments that may be required in the future.

Finally, the importance of routine and even shared daily activities in the global environment will help to meet the need for trust building and for establishing a more suitable global environment

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<sup>208</sup> Mario Luis Small. *Unanticipated Gains: origins of network inequality in everyday life* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>209</sup> Venkat Ramaswamy and Francis Guillant, “Building the Co-Creative enterprise,” Harvard Business Review, October 2010.

supporting shared goals and missions. Solution sets will likely be based on the U.S. military's role as a facilitator with missions characterized by unity of effort rather than unity of command.

## **Conclusion**

In an age of uncertainty, the U.S. government is beginning to address those issues dealing with irregular conflict and complex operations. The fundamental question to ask in terms of policy, organization, and institutional processes is, "Does each allow or encourage stakeholders to interact with each other, to interact with outside organizations, and to coordinate tasks?" For instance, what rules prevent interaction? What incentives or cultural mechanisms are in place that inadvertently encourage isolation? Are there intermediary organizations that can be arranged beyond the formal structures currently in place? Also, what mechanisms are in place to ensure that people accomplish tasks together or have the opportunity to see others repeatedly to rebuild and reestablish trust among stakeholders?

With the framework, organizational, and technological approach discussed above, cooperation and collaboration are the keys to ensuring that relationships with allies and partners are both effective and efficient over time. Working with those who share an interest in the successful outcome of a mission will allow better management of processes, people, and resources. Utilizing such a construct, the United States can leverage its leadership in the role of facilitator and "honest broker" via social networking constructs that will offer the ability for better integration of military and civil leaders for future challenges that may arise in the years ahead.

## Chapter 19

### Tools for Peace: The Emerging Role of Science and Technology<sup>210</sup>

*Steven Gale and James Ehlert*

#### Introduction

What will the future of war look like? As lengthy, expensive land wars grow more infrequent, will traditional air power, precision bombing campaigns, and unmanned aerial attacks become the operations of choice? Will surgically executed military strikes by Special Operations Forces grow in number? Will we witness more stability operations—such as those that took place in Iraq and Afghanistan—as failed states become greater threats to regional and global security? Or will stability operations wither? In truth, only time and budgets will determine how the U.S. military moves forward. But, wherever the new battle space and approach, it is clear that science and technology will play an increasing and irreversible role.

From smartphones, to solar-equipped miniaturized equipment, to increasing use of Nano-materials, to robotics, to next-generation stealth know-how, science and technology tools are likely to transform the military, not just modernize it. Many civilian organizations like the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) will also use science and technology, in unparalleled ways and with increasing uptake, to advance international development. For example, internet based crowd-sourcing approaches are being used to tackle tough development challenges like health and literacy (see [Savinglivesatbirth.net](http://Savinglivesatbirth.net) and [AllChildrenReading.org](http://AllChildrenReading.org)). State-of-the art geospatial tools from USAID's new Geo-Center ([www.usaid.gov/scitech/gis.html](http://www.usaid.gov/scitech/gis.html)) are beginning to change and improve the ways in which the Agency plans projects and monitors programs.<sup>211</sup>

Military and civilian agencies working together on infrastructure development, counter-extremism, anti-trafficking, and security sector reform will face new challenges as they strive to make positive impacts on economic growth, good governance, and social development. Each will attempt to envision what challenges lie ahead, analyze potential scenarios, and plan accordingly. The common language of science and technology will facilitate civilian-military coordination because it will directly improve communication and data sharing.

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<sup>210</sup> The authors are indebted to Sarah I. Jackson of USAID's *Knowledge Services Center* for reviewing the literature on emerging science and technology trends and for her contribution to successive drafts. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or positions of USAID or the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).

<sup>211</sup> USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) have also developed the capacity to provide valuable GIS information and analysis. OTI, for example, has a Geospatial Information Unit.

The 2010 Haiti earthquake introduced an unprecedented dimension to the civilian component of civilian-military coordination when volunteers and technical communities responded to the emergency *en masse* using mobile phones and SMS texting. Instead of stemming from the first responders, data was flowing from the disaster-impacted community itself and across the globe. Organizations, such as OpenStreetMap, Sahana, CrisisMappers, and Ushahidi, opened up the civilian space to new partners and new means of generating emergency information outside traditional civilian networks.<sup>212</sup> The convergence of mobile and online communications with new geospatial imagery and mapping tools, crowdsourcing, and social media networks was unprecedented.<sup>213</sup> In the near future, volunteer and technical communities such as those listed above are likely to develop into information collators and aggregators, not just providers of real-time maps and social media platforms. Their engagement will dramatically change the way information is generated and shared by and between civilians. This, in turn, has the potential to shape the future of civilian-military coordination in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) as well as in complex emergencies, stabilization, and reconstruction operations.

## Stability Operations

National security and global development are inextricably linked. The recently released Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development (PPD-6) and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) raise the importance of development for national security to unparalleled heights.<sup>214</sup> Military scholars agree: “The greatest threats to our national security will not come from emerging ambitious states but from nations unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs and aspirations of their people.”<sup>215</sup> Human security in these conflict-prone states is therefore paramount. Essential services such as water and sanitation, health care, basic infrastructure, governance, economic growth, and civilian empowerment will continue to play an increasing role in the long-term success of military operations.

Human security is at the heart of stability operations. The military formally acknowledged that “soft power,” not just “kinetic power,” ought to be a core military mission. This shift heightened the opportunity for, and importance of cooperation between the civilian and military components. It also ignited a growth in the use of science and technology tools for peace. These technologies and approaches help mitigate conflict and instability while building more peaceful

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<sup>212</sup> Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, “Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in Humanitarian Emergencies,” (Washington, DC: UN Foundation & Vodafone Foundation, 2011). Available at: [http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-files.org/gpgs\\_files/pdf/2011/DisasterResponse.pdf](http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-files.org/gpgs_files/pdf/2011/DisasterResponse.pdf)

<sup>213</sup> In fact, mobile phones and SMS had been used in the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster in the Banda Aceh area but not at the levels observed after the 2010 Haitian earthquake.

<sup>214</sup> *Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development (PPD-6)*. 2010; U.S. Department of State, *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*. (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2010). Available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153142.pdf>

<sup>215</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-07 Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: 6 October 2008). Available at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>

and enduring relationships. They also work to promote equitable social and economic development, good national and local governance, the rule of law, and political reform. These tools can also build up country resilience to local and national disasters, both natural and man-made.

If the new frontline in civilian-military coordination is anchored in science and technology, one high-priority “weapon of choice” appears to be mobile phones and their kindred application software or “apps.” In the military sphere, soldiers can now use the latest technology to support combat operations. For example, they can watch live drone surveillance videos, view and analyze medical evacuation options, and use real-time GIS (geographic information system) maps to show minefields or the latest IED (improvised explosives devices) detonations. In the civilian sphere, mobile phones and apps are fast gaining traction in areas such as banking, health (e.g., detecting counterfeit medicines or providing birth instructions to pregnant women), election monitoring, education, and humanitarian assistance.<sup>216</sup> In both military and civilian spheres, cumbersome instructional manuals and mind-numbing spreadsheets are giving way to apps that contain basic facts and simple pictures, displaying a vast amount of accessible, comprehensible information in one place.

## Emerging Science and Technology Trends

Looking at numerous technological tools and approaches used to promote peace and security, the authors developed a framework to help digest and array the flurry of advances in this area.<sup>217</sup> Four trends were identified. Specifically, these new tools are being used to:

- **Mobilize** people and protect assets<sup>218</sup>
- **Identify**, map, and analyze conflict
- **Strengthen** civil society
- **Support** and improve civilian-military cooperation

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<sup>216</sup> Kevin J. O’Brien, “Mobile Banking in the Emerging World,” *New York Times*, November 28, 2010, accessed February 21, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/business/global/29iht-mobilebanks29.html>; “What is MAMA,” Mobile Alliance for Maternal Action, accessed February 21, 2012, <http://www.mobilemamaalliance.org/what.html>; “Mission,” MPedigree, accessed February 21, 2012, [http://mpedigree.net/mpedigree/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=54](http://mpedigree.net/mpedigree/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=54); “Tech in Election Monitoring: Fighting Fraud and Corruption, one Picture at a Time,” MobileActive.org, accessed February 21, 2012, <http://mobileactive.org/election-monitoring-afghanistan-cameraphones>; “Cell Phones Boost Nigerian Literacy, Profits,” Catholic Relief Services, accessed February 21, 2012, <http://crs.org/niger/cell-phone-literacy/>; “Mobile Phones help target disaster aid, says study,” *BBC*, September 2, 2011, accessed February 21, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-14761144>.

<sup>217</sup> The Framework evolved from a review of more than 50 published articles in 2011 on stability and development-related issues with a focus on science and technology usage.

<sup>218</sup> Assets include homes, schools, hospitals, livestock, etc.



Figure 1 presents these four emerging trends.

**Figure 1**

| <b>Common Use or Trend</b> | <b>People Mobilization and Asset Protection</b>         | <b>Conflict and Situational Analysis</b> | <b>Strengthening Civil Society</b> | <b>Civilian Military Coordination</b>                     |
|----------------------------|---|--|------------------------------------|---|
| <b>Principal Actors</b>    | Local   | Specialized Institutions                 | Local                              | Multi-Institutional                                       |
| <b>Temporal Dimension</b>  | Real Time   | Long Term                                | Long Term                          | Real Time & Long Term                                     |
| <b>S&amp;T Tool(s)</b>     | Social Media (including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube) | Geographic Information Systems (GIS)     | Mobile Phones/SMS                  | Information Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure |

### **Science and Technology Tools for Peace**

Naturally, other frameworks could be constructed, each with its inherent strengths and weaknesses, but this one was able to capture and synthesize the majority of published reports.

The authors do not visualize hard edges between any of the four emerging trends. Therefore, some tools that might help mobilize people and preserve assets (Column 1) could also be used to support and improve civilian-military coordination (Column 4). Likewise, many emerging tools have multiple actors (Column 2 and 4), not just one (Column 1 and 3), and so on. We wanted to give the reader a feel for the emerging trends, rather an exhaustive inventory that will soon be out of date.

#### **People Mobilization and Asset Protection**

The *people mobilization and asset protection trend* refers to the use of science technology to mobilize people quickly. Tools that fit into this category fall within the lines of social media (i.e., Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube) and allow the user to send instant messages and share videos. The Arab Spring is perhaps the most salient example of how social media can be used to mobilize people. Protesters were able to post videos of unrest and injustice and drew others to

their cause immediately.<sup>219</sup> The power of the individual is amplified as people are able to broadcast and share their personal views and experiences with the world. In particular, those who wish to declare their frustrations about unemployment, inequality, poor living conditions, and general lack of opportunity can now do so on a much broader scale. In early 2011, when protests in Tunisia broke out after Mohamed Bouazizi lit himself on fire, Facebook acted as a platform for people to organize protests and galvanize support.<sup>220</sup>

As to asset protection, social media is increasingly being used during and immediately following disasters to provide family members in-country and abroad with detailed, current, factual information. In Haiti, for example, after the 2010 earthquake, Haitians used cellular phones to post messages to Twitter and Facebook. The result was that “requests for extraction from the rubble reached far beyond what might be expected.”<sup>221</sup> Thus, social media can be used to request immediate help at discrete often geo-reference locations, to guide real-time search and rescue efforts, and to solicit everything online from basic supplies, to diesel generators, to immediate medical care.

This trend is characterized by real-time communication and initiated by people on the ground following a more bottom-up, individual-driven approach rather than a formal organizational one.

### **Conflict and Situational Analysis**

The *conflict and situational analysis* trend looks at crisis mapping and early warning detection approaches associated with potential security threats, instability and social and/or civil disputes. Tools linked to this trend often employ the use of geographic information system (GIS) technologies that can store and present all types of geographical data. Satellite imagery is commonly augmented by on-the ground reporting to create patterns, examine relationships, and explore trends with an emphasis on territory, terrain, and borders. The first trend is more centered on popular concerns, is people-inspired, and emphasizes real-time communication, while this second trend focuses more on imminent threats and future problems. In particular, these tools can be used to monitor vulnerable populations and to map potential hotspots and conflict triggers. The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s Satellite Sentinel Project, for example, uses satellite imagery to predict future skirmishes in Sudan. Similarly, USAID is using GIS tools

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<sup>219</sup> “Social Media: Power to the People?” NATO Review, accessed February 22, 2012, [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/Social\\_Medias/Arab\\_Spring/EN/index.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/Social_Medias/Arab_Spring/EN/index.htm)

<sup>220</sup> Colin Delany, “How Social Media Accelerated Tunisia’s Revolution: An Inside View,” *Huffington Post*, February 2, 2011, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/colin-delany/how-social-media-accelera\\_b\\_821497.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/colin-delany/how-social-media-accelera_b_821497.html)

<sup>221</sup> Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, “Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in Humanitarian Emergencies,” (Washington, DC: UN Foundation & Vodafone Foundation, 2011). Available at: [http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-files.org/gpgs\\_files/pdf/2011/DisasterResponse.pdf](http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-files.org/gpgs_files/pdf/2011/DisasterResponse.pdf)

to analyze what is happening on the ground in Mali.<sup>222</sup> In addition, UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) are increasingly being used for non-military purposes such as gathering videos and photo documentation of environmental violations and of police reactions to civil unrest.

### **Strengthening Civil Society**

The third trend, *strengthening civil society*, is largely associated with issues related to democracy and governance. Activities in this category include anything that has to do with civilian empowerment. Examples might include organizations or projects that support free and fair elections, promote the role of independent media, reduce corruption and graft, or educate and invest in people. In terms of tools, mobile phones and text messaging predominate. Mobile money transfers, for example, are being used to put power into the hands of civilians. In Afghanistan as in other conflict-prone states, transferring money via cell phone can mitigate corruption, reduce financial transaction fees, and lessen the overall risk of using cash because users can deposit and withdraw cash, pay bills, and purchase goods on their mobile phones.<sup>223</sup> In Nigeria, mobile phones are being used to help farmers identify market prices as well as potential buyers and sellers.<sup>224</sup> Cell phones also allow individuals to keep track of land titling and registration. In South Africa, for example, a cellphone-based alert system communicates with district officials when a land title transfer has taken place.<sup>225</sup> This allows individuals to be more proactive and makes the legal system more transparent and participatory. Finally, mobile phones are increasingly used to monitor elections. Specifically, SMS has proven to be an extremely useful tool in monitoring elections in countries like Sierra Leone, Albania, and Sri Lanka.<sup>226</sup>

The primary actors in this category are of course the local population. And, the time frame for this trend is seen as more long term because it can take years for an educated, informed, empowered civil society to develop and take action.

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<sup>222</sup> “Chokepoint: Evidence of SAF Control of Refugee Route to South Sudan,” (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, January 27, 2012). Available at: <http://www.satsentinel.org/sites/default/files/SSP%2025%20Chokepoint%20012712.pdf>; “Mapping Our Work – GIS and USAID/Mali,” USAID, accessed March 13, 2012, <http://www.usaid.gov/ml/en/GIS.html>.

<sup>223</sup> Sheldon Himelfarb, “Can You Help Me Now? Mobile Phones and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan,” (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, November 2010). Available at: <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR%20259%20-%20Can%20You%20Help%20Me%20Now.pdf>.

<sup>224</sup> Jenny Aker and Isaac Mbiti, “Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 24, 3, (2010): 214-215. Available at: <http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/jep.24.3.207>

<sup>225</sup> JR Whittal. “The Potential Use of Cellular Phone Technology in Maintaining and Up-to-Date Register of Land Transactions for the Urban Poor,” *PER*, 14, 3 (2011). Available at: <http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2011/24.pdf>

<sup>226</sup> Ian Schuler, “National Democratic Institute: SMS as a Tool in Election Observation,” *Innovations*, 3, 2, (Spring 2008). Available at: [http://www.ndi.org/files/2329\\_sms\\_engpdf\\_06242008.pdf](http://www.ndi.org/files/2329_sms_engpdf_06242008.pdf); “An election monitoring SMS template,” ICT for Peacebuilding, accessed February 22, 2012, <http://ict4peace.wordpress.com/2010/03/10/an-election-monitoring-sms-template/>

## Civilian-Military Coordination

The final trend, *civilian-military coordination*, focuses on the confluence of the military's doctrine of stability operations with non-military (i.e., civilian) counterpart operations like economic development, natural resource management, infrastructure construction/reconstruction, basic health services delivery, and humanitarian assistance. Unlike the *conflict and situational analysis trend*, where science and technology tools are utilized by a few specialized institutions, the *civilian-military coordination trend* typically involves the engagement of a larger community encompassing both national and international players and often a broader range of experiences, skills, and resources. Organizations on the ground might include military forces and aid development agencies from different countries, U.N. specialized agencies and international and local NGOs, and a mix of national, provincial and local host-country governmental entities. The coordination and trust-building required is fundamentally more complex at the organizational level because it involves multiple institutions, each with well-defined lanes, policies, procedures, beliefs, and priorities. Civilian partners include not only U.S. Government entities like USAID and the U.S. Department of State, but also other local civilians, volunteers, academics, and business actors.<sup>227</sup>

The primary science and technology tools used to enhance civilian-military coordination are linked to building up information communications technology (ICT) infrastructure. These technologies are indispensable for coordinating the civilian-military response that supports host countries and allows them to meet the needs of their citizens. One expert on the subject notes that ICTs “provide the means to link the constituent parts of an integrated response and the subsequent development and capacity building efforts.” He also suggests: “Part of the success of any effort to use ICTs to boost recovery efforts is what goes on *before* a disaster strikes or a complex emergency arises.”<sup>228</sup> In almost every sizable disaster, “rapidly deployable ICT capability packages” are vital to the success of civilian-military coordination in crisis response.<sup>229</sup> These ICT packages might include a number of different technologies such as satellite phones, voice-over Internet protocol (VoIP), hand-held radios, ground-to-air transmit and receive (GATR) terminals, and broadband network terminals.<sup>230</sup>

These technologies are vital not only to the success of stabilization and reconstruction efforts in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to the success of disaster relief efforts in such places as Indonesia (Indian Ocean Tsunami, 2004), Haiti (earthquake, 2010), Turkey (earthquake, 2011),

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<sup>227</sup> The U.S. Government has established an Inter-Agency Working group specifically focused on the development of a unified policy for coordinating and planning for ICT in crisis responses.

<sup>228</sup> Larry Wentz, “An ICT Primer: Information and Communications Technologies for Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction.” (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2006).

<sup>229</sup> Larry Wentz, “The Role of Cyberpower in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) and Stability in Reconstruction Operations,” (Carlisle: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute May 2011), 97. Available at: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=129353>.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid.

and Japan (earthquake and tsunami, 2011). Recent disasters like these have amplified the need for better civilian-military coordination and reinforce the necessity for new collaborative models to facilitate effective response to international crises with a focus on rapidly sharing information among partners, optimizing social networks where appropriate, and more open, inclusive, and coordinated communication.<sup>231</sup>

The United Nation's Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook notes: "The communications and information technology systems fielded by most agencies are designed to meet Minimum Operational Security Standards (MOSS) and to support internal reporting and data flow requirements. They are not designed to exchange information between agencies or to facilitate coordination. As a result, a tremendous burden is placed on e-mail, exchange of information in meetings and informal networks."<sup>232</sup> If information and communications technology is better harnessed to promote an exchange of information *between* agencies and not only within, civil-military operations are sure to be more efficient and cost-effective, and will save more lives. In the next section various tools and capabilities are discussed that have the potential to achieve many of these objectives.

## **Example Tools for Peace**

### ***TIGR***

Military units are assessing dynamically changing information through the employment of a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) project called the Tactical Ground Reporting (TIGR) system. "TIGR is a DARPA developed web-based software tool that provides patrol level leaders the opportunity to conduct commanding officer and platoon level intelligence preparation of the battlefield both pre- and post- mission. TIGR supports information-rich reporting, collaboration, and knowledge sharing through the integration of digital pictures, audio, video, global positioning system tracks, and other types of media into the collection, debrief, and analysis process. It is designed to operate on tactical, low bandwidth networks from remote locations."<sup>233</sup>

### ***Ushahidi***

One of the most powerful SMS-based tools for aggregating crowd-sourced data is called "Ushahidi." Ushahidi has been used in support of dozens of HA/DR efforts from the Haitian earthquake to the recent Pakistani floods. During the 2010 Haitian HA/DR effort, the University of Central Florida response team developed and used a Ushahidi module to provide downrange

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<sup>231</sup> Rassmussen, Eric, *Assessing Information Support at the Civilian Military Boundary, Operation Unified Assistance in Indonesia*, USN, 2005.

<sup>232</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. *Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook*" (Brussels: United Nations, 2008). Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47da7da52.html>.

<sup>233</sup> Mari Maeda and Steve Kinder, "Information paper on Tactical Integrated Ground Reporting (TIGR)," US Army, December 1, 2009.

teams with the opportunity to review and respond to real-time information reports from the public. The module functioned by streaming Ushahidi feeds to mobile devices and mapping the various reports by location. Responder teams could then locate reports in their area by drilling down to their location, and read specific requests or even make contact with the individual who submitted the report.

### ***Twitter***

Twitter is a well-known website that offers a social networking and microblogging service, enabling its users to send and read messages called tweets. Tweets are publicly visible by default; however, senders can restrict message delivery to their “friends” list. Users may subscribe to other users' tweets—this is known as “following” and subscribers are known as followers.”<sup>234</sup>

All users can send and receive tweets via the Twitter website, compatible external applications or by SMS available in certain countries.<sup>235</sup> Where the service has achieved critical mass, Twitter has consistently demonstrated the ability to distribute information faster than any other outlet. For example, during the water landing of Flight 1549 in the Hudson River in 2009, the first Twitter report was published within only 10 minutes of the crash. Similarly, the 2008 Mumbai attacks were first reported on Twitter. The 2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya were also Tweeted worldwide before many video feeds reached the airwaves. With this ability to rapidly disseminate information comes the danger of falsely reporting events or perhaps even spreading misinformation. Knowledge management systems should account for this uncertainty, perhaps through a qualitative scoring system until the report can be corroborated by other means.

The same process for the Ushahidi module could also be used to aggregate Twitter feeds, although these reports are not often linked to a physical address. However, with the proper use of tags, Twitter feeds can be established to provide a highly dynamic source of real-time data.

### ***Facebook***

Facebook is another well-known social-network-service website first launched in February 2004. Facebook users can create personal profiles, add other users as friends, and exchange messages to include the automatic dissemination of notifications when user profiles are updated. In addition, users have the option to join common interest groups that are organized by workplace, school, college, or other characteristics. The U.S. military routinely publishes public affairs information, such as photos and news stories, to multiple Facebook pages in lieu of more traditional media outlets. The speed and ease of use are prime factors in the decision by the U.S. military to use Facebook.

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<sup>234</sup> "There's a List for That." [blog.twitter.com](http://blog.twitter.com). October 30, 2009.

<http://blog.twitter.com/2009/10/theres-list-for-that.html>. Retrieved December 31, 2010.

<sup>235</sup> "Using Twitter With Your Phone." Twitter Support. <http://help.twitter.com/entries/14226-how-to-find-your-twitter-short-long-code> accessed December 31, 2010.

## ***IKE/GATER***

Developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Engineering Research and Development Center (ERDC) the “I Know Everything” (IKE)/Geospatial Assessment Tool for Engineering Reachback (GATER) was designed for Civil Affairs field assessments. “The GATER is a suite of applications allowing for a three-tier business process: A field data collection device (the IKE); a desktop application (desktop GATER) that serves as a conduit to synchronize data from the field device to the desktop; [and] the online portion (Online GATER). Data is uploaded to a repository for online data visualization capability (online GIS mapping). “Field data collected and uploaded to the desktop level allows the user to extract shapefiles and generate reports that depict their data collection(s).”<sup>236</sup>

## ***FIST***

FIST, currently being used with civilian and military organizations in Thailand and the Philippines, combines several types of tools listed earlier in the framework, serves an ICT function, has a sizable GIS component, and employs mobile phones. Unlike a number of the preceding tools, FIST optimizes wide partner cooperation (governments, NGOs, academics, militaries, etc.) at multiple levels and can be used by smartphones, tablets, or laptops. With these capabilities in mind, FIST is described in more detail than the tools mentioned above.

FIST is a field-based collection system using commercial-off-the-shelf mobile electronic devices customized software, and a robust information management backend known as *FusionPortal*.<sup>237</sup> *FusionPortal* enables information to flow from the point of capture to an analyst in near real time, regardless of location or physical proximity. FIST can operate in a variety of environments and supports multiple mission sets such as counterinsurgency operations, counternarcotics, HA/DR, and other inter-agency operations. The overarching principle of FIST is the development of a user-friendly data-collection tool that utilizes automated information systems to enable unstructured data to be collected, processed, and structured for analysis and visualization. *FusionPortal* allows real-time integration of disparate sensor systems (such as facial recognition) that provide a powerful common operating picture critical for today's decision-makers. *FusionPortal* permits data to be exported and analyzed using geospatial, geostatistical, temporal, link, and social network analysis in addition to enabling the exchange of information with such external databases as the U.S. Pacific Command All Partners Area Network (APAN) and the Singapore maritime security system called OPERA. FIST has two inter-related components described below.

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
<sup>236</sup> U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. “IKE with GATER (Geospatial Assessment Tool for Engineering Reachback).” U. S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, November 2011.

<sup>237</sup> The concept of FIST originated with Captain Carrick Longley, US Marine Corps, and Chief Warrant Officer Chad Machiela, USA, while both were students at the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).


## Gather

FIST *Gather*, an Android-based application, enables data collection in a structured, form-based menu interface to be transferred to the remote *FusionPortal* server. *Gather* is composed of the smartphone, the mobile operating system, the software application running on the phone, and the collection modules for specific mission types. The *Gather* handheld software contains a number of capabilities and features that allow for a dynamic, flexible approach to field data collection. The application permits customized forms to be created and loaded into the device that support a variety of data types, multimedia formats, and intelligent auto-suggestions for commonly used words and names.

**Figure 2. *Gather* screen shot of Arts, Historical, Cultural, and Religious Form and Chapter Navigation Screenshot**



**Figure 3. *Gather* multimedia report showing detailed bridge infrastructure information**






*Gather* is designed as a form based processing engine in which forms are loaded via a network connection to *FusionPortal*, the form’s “manager”, and can be updated in real-time at any future point. The forms support multiple language packs and will render the questions in the appropriate target language, provide a dynamic environment for data validation and streamlined entry, and enable the operator to capture a variety of multimedia formats for attachment to the collection report, such as geo-coordinates, voice, video, and photographs. The local database on the phone provides the ability to *cache* the collection reports while awaiting transmittal, as well storing collection reports previously submitted to *FusionPortal*.

### *FusionPortal*

*FusionPortal* provides visualization (geospatial and report based), analysis, consolidating and information sharing via streamlined and intuitive user displays. These four capabilities form the foundation of a powerful and flexible information management strategy. This application receives data input from the field and processes the data into a *fused view* that can be shared and analyzed. The resulting transformation of raw data enables knowledge creation that is much more useful to a consumer, be that an analyst, decision-maker, or policy official.

**Figure 4. *FusionPortal* screenshot, each icon represents a *Gather* report and the “lines” depict the GPS tracks of the operator as reported through the *Gather* application**



The FIST architecture results in a capable and practical application—one that is multifunctional, real-time, and easily accessed in the field from smartphones as well as central command centers and mobile laptops. The web architecture is highly scalable, so growth of the operation benefits from economies of scale. The centralized web architecture also provides versatility to add alarms, data-quality assurance, mathematical tools, and advanced systems data, e.g., unmanned

vehicles and sensors such as radars, cameras, etc., as well as straightforward data interchange with other applications and databases.<sup>238</sup>


As *FIST Gather* is designed to improve data-collection processes, *FusionPortal* supports a number of processes and external tools for enhancing and improving data visualization, sharing, consolidation and analysis.

**Figure 5. *FusionPortal* map of Nepal depicting notional areas affected by heavy flooding *FusionPortal* Analysis Tools Interface Module (ATIM)**




FIST uses an Analysis Tool Interface Module (ATIM) that permits non-analysts to quickly create products including temporal data presentations (animated video), geospatial views, data space views, network diagrams, and traditional PowerPoint slides. The animated geospatial format equates to a survey of many data sets in time and allows for rapid assessment of relational patterns. Figures 6-9 (social network analysis, geospatial movie, motion charts, heat maps) are automated outputs from the ATIM based on data submitted from *Gather* reports.

**Figure 6. ATIM Social Network Analysis visualization of fused data from *FusionPortal*. Red nodes represent persons; other nodes represent disaster-related events and organizations to which they are linked.**




<sup>238</sup> Currently, the *FusionPortal* production and development sites are hosted at a DoD compliant commercial data center with capabilities for the full range of Certification and Accreditation (C&A). Future plans call for a portion of the system to be hosted within the U.S. Military domain.


**Figure 7.** *FusionPortal* data converted and exported to Google Earth, where events may be played out in time and space (Geospatial Movie).



**Figure 8.** *FusionPortal* educational data displayed in a “Motion Chart” to visualize correlation between various variables. The graph shows correlation between Total Elementary Enrollment (X-Axis) and Pupil-to-Teacher Ratio (Y-Axis) over time.



**Figure 9. Notional *FusionPortal* data was used to create a “heat map” showing the density of points (red indicates higher density). Blue and red points represent displaced populations and locations of hospitals respectively.**



When *Gather* reports and corresponding data are added to the portal and through subsequent use of the automated output from the ATIM, events gain context and perspective through visualization. Data and events can now be included in other analytical processes (such as related events) that might lead to enhanced planning and causality determinations. This ultimately helps decision-makers understand their overall effect on the environment and how to best achieve their goals. The *FusionPortal*/ATIM system illuminates the possibilities of fusing multi-source and dissimilar mission data sets. Incompatible data often renders HA/DR site data unusable or requires too much time to convert and effectively use and share.

If first responders and assessment teams were armed with FIST or a similar tool, disaster management decision-makers would be able to have access to data immediately wherever their location. They could know the conditions of landing zones, the status of power outages, the extent of fires, the ingress or egress of congestion, etc. FIST gives both the first responders and the decision-makers a single, common operational picture of what is happening on the ground. Most importantly perhaps, FIST provides a capability to the first responders to quickly begin planning for HA/DR operations from their own communication and command center, while in transit to the affected site, or from multiple command centers until an onsite centralized center can be established. These first vital few days could mean the difference in preventing undue loss of life.<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>239</sup> FIST reports submitted from smartphones collectors positioned in Manila, Philippines, during a US Pacific Command workshop called Pacific Endeavor, were sent through various communications channels back to the FusionPortal. At times when there was no connectivity, the FIST-enabled smartphone operator demonstrated the ability to store reports in place until a connection could be established at which point all collected reports were released.

FIST can also be an enabling tool to enhance disaster management and response activities. Its multi-mission capability and appeal for interagency and international partners promote the aggregation of shared information. This aggregated information provides the volume, type, and scope of information to enable effective analysis. The system can promote knowledge creation and sharing, support critical decisions, and provide a new capability aspect for irregular warfare and nation partner support.

## **Next Generation Smartphones**

The smartphone in its current form has had a profound effect on nearly every aspect of our life. They give us the ability to have near instant communications, conduct mobile finance, perform electronic shopping, maintain social networks, and assist with the myriad of tasks and functions that happen in everyday life. They are here to stay. Below are some examples of the types of smartphone technologies that lie ahead.

### **Computing Power**

As with the computer revolution, the processor power resident in smartphones is on the rise. Dual-core processor phones are rapidly becoming a standard feature and quad core processor phones are scheduled to be released for commercial use. Leveraging the full power of more than one onboard processor requires that software applications be developed to take advantage of *multi-thread processing*. If this task is done, the full advantage of the extra processors, and the additional computing power that this renders, can be fully exploited. For example, an onboard camera could be used to create 3-dimensional renderings of an object in the photo. This could be very useful in a HA/DR setting for triage and patient care to enable responding physicians to better plan, prepare, and treat patients. Similarly advanced smartphone processing power could better enable infrastructure surveys, facial recognition, real-time video feeds rectified to archived imagery, and so on. As with any technological development, advances are accompanied with new challenges such as heat dissipation and battery capacity.

### **Screen Resolution**

Current smartphone screens typically experience visibility degradation when viewed in full daylight. New technology is being explored that supports better and brighter screens. A revolutionary step forward may be the ability to project the screen imagery to another surface, rendering television or traditional projector displays obsolete. Future smartphones may very well have the capability to serve as projectors, allowing users the ability to view multimedia displays in HD, 3D, or perhaps even holographic formats.

### **Voice Recognition**

Speech recognition continues to advance through the efforts of governmental and commercial organizations such as Google and other software providers. Although speech recognition accuracy remains a challenge, the ever-increasing processing power of computers and

smartphones will eventually result in much more accurate and useable voice recognition. Another speech-related challenge is automated language translation—the ability for smartphones to recognize speech in one language and translate into another. In the 2010 Haiti earthquake, for example, Creole, French, and English were all being spoken simultaneously. It does not take much imagination to envision strategies where both voice recognition and automated language translation resident on the smartphone directly contribute to more efficient and effective HA/DR operations.

## **Form Factors**

Smartphones have evolved in a multitude of shapes and dimensions. An ideal size seems to be around a 3.7– to 4.3-inch screen display. Subject matter experts agree that smartphones will continue to trend thinner and lighter but will otherwise retain similar physical proportions to today’s smartphones. Apple’s 2012 iPhone5, for example, is 18% thinner (0.30 inch vs. 0.37 inch) than its predecessor, slightly taller, and 20% lighter -- weighing in at 3.95 ounces. Its display area boosted a whopping 14% from 3.5 to 4 inches.

Innovators are also likely to design new ways to incorporate multiple screens through flexible or fold-out technologies as users seek to maximize “display real estate.” Another potential development is the concept of a “wearable phone” such as the wristwatch phones recently released in Europe and Asia.<sup>240</sup> Future versions might be malleable enough to bend, shape, or roll up so as to fit into a bracelet or other wearable item. Infrared or light-based keyboards could become the norm someday. Down the road, users could expand or contract the size of their keyboards based on personal preferences or available desktop space.

## **Conclusion**

Emerging evidence suggests that science and technology will continue to propel advances in the military and international development spheres. Civilian-military coordination and cooperation are likely to benefit as a result. The authors began by describing the growing importance of technological developments and their use in stability operations, then introduced a framework for organizing new tools for peace, and ended by describing some promising technologies that use smartphones and other devices to collect, distribute, and use data. Close to five billion people have mobile phones today. One billion of these have smartphones.<sup>241</sup> These phones and their applications are increasingly important for improved civilian-military cooperation. As the number of smartphone users grows, costs will decrease. Data collection, information access, and information sharing will become easier than ever before. This is good news for those in the field

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<sup>240</sup> Ginny Mies, “Smartphones of the future: How they will look, what they will do,” *PC World*, August 13, 2011, [http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9219159/Smartphones\\_of\\_the\\_future\\_How\\_they\\_will\\_look\\_what\\_they\\_will\\_do](http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9219159/Smartphones_of_the_future_How_they_will_look_what_they_will_do).

<sup>241</sup> “Smartphone Users around the World – Statistics and Facts [Infographic],” Go-Gulf.com, accessed February 24, 2012, <http://www.go-gulf.com/blog/smartphone>.

of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and for those engaged in peace building and stability operations.

It is important to keep in mind that recent cognitive findings suggest that we have excessive and unjustified confidence in what we think we know, and that we are often unable to appreciate our understanding of even the simplest situations.<sup>242</sup> This assertion ought to humble those in disaster relief and stability operations but not impede innovation. It is also necessary to emphasize that science and technology is not the panacea as human intelligence remains vital for the success of all these peace tools. Smartphone technologies can facilitate the work of the decision-makers, but they cannot make decisions. Tools can augment the work of people, but there is no replacement for the power and intelligence of dedicated professionals.

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<sup>242</sup> Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2011.

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**SECTION V**  
**CONCLUSION**

## Chapter 20

### Integrating Strategic Realities into Strategy

*Franklin D. Kramer*

War is a gamble—as Clausewitz has written and others understood.<sup>243</sup> And of the types of war, irregular conflict—be it counterinsurgency, hybrid actions, stability operations, or some other form—seems even more of a gamble, less susceptible to certain outcome, more subject to forces not in control of the participants. The burden of the analysis in this book is that the high gambling nature of irregular conflict arises because of a multiplicity of factors that come together in a complex (or even chaotic) fashion to make environments unusually opaque and outcomes decidedly uncertain.

But the implicit suggestion in all the chapters—and the explicit one in this chapter—is that a greater understanding of the factors and a strategic approach designed to marshal the resources and shape of context in which those factors arise can change the nature of the gamble and improve the probabilities of success. In short, war *is* a gamble, but, as with all gambles, understanding the game improves the likelihood of a successful outcome.

#### **What Makes Irregular Conflict a Greater Gamble than Conventional Conflict?**

Although practitioners have a good sense of what adds to the irregular conflict gamble, it seems useful to sketch out the contrasts and especially the factors that make conventional conflict more susceptible to evaluation under current conditions than has been true for irregular conflicts.

Preliminarily, one can say that, in a conventional conflict, the predominant means of implementation will be the use of force; that there will be a focus on battles undergirded by such critical factors as logistics, intelligence, training and doctrine, and resources including the quality and quantity of armaments and forces; that allies and enemies are largely fixed; and that the enemy is a nation-state with its own organization and the prospect of finding a key center of gravity (or, at most, a few keys). Strategy can thus be designed around such considerations. None of this makes conventional war in the slightest bit easy or its outcomes predetermined. Among other key factors, the enemy gets a vote, and, as Clausewitz states, “In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry.”<sup>244</sup>

As difficult as it is, the contrast between conventional and irregular conflict is striking. To begin with, the role of force is entirely different. Violence is the dominating factor in conventional

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<sup>243</sup> Clausewitz, *On War* p. 96 (Howard & Paret ed.) (“Not Only Its Objective But Also Its Subjective Nature Makes War A Gamble”).

<sup>244</sup> *Id.* At p. 97.

conflict. In irregular conflict, persistent force still remains a critical factor, but at least as important are societal structures, culture, and the psychology of individuals and groups. Indeed, force may be withheld precisely because of these factors,<sup>245</sup> whereas that generally will not be a consideration in conventional conflict. The importance of societal, cultural, and psychological issues means that irregular conflict therefore requires an interplay not only of forces but also of politics, economics, and information and communications, adding to the complexity of the environment. Those issues are difficult enough in a country with a generally peaceful environment, but become even more difficult in an irregular conflict environment when the use of force is added to the mix. The addition of multiple considerations, such as governance, economics, and social factors, adds to the complexity with multiple players and potentially multiple centers of gravity. Moreover, almost by definition in an irregular conflict, many institutions and social arrangements are not operating effectively. Finally, in part because of the high degree of uncertainty, many groups engaged in the conflict have uncertain allegiances, and the environment is susceptible to significant change.

In short, irregular conflict generally presents a more complex situation than does conventional conflict. Of course, in any particular situation, the consequences and the risks of conventional conflict may be greater as compared to the consequences and risks of a particular irregular conflict. But the complexities of the latter are often going to be more significant. How to resolve those complexities is the burden of strategic analysis in irregular conflict.

### **Understanding the Gamble: The Sun Tzu Test**

Although the gamble inherent in irregular conflict cannot be eliminated, there are ways to improve the odds. In the *Art of War*, the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. . . . If ignorant of both your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.”<sup>246</sup> As the discussions in the preceding chapters suggest, there are reasons to believe that in many irregular conflicts, the United States has inadequate knowledge, though the categories for which knowledge is insufficient go beyond Sun Tzu’s conventional conflict focus on the “enemy” and “yourself.”

Indeed, analyzing the critical categories for irregular conflict from a United States perspective, one would come up with a starting list not of two (“enemy” and “self”) but of at least nine. Those would include: (1) the United States government effort both military and civilian; (2) the host nation in which the conflict is occurring, which will have (a) a governance structure of some sort and (b) societal arrangements and groupings including cultural, economic and individual; (3) the adversary group (or groups) who comprise the obvious enemy; (4) United States allies and partners, both military and civilian; (5) neighboring and other engaged countries (whose involvement will differ among different conflicts and some of whom may support the adversary groups); and (6) relatively independent outside entities that can include financial institutions,

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<sup>245</sup> “Combat operations must therefore be executed with an appropriate level of restraint to minimize or avoid injuring innocent people. . . . Needlessly harming innocents can turn the populace against the COIN effort.” Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, at p. 5-12.

<sup>246</sup> Sun Tzu, *Art of War* p. 84 (Griffith ed.).

businesses, and nongovernmental organizations (and whose involvement and orientation will also differ among different conflicts). It is probably also sensible to consider in this Information Age the “media” as a further seventh category and the populations of populations of the United States and other engaged or potentially engaged countries as an eighth. Finally, because so many irregular conflicts involve international organizations (often the United Nations but also other organizations, e.g., NATO, World Bank) or consensus approaches (e.g., Friends of Syria), the international aspect needs consideration as a ninth factor. Of course, each of these categories will have significant (and potentially differing) sub-categories so the breadth of understanding required, and the inherent degree of complexity, are very substantial.

Given the multitude of involved entities and forces in the irregular conflict arena, complexity in and of itself can become an obstacle to success. A fundamental question, then, is whether an approach to irregular conflict can be generated that would simplify strategic considerations. It is difficult to do everything well all the time. Prioritization is valuable. John Blaney makes this point, stating that “one of the most successful gambits when formulating strategies is to seek ways to make complex situations less complex. . . . [T]he winner wins by careful simplification of a complex problem.”<sup>247</sup> Of course, one would have to keep in mind what is sometimes called Einstein’s Principle, that “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler.”<sup>248</sup> But, the chapters in this book suggest that there are some considerations that are important to success in irregular conflict, yet are not sufficiently focused upon nor prioritized.

As a first approach, it seems fair to say that two entities that will, again by definition, be critical in irregular conflicts in which the United States is engaged are the host nation in its multiple manifestations and the United States itself as it operates in fact (as opposed to theory). The multiple chapters of this book suggest that our understanding of the cultures of the host nation and of ourselves as we engage in such conflicts is often insufficient and thereby contributes to the difficulty of results.

Culture as a critical factor comes up in almost all the chapters—and, to underscore the point, the cultural discussion is as much focused on the United States as it is on the host nation. As an example, Stacia George’s chapter clearly points out that this is not a one-sided issue. She notes, of course, that “many of the critical errors in complex operations can be linked to a lack of understanding of the dynamics of local culture and conversely, some great successes resulted from leveraging knowledge of local cultures.”<sup>249</sup> But she also underscores that “Making assumptions based on one’s own cultural predisposition . . . results in mistakes in judgment.”<sup>250</sup> Thus, if “one is encumbered by our own cultural baggage . . . our observations are not necessarily objective analytic assessments.”<sup>251</sup>

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<sup>247</sup> Blaney Chapter 2 *supra*.

<sup>248</sup> It is not clear whether this is an actual Einstein quote or a paraphrase.

<sup>249</sup> George Chapter 4 *supra*.

<sup>250</sup> *Id.*

<sup>251</sup> *Id.*

The two-sided need to understand culture as a prerequisite to successful irregular conflict results arises again and again. Ambassador Ronald Neumann notes that “too often foreigners proceed to study problems on their own and then present solutions without having taken the time to learn from their counterparts the local understanding of the full nature of a problem or the obstacles to solution.”<sup>252</sup> And he further and equally notes “cultural differences” within the United States government that “as I have seen repeatedly, hampers cooperation and unity of effort and leads to a thoroughly dysfunctional atmosphere.”<sup>253</sup> The point can be expanded. Michael Dziedzic notes the importance of understanding the role of illicit power structures in the host nation culture,<sup>254</sup> while Beth Cole discusses developing new structures within the United States government. Stuart Bowen discusses both the importance of changed attitude toward the rule of law by the host nation as well as actions outside interveners must take.<sup>255</sup> Ambassador Robert Beecroft underscores the importance of changing the culture of the U.S. Foreign Service professionals through revised education, training, and assignment practices.<sup>256</sup>

The requirements of cultural understanding can be expanded beyond the host nation and the United States—there are multiple other groups, noted above, that impact the outcome of irregular conflicts. But a good starting point—and a first rule of success in irregular conflict—will be understanding the cultures of both the host nation and that of the United States as is relevant to engagement in irregular conflict.

### **From Understanding to Strategy: Improving the Odds**

As discussed above, strategy proceeds from contextual understanding, and, therefore, at the end of the day, strategy has to be context specific. Just as one cannot hope to resolve the problem of disease generally, but must focus on specific cures and preventative measures that deal with the particular causes of particular diseases, so too one must deal with the specific context of an irregular conflict. Colombia is not Afghanistan, which is not Iraq, which is not El Salvador. But there are some general approaches that are important—to extend the disease analogy, cleanliness in hospitals is very important regardless of the disease being treated—and that often have not been satisfactorily addressed by the United States in the irregular conflicts in which it has engaged.

Those necessary general approaches to irregular conflict can be derived in a variety of fashions. In the *Art of War*, Sun Tzu proposes “five fundamental factors” of war, which he lists as: “moral influence,” “weather” and “natural forces;” “terrain,” “command,” and “doctrine.”<sup>257</sup> With only a little effort, one can update those factors to be relevant to a modern irregular conflict as follows:

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<sup>252</sup> Neumann Chapter 9 *supra*.

<sup>253</sup> *Id.*

<sup>254</sup> Dziedzic Chapter 5 *supra*.

<sup>255</sup> Bowen Chapter 6.

<sup>256</sup> Beecroft Chapter 15 *supra*.

<sup>257</sup> Sun Tzu *supra* note 246 at p. 63-65.



“**Natural forces**” analogizes to the environment in which the conflict plays out and especially the existing culture of the host nation and of the interveners. The importance of culture has been discussed above—both the host nation’s and the interveners’. With respect to the latter, which gets less explicit attention, it is important to recognize both how as an outside intervener one’s own culture may affect an objective view of the irregular conflict and, likewise, how the interveners’ culture may negatively affect the capacity to develop and implement strategy and thereby reduce effectiveness well below what analytically should be possible.

Further, it should be clear that the concept of culture discussed here is highly operational and includes most importantly the functional dynamics of a society and relevant institutions and entities. The interplay of factors is critical—but what is being sought ultimately are outcomes. Thus, culture is important because the interaction of groups and individuals will determine outcomes. This is politics in the largest sense—sometimes electoral and governmental politics and sometimes politics in a broader societal sense.

“**Moral**” analogizes to legitimacy of governance as well as undercutting factors, including corruption. The elements of legitimacy have received full lip-service, but much less actual focus, in the conduct of irregular conflict. As I have noted previously, “The real question becomes what the government must do to resolve the conflict when it is considered illegitimate by important stakeholders . . . . [T]his is a complicated endeavor because there likely will be disagreements as to what legitimacy means in the context of the conflict and how best to achieve it.”<sup>258</sup> But one matter that the analysis in the book makes clear is critical is corruption in the host nation governance system beyond that which fits the culture of the society.

“**Terrain**” analogizes to the multiple centers of gravity in the conflict—governmental and population, including illicit structures. The complexity of irregular conflict suggests that there will be multiple key focal points as opposed to conventional conflict where the tendency is to look for the single center of gravity. The analysis in the preceding chapters underscores the importance of considering illicit power structures as one of those key focal points.

“**Command**” analogizes to the importance of an adaptive strategy. The need for an overall strategy is well understood, but what is generally far less appreciated is the need for strategy to be adaptive. In one well known commentary on the *Art of War*, the author notes, “If wise, a commander is able to recognize changing circumstances and to act expeditiously.”<sup>259</sup> Clausewitz makes the same point even more clearly, stating that the “original political objectives can greatly alter during the course of the war and may finally change entirely since they are influenced by events and their probable consequences.”<sup>260</sup> John Blaney notes in his chapter the need to “be flexible as circumstances change—and they will.”<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>258</sup> Kramer, “Irregular Conflict and the Wicked Problem Dilemma,” in PRISM, vol. 2, no. 3, at p. 94 (2011).

<sup>259</sup> Sun Tzu, *supra* note 246, at 65.

<sup>260</sup> Clausewitz, *supra* note 243, at p. 104 (emphasis in original).

<sup>261</sup> Blaney Chapter 2 *supra*.

“**Doctrine**” analogizes to the requirement for a combined civil-military organization. When Sun Tzu discussed organization, it was in the context of the contending armies. Such organization is still important, but the modern and more difficult analogies would, first, be the need to generate an effective civil-military effort by the United States—a topic to which many of the chapters in the book are directed, and, second, the organization of the host nation itself—what institutions exist or can be built so as to operate in an effective fashion.

Taken together, one can conclude from the five factors above that a successful strategic approach in irregular conflict will involve a combination of the thoughtful use of military and civil operations and the task of effective institutional creation and operation. This combination of operational and structural is set forth in the first two chapters of the book. John Blaney describes the importance of an adaptive operational approach, seizing momentum in highly dynamic situations, avoiding linear thinking, and instead operating on multiple fronts and being willing to “push . . . without knowing precisely what will happen.”<sup>262</sup> Lisa Schirch adds in the element of the structural, clarifying that, if short-term results are to be maintained over time, institutions must be available to support them. Schirch is clear that institutions go beyond governments, stating that “effective approaches are more likely when governments and civil society can work together.”<sup>263</sup>

Blaney’s focus on nonlinearity and Schirch’s emphasis on structural development deserve full consideration. Each has depicted the complexity of irregular conflict, and, as noted above, in irregular conflict there are at least nine categories of relevant entities. With such a high degree of complexity, it is difficult to think that outcomes will be easily predictable or deterministic—and effective strategy needs to take account of that uncertainty. Looking at the problem as a whole, one can view the conflict as an evolving multi-factor system. In response, then, there is a need for a systems approach—an integrating strategy that can adaptively organize and implement different solutions over time in response to changing conditions.

Such a systemic approach will be enhanced by the judicious understanding of the importance of time and sequencing and prioritization. As prior CNA analysis has stated:

“Based on the realities on the ground, it almost always will be the case that a multiple time-frame approach is required. The very ambitious end state of legitimate, effective, and accountable host nation government is certainly an end goal. To realize that end state, however, intermediate goals are required that articulate a transitional process of moving forward over time. These intermediate goals should define what is “good enough” and “fair enough” at various stages in an ongoing process. The intermediate goals must clearly address the appropriate sequencing and prioritization of activities, and must nest within what is sustainable in terms of resourcing over the extended periods required for genuine reform and transformation.

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<sup>262</sup> Id.

<sup>263</sup> Schirch Chapter 3 *supra*.

“The skilled planner and practitioner must understand both the longer-term and shorter-term goals, the relationship between the two, and the actions necessary to achieve each over time. . . . Equally importantly, it may be critical to put one or another of the objectives as the most crucial for some period of time or for some particular place. Irregular conflicts are complex and dynamic, and they require a skilled and adaptive implementation to respond to that complexity.”<sup>264</sup>

The second rule for success in irregular conflict will be to undertake the effort with a systemic integrated strategy that (1) operationally, almost by definition, will need to be adaptive and to change over time, and (2) will seek to develop institutions that can integrate and perform as an effective host nation.

### **Meeting the Obstacles: Leveraging an Integrated United States Strategy**

As one considers the ways in which an integrated irregular conflict strategy should be established, an important consideration will be the availability of resources. William Rosenau highlights the limitations on the conduct of future irregular conflicts arising from a combination of the “precarious nature of the global economy, shrinking government budgets, and the public’s intervention fatigue.”<sup>265</sup> Limited resources are a further reason to focus and prioritize efforts in irregular conflict. The point has been underscored by the recent U.S. Department of Defense strategy, which states:

“In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. *However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.*”<sup>266</sup>

Two important points can be derived from these considerations. First, a strategy of high leveraging rather than one of mass is in order. Resources are scarce and that includes U.S. military forces that will be husbanded. There is no doubt that they can be increased in size if deemed sufficiently critical to national security, but that is not the plan for irregular conflicts in general. Second, non-military capabilities need to be enhanced so that greater effects can be achieved through other than the use of force.

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<sup>264</sup> Kramer, Dempsey, Gregoire, Megahan, and , Merrill, “Succeeding in Irregular Conflict: Effective Civil Operations” in *Civil Power in Irregular Conflict* at p. 7.

<sup>265</sup> Rosenau Chapter 8 *supra*.

<sup>266</sup> Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense, at p.5.

Those two points need to be combined with the two strategic conclusions set forth above—the need for better understanding the cultures both of the host nation and that of the United States and the requirement for a systemic integrated strategy focused on both operations and institutions. So a four point strategic effort would include (1) high leveraging activities within a (2) systemic integrated strategy based on (3) cultural, including political, understanding and (4) enhanced civil effects.

The recommendations in the book underscore leveraging activities that the United States can undertake within its own structures that would have significant value. In general terms, these involve making our people more competent through improved education and training, establishing integrated organizations, and using technology.

To be more specific, an important place to start is to improve the capacity of our civilian agencies by enhancing the education, training, and operational approaches of State and AID officers as recommended by Ambassador Neumann and Ambassador Beecroft. Neumann lays out multiple requirements, including more extensive training, integration between cultural and technical experts, and extended tour lengths. Beecroft likewise emphasizes the need for systemic training but also the requirement for professional education for civilian officers akin to the system used for military officers.

Training and education on one side of the civil-military effort is not enough. In the military, there would be great benefit from greater number of civil affairs officers in order to enhance the prospect of leveraging. John Agoglia takes the point made by Neumann and Beecroft a step further and calls for systematizing an interagency education and training process. Agoglia also underscores the need for a lessons learned approach, also on an interagency basis. Systemic lessons can be invaluable, but currently there is no good way to receive, evaluate, and disseminate such lessons, as Beth Cole points out.

Establishing integrated organizations is another theme of this book. It would be fair to say that this is not the first time that has been called for, and it would be unfair to suggest that there is no integration whatsoever. What is suggested, however, goes beyond the current approaches. Agoglia's emphasis on interagency lessons learned is complemented by Beth Cole's call for enhanced interagency assessment and planning. Melanne Civic focuses on integrating civilian and military surge capacity. Sherri Goodman and Nancy Nugent discuss the value of a unified civil-military command and decision-making structure. Stuart Bowen makes the same point in the context of anti-corruption activities. Each of these actions would significantly increase leveraging capabilities in a time of constrained resources.

A third area for significant leveraging possibilities is in the use of technology. Steven Gale and James Ehlert set forth how technology can make a significant difference, focusing on social media, geographic information systems, mobile phones, and information communication technology. Sherri Goodman and Nancy Nugent discuss the operational value of technology, including social media, in the field and as part of an effective communications strategy. Continued focus on technology, particularly when resources are limited, can have highly consequential benefits.

## Choosing the Right Objective: Understanding Limitations

In an irregular conflict, the United States will generally find itself in a situation where its host nation ally lacks legitimacy at least with respect to some part of the population—otherwise, almost by definition, there would not be a conflict. But from that general point forward, the host nation circumstances are likely quite different—and the United States will need to decide what is the objective of its intervention into the conflict. It certainly would be desirable if each irregular conflict ended successfully with a stable, democratic country with sound governmental institutions and good economic prospects for its people. However desirable, experience teaches that such a state is somewhat difficult to arrive at. Iraq and Afghanistan are current examples of less-than-perfect circumstances, but Bosnia, Libya, and Liberia, among others, also illustrate some of the difficulties.

It is, therefore, important to do as Clausewitz states and understand the objective: “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking . . . [W]ar is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political objective . . .”<sup>267</sup> This is critical even though, as noted above, the objective may change over time.

The objective, if it is to be achievable, has to be thought through with the contextual understanding discussed above as well as with a sense of the resources that will be utilized, including over what period of time. There are several factors that make a significant difference in undertaking that analysis. First, there is an important question of the starting point of the conflict. The United States has been engaged in several conflicts in which the initial objective involved termination of an existing government. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya are examples. That initial objective has generally been relatively promptly achieved, but, in each of these instances, the elimination of the government also led to the absence of governance structures. By contrast, in Colombia and El Salvador, the United States supported an existing government that had some functioning capabilities. This difference has proved important to outcomes.

Second, the level of development in the country prior to the onset of the conflict makes an important difference. A literate society used to reasonably effective governance will be easier to reconstitute than a far less-developed society. A country with limited legitimate institutions, high levels of corruption, and significant illicit structures will present substantial challenges.

Third, culture is a key factor. A country whose institutions and society are somewhat akin to those of the United States will generally be easier to work with than a country with which the United States has a far more limited understanding. No irregular conflict is a one-way effort, and the relationship between the interveners and the host nation is crucial. As noted above, it is important for the United States to seek to understand the culture of the host nation in which it is operating, but the need for understanding also runs in the opposite direction and is not

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<sup>267</sup> Clausewitz, *supra* note 243.

necessarily easily accomplished. Poor understanding of one another makes poor outcomes more likely.

Fourth, the nature of the leadership in the host country is significant. The relationship among multiple host nation leaders and their ability to agree on and implement common objectives will be important. In addition, the host nation leaders may have different objectives than the outside interveners, which would, of course, impact the outside interveners' ability to achieve their goals.

Fifth, the number and nature of important actors will affect outcomes. A conflict in which neighbors are important—perhaps for reasons of sanctuary or materiel support—may have complications different from a more purely internal conflict. Internally, it will make a difference if there are one or several opposition groups. It may also be important as to whether the country is relatively homogeneous or significantly divided.

In sum, it will be important in any irregular conflict to take account of the context in setting objectives. Given the complex nature of most such conflicts, a proper understanding of reasonably achievable objectives will provide the context for understanding whether and how the United States should pursue the conflict.

### **Conclusion: Strategic Realities**

War is a gamble and irregular conflict is a complex gamble. But irregular conflict does not have to be an impossible gamble. Victories may not always be clean, but strategic interests can be met if strategic realities are properly factored into the development and implementation of objectives.

The effort in this book is to ensure that policymakers understand and take into account such realities.

- The importance of understanding culture
- The factors in the host nation such as corruption and illicit power structures
- The criticality of integrated assessments, planning and operations
- The keys to leveraging, including the role of education and training, and technology
- The need for and the interplay of operational and structural efforts.

No book—and especially no book that emphasizes the importance of context—can provide a specific solution to a particular irregular conflict challenge. Yet, the lessons in the chapters of this book can be put into a structural, planning, and operational framework that can make the development of particular strategies more effective. The authors hope that it will be used in that fashion.

## Biographies of Authors

**Robert M. Beecroft** is a Career Minister-Counselor (retired) in the U.S. Foreign Service. He continues to serve part-time at the Department of State as a Supervisory Senior Inspector, with recent inspections in Viet Nam, Taiwan, Kuwait, Syria, and Washington, D.C. He recently conducted an in-depth report for the American Academy of Diplomacy on diplomatic professional education and training. In 2004-06, he was a Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College. In 2004-06, he was a Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College. In 2001-04, he served as Ambassador and head of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a staff of 800 people from thirty countries.

**Ambassador John Blaney** was instrumental in successfully negotiating the end of Liberia's 14-year civil war and creating strategies that transitioned Liberia to a democracy. Previously, he served 27 years in the U.S. State Department; as the President's Deputy Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, Charge d'Affaires in South Africa, Minister-Counselor in Moscow, an arms control negotiator and principal author of the US-USSR Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Agreement, and as Director for Southern Africa. Mr. Blaney also has been a financial economist at the U.S. Treasury, an officer in the U.S. Army, and recently, a Wall Street adviser to private firms.

**Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.**, is the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. His oversight work has produced over \$1.6 billion in financial benefits and 76 convictions. Previously, he served in the White House as Deputy Assistant to the President and Special Assistant to the President, as Deputy Counsel to the Governor of Texas, as a civil prosecutor, and as an Air Force intelligence officer.

**Rosa Brooks** is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, a Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, and the author of a weekly column for Foreign Policy. Her past experience includes senior positions at both the Defense Department and the State Department.

**Melanne Civic** is the Senior Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Advisor in the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Previously, she served in the World Bank Office of General Counsel and the World Health Organization; in NGOs including Amnesty International, the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Human Rights, and the Center for International Environmental Law; and was a Congressional Fellow to the late Senator Ted Kennedy. She is the founder and co-Chair of the American Society of International Law Transitional Justice and Rule of Law group, and a member of several Boards, including the ABA and Women in International Security.

**Michael Dzedzic** is a retired Air Force veteran whose scholarly positions have included Professor at the Air Force Academy, the National War College, and Georgetown University; Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Institute for National

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**James Ehlert, Jr.** is a civilian faculty member of the Information Sciences Department at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. Mr. Ehlert is designated a Technical Subject Matter Expert for the U.S. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats and he is currently focusing on leveraging mobile electronic devices in support of enhanced knowledge management. Mr. Ehlert is the former Director of the NPS Cryptologic Research Center responsible for promoting advanced level research in support of National Security Agency (NSA) requirements and to enhance the graduate education of military officers and NSA civilians. A graduate from the U.S. Naval Academy (Class of 1989) Mr. Ehlert served the early part of his military career as a Navy Surface Warfare Officer and the latter part of his service as a Navy Cryptologist.

**Vincent Foulk** is a senior advisor to the Inspector General for the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Mr. Foulk served for 6 years in Iraq with the Department of State as an advisor to Iraq's Law Enforcement community. Mr. Foulk is a retired Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves, having served in Civil Affairs assignments in Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia, Honduras, and Panama.

**Steven Gale** is Senior Advisor for Strategic Opportunities in the Office of Science and Technology at the U.S. Agency for International Development where he focuses on innovations to accelerate development and using futures analysis to inform decision-making on emerging global trends. Dr. Gale was a Brookings Legislative Fellow on the House Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations from 2009-2010. He served as USAID's Principal Advisor for Strategic Communications from 2005 to 2008 and Deputy to the Interagency Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) on Public Diplomacy from 2007-2008. Dr. Gale was formerly the Director for Afghanistan at the National Security Council (NSC) under Dr. Condoleezza Rice (2004-2005). Earlier in his career, he served as Chief of Evaluation at the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service. Dr. Gale was an National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Columbia University Post-Doctoral Fellow (1977-1979), earned his Ph.D. in Experimental Psychology from the Graduate School, City University of New York (1977), and graduated in 1969 from Hobart College.

**Stacia George** works in the field of conflict management and international development with specialties in post-conflict and transitional environments, stabilization and counterinsurgency programming, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. She presently works at Caerus Associates as a Director for Government Services and served with USAID for over ten years in conflict countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Colombia. She wrote this piece while serving as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow at Georgetown's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

**Sherri Goodman** is Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary of CNA, as well as Executive Director of CNA's Military Advisory Board. She served on the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel (2010) for which she chaired the subpanel on the



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**Sandra L. Hodgkinson** is Vice President and Chief of Staff at DRS Technologies. She was previously a career member of the Senior Executive Service, serving as: The Special Assistant (Chief of Staff) for Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn, III; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Detainee Affairs; and as a Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow at National Defense University. She also served at the U.S. State Department as the Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and the Senior Advisor on Human Rights for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, Iraq, and at the National Security Council as the Director for International Justice. She is currently a Commander in the U.S. Navy JAG Corps reserve.

**John Inns** is a Principal with the IPA Group. John lives and works out of Ottawa and Malone, New York. He is an MBA graduate from the University of Saskatchewan, spent 12 years in the Canadian government, was a partner at Deloitte's and has been consulting on his own for 25 years. Since the late 90s he has developed and delivered middle management and leadership training programs for hundreds of public and private sector clients across North America. This experience earned him assignments to design, develop and deliver programs for the Afghanistan public sector from 2007 to 2009.

**Franklin Kramer** is a national security and international affairs expert, and has multiple appointments, including as a Senior Fellow at CNA. Mr. Kramer has been a senior political appointee in two administrations, including as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for President Clinton, Secretary Perry and Secretary Cohen; and, previously, as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Among his recent activities, Kramer is the author of "Irregular Conflict, The Department of Defense, and International Security Reform" and "Irregular Conflict and the Wicked Problem Dilemma: Strategies of Imperfection," and is principal editor, and co-author of the policy chapter, of the book "Civil Power in Irregular Conflict." He is also the principal editor and has written several chapters for the book "Cyberpower and National Security," and is the author of "Cyber Security: An Integrated Governmental Strategy for Progress" and "Achieving International Cyber Stability."

**Karim Merchant** is a development advisor for the Afghan government, United Nations and International NGOs. He has lived and worked in Afghanistan for 12 years. He is the former Director of Operations for the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan and has served as an advisor to a variety of Afghan government ministries.

**Ronald E. Neumann**, now President of the American Academy of Diplomacy, he served as US ambassador to Algeria (1994-97), Bahrain (2001-04) and Afghanistan (2005-07). He served in Iraq (2004-05) and was a deputy assistant secretary of State in the Middle East bureau of the State Department. He is the author of *The Other War: Winning and Losing in Afghanistan* (Potomac) 2009.

**Nancy Nugent** has conducted research analysis over the last 13 years for the Center for Naval Analyses located in Alexandria, VA, where she has been the author and co-author of papers on interagency and international relations, homeland defense, the operational level of war, strategic communications, and media relations. She was the lead staffer for the subpanel on the Comprehensive Approach led by Sherri Goodman for the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel (2010).

**William Rosenau** is a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies, CNA, a federally funded research and development center in Alexandria, VA. Before joining CNA, he served in the RAND Corporation's International Security Policy department, and as chair of RAND's Insurgency Board; as a policy adviser to the coordinator for counterterrorism, US Department of State; and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict. He has also been an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program, Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

**Lisa Schirch** is Director of 3P Human Security at the Alliance for Peacebuilding and Research Professor of Peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University. She is the author of "Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process in Afghanistan" and regularly teaches governance and civil society to the U.S. government and military.